

The Truth About Soviet Lies



R. H. Shackford

"In the struggle against Communism the truth is one of the most effective and important weapons the free nations possess. That is why *The Truth About Soviet Lies* ought to be required reading for everyone interested in world affairs. The author attempts, in a very objective and interesting way, to set the Communist record straight by laying the facts on the line beside Soviet lies." — *Francis O. Wilcox, Dean, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.*

"R. H. Shackford, who for many years has keenly observed and cogently reported the struggle against international Communism, has written a highly revealing and useful book about the enormous distance between Soviet statements and the truth, between Soviet myth and reality. It is a startling flashlight photo of one of the Soviets' most frequently used weapons — the lie. It will assist toward a better understanding of why the United States Government, with the best of good will in the world, has not been able to reach agreement with the Soviet rulers." — *Andrew Berding, former Assistant Secretary of State.*

"Impotent indignation is the all too common reaction to Communist propaganda. *The Truth About Soviet Lies* is a factual documented analysis of the distortions and prevarications with which the Soviets have filled their official pronouncements. This book is the informed citizen's guide to an understanding of a mentality and a pattern of speaking which we can ignore only at our peril." — *Landrum Bolling, President, Earlham College.*

Author R. H. Shackford knows whereof he speaks. As foreign correspondent for the Scripps-Howard newspapers, he has covered Soviet affairs intensively since the end of World War II.

In the course of his work Mr. Shackford has observed the representatives of the Kremlin carry on their campaign of misrepresentation at practically all of the major postwar international conferences. In preparing this book he has drawn heavily upon both first-hand knowledge and documentary research.

A native of Westbrook, Maine, Mr. Shackford now resides in Chevy Chase, Maryland.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

\$4.50

the 1990s, the number of people in the UK who are employed in the public sector has increased by 1.5 million, from 2.5 million in 1980 to 4 million in 1995 (Department of Health 1996).

There is a growing emphasis on the need to improve the efficiency of the public sector, and to ensure that the public sector is able to deliver the services that are required by the public. This has led to a number of initiatives, including the introduction of competition, the restructuring of public services, and the introduction of new management practices. These initiatives have led to a number of changes in the way that public services are delivered, and have led to a number of improvements in the efficiency of the public sector.

One of the main reasons for the need to improve the efficiency of the public sector is the increasing pressure on public resources. The public sector is responsible for a large proportion of the country's expenditure, and this expenditure is increasing rapidly. This is due to a number of factors, including the increasing demand for public services, the increasing cost of public services, and the increasing pressure on public resources.

One of the main ways in which the public sector can improve its efficiency is by introducing competition. This can be done in a number of ways, including the introduction of competitive tendering, the introduction of public-private partnerships, and the introduction of new management practices. These initiatives can lead to a number of improvements in the efficiency of the public sector, including the reduction of costs, the improvement of service quality, and the improvement of the responsiveness of public services.

Another way in which the public sector can improve its efficiency is by restructuring public services. This can be done in a number of ways, including the consolidation of public services, the introduction of new management practices, and the introduction of new technologies. These initiatives can lead to a number of improvements in the efficiency of the public sector, including the reduction of costs, the improvement of service quality, and the improvement of the responsiveness of public services.

Finally, the public sector can improve its efficiency by introducing new management practices. This can be done in a number of ways, including the introduction of new management systems, the introduction of new management practices, and the introduction of new management personnel. These initiatives can lead to a number of improvements in the efficiency of the public sector, including the reduction of costs, the improvement of service quality, and the improvement of the responsiveness of public services.







THE TRUTH
ABOUT
SOVIET LIES



THE TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET LIES

By R. H. SHACKFORD

Foreign Correspondent, Scripps-Howard Newspapers

Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C.

TO KRISTIN, JOHN AND JAMES

Copyright, 1962, by Public Affairs Press
419 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Washington 3, D.C.

Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 62-17452

FOREWORD

Let Truth and Falsehood grapple:
Who ever knew Truth put to the worse
in a free and open encounter?

—MILTON, *Areopagitica*

That is the objective of this book: to let the lies of the Communists grapple with the truth. The reader can decide who is "put to the worse."

There is no attempt to answer every Communist lie, but enough variety in different subjects is included to provide the reader with guidance for coping with other lies.

To those who are inclined to say that the United States has not always been above reproach in its performance on the international stage, the answer is, "Quite true." Mere mention of the American-supported invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961, that ended in disaster is enough to prove that we are far from perfect. But in the long run of history the evidence is preponderant that American objectives generally have been defensible, however many shortcomings there have been in execution. Would that the same could be said about Soviet intentions.

A word of caution is in order for anyone seeking to examine and refute Communist lies. Often it is the half truth rather than the whole lie upon which the Soviets play most vigorously. They know, as Tennyson wrote, "that a lie which is all a lie may be met and fought with outright; but a lie which is part a truth is a harder matter to fight."

The Bolsheviks are in their 45th year of power in Russia. But diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are not yet 30 years old, having been established on November 16, 1933. The period of Soviet-American diplomatic relations coincides with my career as a reporter, most of those years devoted to travelling, reporting and writing about diplomacy and world affairs. I have listened to the Soviet lies in Washington and New York, at the United Nations and most of the major summit and foreign minister's conferences in London, Paris, Moscow and Berlin, in Latin America, the Middle East, Europe and the Indian subcontinent.

I have had the opportunity to observe the representatives of the

Kremlin—including Nikita Khrushchev in America and at the UN as well as at Paris—carry on their campaigns at practically all of the major postwar international conferences. It also has been my privilege to have had personal knowledge and contact with most of the American experts on Soviet affairs as well as with eight Secretaries of State.

In the pages of this book primary attention is devoted to Soviet lies of the past few years—particularly to the period from October, 1960, when the special meeting of 81 Communist Parties met in Moscow, through the early months of 1962. This period is especially important because it includes the crucial 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia in late 1961 and the new Communist Party program published in the summer of 1961. This period coincides with the beginning of the presidency of John F. Kennedy through the first months of his second year in the White House.

Over many years I have become deeply indebted to many people, both in and out of public office, for help in understanding Soviet affairs in general and the deception of Soviet propaganda specifically. However, the conclusions, judgments and evaluations in this book are wholly my own. (When references are appropriate they appear on the last page of each item).

I wish to acknowledge the help of M. B. Schnapper, Editor of Public Affairs Press, who suggested the development of this book out of a series of articles I wrote for the Scripps-Howard Newspapers.

Without the help, patience and good humor of my wife, Augusta, this book might not have been possible. Her substantive suggestions were matched by long hours of proofreading.

I am also thankful to both the United Press and the Scripps-Howard Newspapers for making it possible for me to travel widely (including trips to Russia) and to follow the course of history of Soviet-American relations, during the last twenty-five years.

R. H. SHACKFORD

Washington, D.C.

CONTENTS

Red Lies vs. The Truth, 1

Part One

RUSSIA AND THE WORLD

Peaceful Coexistence, 13. Respect For Treaties, 18. The West Started the Cold War, 26. The United States is a Warmonger, 31. U.S.S.R. Threatens No One, 34. Red Wars Are Just, 37. "But We Were Compelled . . .," 41. Hammer and Sickle—Emblem of Peace, 43. "Lies are Truth," 46. Right to Secede From Russia, 47. Russians Never Intervene, 56. "Intervention!—Who, Us?", 63. Revolutions Are Not Exportable, 72. There Are Three Worlds, 75.

Part Two

ALLIES AND ENEMIES

The Stalin-Hitler Pact, 81. Moscow Was Poland's Friend, 85. Russia Defeated Hitler, 86. The Kremlin is Scared of Germany, 89. Russia's Germans Are Unarmed, 91. Adenauer Follows in Hitler's Footsteps, 96. The West Violated Potsdam, 98.

Part Three

CRISIS IN GERMANY

"Let's 'Normalize' Germany," 105. U. S. Threatens Atomic War, 109. Americans Oppose German Settlement, 112. U. S. Created Berlin Crisis, 115. Communists Do Not Threaten Berlin, 118. Free Access to Berlin, 122. Refugees Fled Utopia, 124. "The Wall," 127.

Part Four

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Russia Helped Defeat Japan, 131. U. S. Denied Russia a Role in Japanese Peace Treaty, 133. "Don't Ask Us About Japanese Prisoners," 135.

Part Five

NUCLEAR TESTS AND DISARMAMENT

U. S. Is Atomic Blackmailer, 139. Who Favored a Nuclear Test Ban First?, 143. Russia Never Will Test First Again, 146. The H-Bomb—A Russian First, 149. U.S.S.R. Abides by International Law, 151. U.S.S.R. Favors Strict Inspection, 152. U. S. Blocks Disarmament, 157.

Part Six

COLONIALISM

Americans Are Imperialists, 165. Russian Liberators, 169. U.S. Plot For Bases, 172. Independence For All—Tomorrow!, 173.

Part Seven

INSIDE THE COMMUNIST WORLD

The Free Russian People, 179. The Well Informed Russians, 182. Genuine Democracy, 186. Free Choice in 1917, 188. "The Apple of Our Eye," 193. U. S. in Decay, 196. "We are Prosperous — We are Poor," 199. "Stop Spying on Us," 202. Soviet Science Leads the World, 207. "We Write as We Please," 212. Farmers Love Communism, 216. The U.S.S.R. Is Abolishing Taxes, 217.

Index, 220.

Red Lies vs. The Truth

The world is inundated day after day, month after month, and year after year with a torrent of words that flows from the Kremlin, from the rival Communist capital of Peking, and from all the ancillary capitals and organizations of those centers of Marxism. It matters not where a person is, whether it be in a village of India, an African jungle, an island of Indonesia, a Middle Eastern desert, in Tokyo, Rome, Paris, or San Francisco, or in that part of the world dominated by Communism, the "words" of Moscow and Peking are there. The words look and sound like those used by other men, but their meanings are as different as the opposite ends of the spectrum.

Never in the history of mankind have words been such an important part of the effort of a "system" to convert, pervert and subvert man, whether he already be a Communist, a sympathizer or just a potential victim. And in this era of advanced technology, this abuse and misuse of words, plus "perfection" of the lie to an extraordinary degree of effectiveness, is aided by means of communication which guarantee transmission to every corner of the world instantaneously and, if desired, continuously and without discrimination as to truth or falsity.

The Russians are the chief practitioners of this "art," a sort of Red witchcraft. They are also the chief respecters of its value and potency as an instrument of conquest. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. spends more money and uses more technical effort and skill to prevent the dissemination of truth and the ideas of others within its empire than, for example, the United States devotes to getting truth and its ideas through the Iron Curtain. The Soviet jamming of free world broadcasts to the Red Empire is, in itself, one of the most elaborate networks of transmitter stations in the world. Jamming is accomplished by transmitting noise on the other fellow's wave length.

At all levels of life the liar has great advantages, especially when the lie is propagated deliberately, systematically and with calculated designs. The truth seldom catches up, and persistent repetition of a lie without an equally determined effort to answer it is bound to find acceptance in part or in whole by many subjected to it. If it is worth such extraordinary efforts by the Communists to circulate their lies and to block the truth or dissemination of facts other than those

currently sanctioned by the Red hierarchs, it is certainly worth greater efforts on our side to learn the answers. Free men have no one to blame except themselves if they are unarmed or uninformed when confronted with Communist lies. It is not enough to dismiss them as "only lies." The truth is available.

The average free man is confused, often deceived, and frequently either bored or overwhelmed by the ceaseless repetition of Communist statements which he knows are untrue but the answers to which he has never taken the time nor made the effort to learn. The Kremlin counts on and profits by the political inertia and laziness of man in general.

Another Red objective is to keep the free world's experts on Soviet affairs guessing. They, too, are frequently stumped and bewildered by this battle of words in the Cold War. Even if there were Doctors of Philosophy in the "science" of Communist rhetoric and propaganda, they would have difficulty keeping abreast of all the facets and diabolical variations in the "line." Contradictions by the Communists themselves add to the confusion.

Free men have slipped into bad habits in coping with this ceaseless flow of words. Even their officials tend to dismiss Communist statements as "just propaganda" with little effort to set the record straight. So outrageous are some of the lies that men reared in a world based primarily on truth lose patience when forced to repeat and repeat the truth to refute lies that frequently are preposterous. The free world also answers Red lies and promises with the response that the non-Communist world's interest is in "deeds not words." This frequently allows the Communist falsehood or slander to stand unchallenged and leaves the impression that there is no relation between Communist words and Communist deeds. But what Communists say as well as what they do is calculated carefully, and both their words and deeds are closely correlated as vital parts of their strategy. Thus, knowledge of what they say in contrast to what they do or have done, or promise to do, and vice versa, is a vital part of the free world's counter-strategy.

This book is designed to help the intelligent layman evaluate the unceasing statements, speeches, informal remarks, editorials, broadcasts, diplomatic notes, letters, manifestoes, Party programs, "peace" plans, etc., which the Communists aim at the headlines of the free world press—a major outlet for the men of the Kremlin in their effort to confuse. Nikita Khrushchev frequently has dominated the front pages of the free world press for days and, sometimes, weeks on end.

The dictators of the totalitarian system are not, of course, naive enough to expect to win converts to Communism (potential card carrying members, that is), with their propaganda. It is aimed rather at dissemination of views that support Soviet foreign policy and persuade many non-Communists to see validity in that policy and only flaws in that of the Western world. The bitter campaign of slander against West Germany finds many minds with latent doubts about the Germans and a willingness to lean toward the Soviet "line" that a rearmed West Germany is a danger. The Soviets never mention, and their dupes seldom remember, the East Germans who were rearmed by Russia long before the West.¹

The reader will discover in subsequent chapters that one of the most valuable tools in understanding what the Russians are up to and in answering their lies is the historical record. Falsification of history and twisting it to fit current needs has become one of the most effective "arts" of the men in the Kremlin. No holds are barred in this continuous Red process of rewriting history. Admissible and praiseworthy are the lie, the half-truth (often more productive than total fabrication), distortion as well as falsification of historical facts, understatement as well as hyperbole, dissembling, duplicity, perfidy, denigration, hypocrisy and all the other instruments of Machiavellianism. The Communists make Machiavelli, the 16th century master of deceit and unscrupulousness, appear like an amateur. Demagoguery never has been practiced on such a vast scale. Even Adolf Hitler, whose Big Lie dominated the 1930's, did not come as close to attaining absolute falsehood.

The techniques are so varied that no sooner has a free man mastered the answer to one kind of Communist lie, contradiction or deception, than another is being used. Often this involves much more than a lie in the usual meaning of that word. For example, the Communists have their own rules for making judgments. They insist that the Soviet Union be judged by its Communist doctrines and promises, but that America be judged on the basis of its failure to achieve all of its promises or live up to the letter of its doctrines of democracy. The Communists scream "foul" when they are judged on their record, as this book will attempt to do.

Totalitarians have many advantages in such a struggle. They can continue lies for decades as they do: capitalists are warmongers; the Soviet Union is peaceful; Communism is more democratic than capitalism; etc. But there are other cases where they can change "truths" and "lies" with the times. Even the best indoctrinated

Communist is not immune from being trapped by sudden changes.

Political agility is a *sine qua non* of successful life in the Red world because today's Communist "truth" may be—probably will be—tomorrow's Communist "lie," and vice versa. The mightiest are not free of being victimized by such changes. The de-Stalinization campaign, climaxed in the fall of 1961 by the removal of Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum where for eight years it had shared a hero's honors with the embalmed body of Lenin, shows how precarious reputations can be in a totalitarian society, in death as well as in life.

For a generation Stalin's name was a synonym for truth, that is, Communist truth. He was the only true interpreter of Marx and Lenin. He could do no wrong, speak no falsehood. He was a demigod. While he was alive no one, certainly not Nikita Khrushchev, dared question his omniscience. But Khrushchev now is doing to Stalin what Stalin did to Trotsky; making his name feared among the Party faithful. Stalin made Trotskyism a high Communist crime. Only the oldest and once most powerful Bolsheviks such as V. M. Molotov, and, ironically, tiny Albania with the support of Red China, have dared to boast that they are Stalinists.

Less than ten years ago, on March 6, 1953, the great "truth" in the Soviet Union went like this: "Stalin's name is boundlessly dear to our party, to the Soviet people, and to the workers of the whole world . . . The immortal name of Stalin will live forever in the hearts of the Soviet people and of all progressive mankind." That was the statement issued the day after Stalin's death by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Today that quotation embodies the greatest of "lies" in the Soviet Union. "The immortal name of Stalin" is being expunged. Even the city of Stalin-grad, famous for the epic World War II battle where the tide was turned from defeat to victory against Nazi Germany, has been renamed Volgograd.

Nowhere in the history of Communism is there anything to match the transformation of Stalin from genius and loving father of all the Russians (and Communists everywhere in the world) into a murderer, sadist, megalomaniac and, most-damning for the Party faithful, an anti-Marxist-Leninist. Khrushchev's own words document the immensity of this switch:

What Khrushchev said about Stalin in 1949: "All the peoples of the Soviet Union . . . are observing a precious occasion, the 70th

birthday of our genius, leader and teacher, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin. Millions . . . turn to Comrade Stalin . . . *because he enriched Marxist-Leninist theory and raised it to a new and high level* . . . All the peoples of our country, with extraordinary warmth and filial love, call the great Stalin their dear father and genius teacher . . . Glory to our dear father . . . the genius leading the Party, the Soviet people, and the working people of the whole world, Comrade Stalin!"

What Khrushchev said about Stalin in 1961: Stalin's crimes included "gross distortion of Marxism-Leninism . . . flagrant flouting of Leninist principles of leadership . . . arbitrary action and abuse of power . . . brutal violence . . . cruel and massive repression . . . physical annihilation . . . thousands of people executed without trial or investigation . . . methods of terror and torture . . . death of innocent people . . . arrest and execution of 70 percent of the Party's Central Committee to the 17th Congress . . . vile provocations . . . odious falsifications . . . untold number of corpses."

Apply this sort of "reasoning"—black is white and white is black; or black is white today and black tomorrow; or black is white to one audience and black to another—to any subject and it will open the doors of understanding of the upside down world of Communist jargon. It is a constant juggling of what is "truth" and what is "lie."

George F. Kennan, one of America's most experienced diplomats and experts on Russia and Communism, warns that a major problem in dealing with the Communists is the gap between "the concept of truth that prevails in Moscow (not to mention Peking) as opposed to that which prevails in most other parts of the globe."

"We are all accustomed to hearing not only from the Communist propaganda machine but from the lips of senior Soviet statesmen propositions which are either so patently absurd or so flatly in contradiction to known facts that no child could believe them," Kennan wrote in a 1960 reply to Nikita Khrushchev's essay on "peaceful coexistence" in *Foreign Affairs*.

" . . . So long as the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continue to hold that truth is what is useful to the interests of the Party that people should believe, regardless of how preposterous or absurd this may be in the light of objective evidence—so long as they continue to deny the very existence of an objective reality and, accordingly, any obligation on their part to understand and respect it—even those people in other parts of the world who

might most earnestly wish for coexistence as Mr. Khrushchev has defined it^a will have to put restraints on their hopes and expectations."

Even the most sincere men frequently are booby-trapped by this Communist technique. Former President Eisenhower obtained headlines on February 16, 1962, reading: "Eisenhower Says Goal Of Khrushchev Is Peace." Eisenhower had told Columbia Broadcasting System interviewer Walter Cronkite: "I really think he very much wants peace in the world." This is a partial truth. Khrushchev undoubtedly wants to avoid major wars, hoping and expecting to obtain the fruits of war without fighting. But the damage of such unqualified statements about Khrushchev's desires is their failure to explain that the difference between Khrushchev's and Eisenhower's concepts of "peace" is very great. Peace, as non-Communists conceive it, is attainable in the mind of a Communist only when the entire world is Communist, and conflict at many levels is inevitable until that Utopia is reached. Khrushchev claims that the Red Army's slaughter of the Hungarian people was to promote "peace" because the Freedom Fighters were revolting against Moscow's domination. He also insists that the Communist guerilla war in South Viet Nam is in the interests of "peace" because any action to promote Communist domination or rule is, in his eyes, a move toward "peace." Thus, Khrushchev "very much wants peace in the world," but he wants it on his terms—and those terms are a contradiction of peace as we non-Communists understand that word. Genuine peace is an absence of conflict at all levels, not just the absence of global wars—and that concept is a contradiction of the fundamentals of Communist philosophy.

The Communists have no monopoly on the practice of lying. Few men always tell the *whole* truth. But seldom has a major government or system of society used it with such deliberateness as a calculated element of policy. This is easily understood if non-Communists remain perpetually alert to the role of the lie and deception as justifiable tactics in Communist dogma, or what the current leaders of world Communism call Marxism-Leninism.

Marxism is a theory of the mid-19th century that developed primarily as a result of the industrialization of semi-feudal societies in Europe. Karl Marx explained the history of human society solely in terms of the class struggle. It is an irreconcilable struggle, he claimed, between those classes of society which own the instruments of production (described by Marx as bourgeoisie) and those who have no property and only their labor to sell (described by Marx as the proletariat). Marx and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels, claimed

to have discovered "scientific laws" for the development of society. Those "laws" state that just as capitalism followed feudalism, so Socialism will replace capitalism, and, ultimately, the highest order of society—Communism, a classless society—will take the place of Socialism.

That part of Marxist dogma has not changed in the last 100 years. In an interview with a Socialist member of the Austrian parliament on January 2, 1962, Khrushchev reiterated that "the laws of the development of human society" discovered by Marx and Engels and put into practice in Russia by Lenin "possess a force similar to that of the laws of nature."

"With the same inevitability with which feudalism took the place of the slaveholding system and capitalism of the feudal system," he added, "Communism will take the place of capitalism. This will happen not because we want it, but because in comparison with all other social formations the Communist order guarantees the development of productive forces . . .

"Capitalism, which is founded on the exploitation of man by man, on the suppression of the majority by the minority, cannot hold its own in the historical competition with an order which has inscribed on its banner the salvation of all men from social inequality, from all forms of suppression and exploitation, and from the horrors of war, and which gives to the world peace, work, liberty, equality, fraternity and happiness of all peoples."

This is Marxist "truth": the inevitable and immutable trend of history. The Marxists have persuaded themselves that this "scientific" analysis of the future can not be changed, that all other theories are in error, and that, therefore, any action promoting this inevitable development of events is justifiable. Irrespective of the repetition and glorification of this doctrine in its purest form and the obeisance to it in the new Communist Party program, it nevertheless is debatable how much the current leaders in the Kremlin are true believers in it. It remains a valuable tool in Communist societies to keep the people satisfied with less-than-possible standards of living (for the sake of the cause) and remains the honey used to catch innocents abroad. It also does yeoman service in justifying much of the Communist propaganda program.

Charles E. Bohlen, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and the senior American government expert on Soviet and Communist affairs, believes one of the primary uses of Marxist doctrine or dogma in the contemporary Red world is related to the theme of this book—

the Communist lie: "Communist ideology derives from the assertion that Marxism represents a scientific analysis of the inevitable development of human society *coupled with a denial of the existence of any objective standard of morality or ethics.* Ideology thus constitutes a permanent dispensation under which its followers are relieved from the observance of any standard whatsoever of morality or ethics or fair play. It permits, *and indeed justifies,* any Communist to lie, deceive and operate with a disregard of human suffering without undue violence to their consciences as human beings. They believe they are operating in accordance with the iron laws of history and that all, and quite literally all, is permitted for the achievement of Communist aims."⁴

With that as a base, plus a totalitarian system which gives the governing regime control over much of its people's thoughts as well as activities, Communism presents a formidable challenge to the rest of the world which must operate on the basis of truth. It is a challenge not only to the leaders of the non-Communist world but to the ordinary people of that world if their leaders are to be understood in their efforts to cope with totalitarians.

The "simple" answer, and the one used by the current rash of extremists on the right, would be to refuse to negotiate or to have anything to do with the leaders of such a system. They would sever contact with the men in the Kremlin and set out in search of something they call "total victory." Such a policy could lead to disaster as quickly as the opposite gullible acceptance of everything the men in the Kremlin say and promise. But it is not an easy task for a nation like the United States, with an open and free society that allows citizens to campaign even for the impeachment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to deal with a society that starts with a lie; uses the lie in its day to day dealing with the rest of the world; and looks upon lies as legitimate and praiseworthy tactics. This places a far greater burden on free world leaders and their people to understand the Communist policy of deliberate falsehood.

President Kennedy returned from his conference with Nikita Khrushchev at Vienna in June, 1961, very conscious of the problem these Communist techniques present. Reporting on his talks with Khrushchev, the President solemnly told the American people:

"I will tell you now that it was a very sober two days . . . for the facts of the matter are that the Soviets and ourselves give wholly different meanings to the same words: war, peace, democracy and popular will. We have wholly different views of right and wrong, of

what is an internal affair and what is aggression. And above all, we have wholly different concepts of where the world is and where it is going."

But despite this, it remains necessary to negotiate whenever possible or advisable, even with men about whose duplicity we are well aware. The important factor is to be aware of their techniques and well schooled in the truth that counters their lies because, as the President said later, we cannot compete with them with their weapons of falsehood and deceit: "we cannot . . . tell different stories to different audiences, foreign, domestic, friendly and hostile."

1. See page 91 for the timetable and scope of East German rearmament.

2. Red China's Premier Chou En-lai placed a wreath at the mausoleum in Moscow where Stalin's body was on display at the opening of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party in mid-October, 1961. The message on the wreath read: "To the great Marxist-Leninist, Josef Stalin." Within days, in response to the clamor of a pro-Khrushchev Congress, the body was removed from the mausoleum and buried in an ordinary Kremlin grave, primarily because Stalin was denounced as a traitor to Marxim-Leninism!

3. This is explained in the next chapter on "peaceful coexistence". Khrushchev's article appeared in the October, 1959, issue of *Foreign Affairs*; Kennan's rebuttal was carried in the January, 1960, issue of the same quarterly.

4. Address before City Council Advisory Committee, El Paso, Texas, October 7, 1960.



Part One

RUSSIA AND THE WORLD



Peaceful Coexistence

THE LIE. *The only alternative to war is "peaceful coexistence." There is no other choice. This has always formed the basis of Soviet foreign policy. The world's two rival camps—the camp of Socialism (Communism)' and the camp of capitalism—can live-and-let-live together.* (The italicized words at the beginning of each subject are the author's simplification and generalization of the Soviet lie).

Communist dividends from this slogan are immeasurable. The Soviet leaders for years have played upon the phrase, "peaceful coexistence," in the manner of great composers working out variations on a simple theme.

According to the popular version of this concept, Communism and capitalism can respect each other's existence, collaborate and trade with each other, confine their struggle to peaceful competition, and let the people choose between the two systems.

Although this phrase was bandied about during the Lenin and Stalin eras, when expedient, it has become the keynote for Russian propagandists since Stalin's death and especially during the reign of Khrushchev. It is now a ritual of Kremlin diplomacy to claim that it is "the immutable basis of Soviet foreign policy."

"From its very inception the Soviet state proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of its foreign policy," Khrushchev wrote in a *Foreign Affairs* quarterly article in 1959. "It was no accident that the very first act of the Soviet power was The Decree on Peace . . ."

Khrushchev insists that the principles of "peaceful coexistence" were bequeathed to the U.S.S.R. by Lenin and that "over the span of more than 40 years the Soviet foreign policy has been consistent—it has always been, is and will continue to be a Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence."

"In our day there are only two ways: peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history," according to Khrushchev. ". . . In its simplest expression peaceful coexistence signifies the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues . . . an obligation on the part of all states to desist from violating each other's integrity and sovereignty in any form and under any pretext whatsoever . . . a renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries

with the object of altering their system of government or mode of life or for any other motives . . . political and economic relations between countries based on complete equality of the parties concerned, and on mutual benefit.”²

THE TRUTH. No more cruel hoax has been perpetrated upon the world by the Communists than the claim that they really mean what they say when they so define the “peaceful coexistence” slogan. It sounds so good, so reasonable, so fair, so sensible. Who could possibly be opposed to it? And Khrushchev answers, “only those who pursue war aims can reject the only correct way—peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.” This slogan poses a perpetual dilemma for the free world.

Free men, for example, think of the phrase “peaceful coexistence” as the embodiment of tolerance, especially tolerance for ideas. Most of us live and work in “peaceful coexistence” with people whose sense of values and philosophy of life, whose religious, educational and economic backgrounds, whose beliefs and disbeliefs are quite different from ours. The essence of a free society is that there is room for all kinds of ideas about everything, plus the freedom to choose among them—even the freedom to choose the most ridiculous ideas. The competition of ideas is the warp and woof of life in a free society.

Communists try to claim that is *their* interpretation of “peaceful coexistence.” But “peaceful coexistence” in that sense is contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. As envisioned by Communists, despite what they say, “peaceful coexistence” is a formula by which they hope to communize the world. It is a major weapon of the Cold War. There is no excuse for free men being bewitched by words because the Communist leaders themselves constantly expose the duplicity of their fine-sounding words about “peaceful coexistence” with more realistic words and by deeds.

There is, for example, considerable dispute inside the Communist camp over this phrase—Old Bolshevik V. M. Molotov, Red China’s Mao Tse-tung, and Albania’s Enver Hoxha claim that it is “pacifist” and therefore anti-Marxist. To try to pacify some of the ferment caused by discussion of this issue at the 22nd Party Congress, Khrushchev had his chief of agitation and propaganda (Agitprop), Leonid F. Ilyichev, reassure the Party militants at a special meeting on December 25, 1961. To those who thought Khrushchev was “soft,” he had this to say:

"It is necessary to lay special stress on the fact that peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems *has never meant and will never mean* the peaceful coexistence of differing ideologies—the Socialist (Communist) and capitalist. The relentless class struggle has always been waged and will continue in the sphere of ideology as the struggle for the minds and the hearts of the people."

The Chairman of the Soviet Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations explained it more crudely during a recent visit to England when he said: "We have declared and will declare again . . . that the peaceful coexistence of ideas is as nonsensical as fried snowballs." The "peaceful coexistence" slogan is built on a false premise—that there are "two camps" in the world, Communist and capitalist." On the contrary, there is a great variety of political, economic and social systems in the non-Communist world, and even the once monolithic "Communist camp" is now fragmented with Russian, Chinese, Yugoslav and Albanian varieties of Marxism-Leninism.

Capitalism, as the Communists portray it, just doesn't exist any more. Red propagandists sound as though there had been no change in the capitalist economic system since Charles Dickens wrote about it in the 19th century. In fact, the system that prevails in Russia is really state capitalism and bears more resemblance to 19th century capitalism than any non-Communist system elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, there is more socialism and welfare statism in the United States than some Americans like to admit.

In an historic address at the conference of Foreign Ministers of the American states at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on January 26, 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted:

"Whatever contribution Communism has appeared to make to industrial development comes only because it does what Marx charged 19th century capitalism with doing; that is, it grinds down the faces of the poorest and forces from their postponed consumption the capital necessary for arms and industry. Communism—once in power—has turned out to be the most effective and brutal means known to history for exploiting the working class."

Thus, to let the Communists define the world to make their "peaceful coexistence" slogan sound credible is to play their game. They would have us believe that the struggle is between Communism and capitalism—a capitalism that doesn't exist in any generic sense. The real struggle is between totalitarianism and freedom. If there are "two camps" they must be defined as a world of choice (the non-Communist world) and the world of coercion (the Communist world).

In spite of all evidence of the fraudulence of the "peaceful co-existence" slogan, the U.S.S.R. continues to reap propaganda successes with it primarily because the Communists have two different concepts of it for use at different times and with different audiences. One of these is that used on the unsuspecting, as quoted above from Khrushchev's article in *Foreign Affairs*. *This paints the kind of world non-Communists want.* The other is used in discussions with activists of the Communist Parties everywhere. *It describes the kind of world Communists want.* So certain are the Reds of their tactics of confusion that they are emboldened at times to give both versions in the same speech or document.

After paying lip service to the "sanitized" version of "peaceful coexistence," the 1960 Peace Manifesto of the 81 Communist Parties proceeded to outline how the other version could be used to destroy and bury capitalism:

"The line of peaceful coexistence is a line of mobilization of the masses, of development of *intensified action* against the enemies of peace [meaning any non-Communist]. Peaceful coexistence among states *does not mean . . . a rejection of class war.* Coexistence between states of differing social systems is a form of class struggle between Socialism (Communism) and capitalism.

"In the conditions of peaceful coexistence *favorable opportunities are created* for developing the class struggle in capitalist countries and the national liberation movement of peoples of colonial and dependent countries." In turn, the successes of the revolutionary class and national liberation struggle contribute to the consolidation of peaceful coexistence . . .

"Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems *does not mean reconciliation* between the Socialist and bourgeois ideologies. *On the contrary, it implies an intensification of the struggle* of the working class and of all Communist parties for the triumph of Socialist ideas."

When Khrushchev explained and elaborated on this document in January, 1961, in a speech subsequently published in *Kommunist*, the Bible of Communist doctrine, he came close to admitting that his slogan might better be called "peaceless coexistence":

"The consistent implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence strengthens the position of the world Socialist system, promotes the growth of its economic might, its international prestige and influence among the people's masses, and creates for it favorable foreign-political possibilities in peaceful competition with capitalism . . .

Peaceful coexistence helps to develop the forces of progress, the forces struggling for Socialism, and *in capitalist countries it facilitates the activities of Communist Parties . . .*"

One of the most recent official Soviet explanations of the meaning of "peaceful coexistence" is probably one of the most revealing. On January 17, 1962, in a major editorial entitled "Peaceful Coexistence—A Most Important Question of Our Times," *Pravda*, the official Communist Party newspaper, printed this paragraph in bold face type:

"Peaceful coexistence does not exclude, but presupposes revolutionary changes in society; it does not retard, but speeds up the world revolutionary process; it does not preserve the capitalist regimes, but promotes the decomposition and disintegration of imperialism."

It is, in short, a policy by which Khrushchev has said: "We will bury you." He doesn't plan a big military funeral. He prefers a quiet, simple ceremony if we will cooperate and stop resisting.

One of the best explanations of the coexistence trick appeared in the magazine *Commentary*, November 1961, in an article by Theodore Draper, author of a history of the U.S. Communist Party:

" . . . The slogan [peaceful coexistence] has always suffered from an inherent contradiction which the Soviets have never attempted to resolve. The operative word is 'coexistence,' not 'peaceful,' because coexistence today must be peaceful or not at all. But before two parties can agree to each other's coexistence, they must first be reconciled to each other's continued *existence*. And this is precisely what the Soviet leadership will not and cannot accept. Indeed, it professes to be certain that the 'complete triumph' of Communism is closer than ever before, and it makes no secret of its determination to accelerate the inevitable. At best, then, 'peaceful coexistence' means that the Soviets intend to put an end to rival social orders by peaceful means if possible and to coexist with them only as long as necessary. The slogan is, if anything, a description of the present, not a prescription for the future. This is a very different matter from what 'peaceful coexistence' seems to suggest, and the formula is effective from the way it permits the Soviets to have their cake and eat it too . . . " ¹

1. The Soviets use the word "Socialism" to describe the present status of Russia. Communism is something they claim they are building, to be achieved according to their latest estimates in Russia in 1980. The U.S.S.R. stands for the Union of Soviet *Socialist* Republics—not Communist Republics. But when they use the word "Socialism" they are talking about what we in the non-Communist world mean when we use the word "Communism." At appropriate places in the text the author

Respect For Treaties

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union and her Communist partners are the only peace-loving, law-abiding, treaty-respecting nations in the world. The bourgeois, capitalist nations make treaties to break them; the Soviet Union pursues a policy of strict and unflinching observance of treaties.*

No other nation in modern history has a longer record than the U.S.S.R. of invoking the sanctity of international law and treaties in words—and of breaking and disregarding them in deeds. Communist professions of respect for international law and the observance of treaties are part of the deceptive “peaceful coexistence” policy. During one of his frequent trips into the Russian countryside, Nikita Khrushchev stated:

“Not infrequently our opponents attempt to accuse the Soviet Union of not observing international treaties. This is not true. This can only be stated by people who consciously distort facts. The Soviet Union has always fulfilled and will continue sacredly to fulfill all its international obligations. We recognize profoundly that without the observation of norms of international law, without fulfilling obligations undertaken in relations between states, there cannot be trust and without trust there cannot be any peaceful coexistence.”

has parentbetically inserted Communism after the use of Socialism, so that the reader will not at any time think that “Socialism” in these contexts bears any relationship to the democratic socialist systems or parties of Western Europe.

2. Almost every chapter of this book deals with the claim that Soviet policy is based on these fine sounding principles.

3. See page 75 for the variety of “camps” in the world.

4. See pages 37 and 163 for Soviet policy on national liberation wars and colonialism.

5. The author has deliberately avoided inclusion of the controversy between Moscow and Peking over “peaceful coexistence.” The ramifications of that conflict alone are sufficient for a separate study. Suffice it to say that Mao Tse-tung has rejected Khrushchev’s version of “peaceful coexistence” as undesirable and unworkable, and Khrushchev rejects as too dangerous Red China’s desire to pursue a more activist policy in the expansion of Communism, especially in the underdeveloped world. The root problem is the ultimate division of authority within the Communist world between Moscow and Peking—who is to be the leader of the international movement? President Kennedy referred to this growing disunity in the Communist camp in his 1962 State of the Union message. Much material is available on this complex subject for the interested reader. *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, Roderick MacFarquhar (Praeger, Inc.) is comprehensive. *Problems of Com-*

Soviet textbooks also pay lip service to the standard legal principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (the sanctity of treaties), but there is always the additional comment that, of course, violation of treaties is normal behavior for capitalist states. S. Krylov, Professor of International Law at Moscow University, tells the lie this way: "The Soviet Union . . . from the very first days of its existence has accurately and loyally observed the international obligations which it has assumed. The scrupulous observance by the Soviet Union of the treaties and agreements which its representatives have signed is recognized even by those who are unfavorably disposed toward us."

THE TRUTH. The record of Soviet diplomacy is one of arbitrary and calculated violation of almost every important agreement and treaty signed by the Bolsheviks since they seized power in 1917. The gap between the claims and the actual practice of the Soviet Government is wide and simple to document. Contrary to statements by Khrushchev and Professor Krylov, the policy of the Soviet Union "from the very first days of its existence" has been to violate any treaty whenever expedient.

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This was the first international agreement signed by the Bolsheviks with Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany on March 3, 1918. It provided a separate peace settlement between Russia and Germany, and took Russia out of World War I in which she had been an ally of the Western powers. Yet later that same month, Lenin conceded that the treaty was a move to gain whatever protection was possible for the new Bolshevik state, with no inten-

munism, a bimonthly published by the U.S. Information Agency, Washington, prints current analyses and discussions of this fascinating subject. Two British quarterlies, *The China Quarterly* and *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* are scholarly publications offering excellent studies of this subject.

Invaluable analyses of problems posed for the United States by the Sino-Soviet dispute, "peaceful coexistence," Cold War, and most other issues discussed in this volume are contained in the series of reports written for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and published in one volume for the Committee in 1961 by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, under the title: *United States Foreign Policy A Compilation of Studies*. Especially pertinent for readers wishing to explore these problems in greater detail are these studies:

United States Foreign Policy—Asia, by Conlon Associates, Ltd.

Ideology and Foreign Affairs, by Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, by a Columbia-Harvard Research Group, Columbia University.

tion of abiding by its provisions. "Yes, of course we are violating the treaty," Lenin boasted in the same month it was signed. "We have already violated it 30 or 40 times."

On November 13, 1918, two days after Germany conceded defeat in World War I, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty null and void and accused the Kaiser's government of having "forced this outrageous peace treaty" upon the new Soviet regime "to weaken it and gradually to strangle it." The fact that it was Lenin and Trotsky who were eager to negotiate the treaty was forgotten.

The Soviets haven't changed since the days of Brest-Litovsk. As of January 1, 1962, a State Department survey disclosed over 50 violations of major treaties and agreements since 1917.² Lenin's attitude has typified Communist policy toward almost every treaty and agreement: observance when it is advantageous to the Communist cause and violation when it is not.

Here is more proof of Khrushchev's lie when he claims that the U.S.S.R. always has "sacredly" fulfilled its agreements:

The Kellogg-Briand Pact. Russia signed this treaty in 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and was the first major power to violate it. In October and November, 1929, Soviet troops, supported by gunboats and aircraft, invaded Manchuria and seized control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. When the other signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact urged a peaceful settlement, the Soviets insolently rejected the suggestion.

Litvinov Agreements. In return for U.S. diplomatic recognition Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov promised President Franklin D. Roosevelt that his government no longer would promote Communist propaganda or subversive activities in America. It was naive of the U.S. to expect the Bolsheviks to honor such a promise.³ Within 18 months, American Communists were in Moscow at a Comintern meeting, discussing ways of overthrowing the U.S. government. Litvinov imperiously dismissed the American complaint of violation of agreements with the lie that Moscow had no jurisdiction over the Comintern.

Treaty of Non-Aggression with Poland. Signed in 1932, extended in 1934 and reaffirmed in 1938, this treaty pledged the U.S.S.R. "to refrain from taking any aggressive action against or invading the territory of the other Party [Poland], separately or together with other powers." The Red Army invaded Poland on September 17, 1939.⁴

Treaties with Finland and the Baltic States. Peace treaties after

World War I and subsequent "non-aggression" treaties between the Soviet Union and these states did not deter the Soviets from military invasion in 1939 and 1940. They forcibly incorporated Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the U.S.S.R., and annexed large areas of Finland. Disregard for the most elementary rules of international behavior was typical of the attack on Finland. Thirty Red Army divisions invaded Finland on November 29, 1939, without a declaration of war.

When the League of Nations called attention to the Soviet violation of the League Covenant, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov replied: "The Soviet Union is not at war with Finland and does not threaten the Finnish people. The Soviet Union maintains peaceful relations with the Democratic Republic of Finland." (The Democratic Republic of Finland was the puppet regime that was brought into Finland from Russia by the Red Army. It was headed by former Comintern Secretary Otto Kuusinen, who today is one of the 11 full members of the Presidium, the old Politburo, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the real power behind the Soviet government).⁶ The U.S.S.R. was expelled from the League for its attack on Finland.

Treaties with Iran. Under the 1921 Treaty of Friendship and the 1927 Treaty of Non-Aggression, the Russians promised not to intervene in the internal affairs of Iran. By the terms of World War II agreements under which Soviet and Allied troops were stationed in the country the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw Red troops from Iran within six months after the end of the war. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. promoted a rebellion in the northern areas of Iran after the war and refused to let Iranian troops enter the area to quell it. The Red Army moved out only after long debate and denunciation of the Soviet Union by the United Nations. UN action was possible only because of the Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council meetings on the Iranian crisis.⁷

The continuing Soviet campaign of subversion in Iran is carried out through the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, whose Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh nearly put Iran in the Red camp in 1952. Typical of the incitement of the Iranian people to revolt against the Shah is this recent Khrushchev comment about the man with whom Russia still has a "Treaty of Friendship": "Whom does the Shah of Iran really fear? He does not fear us, but he fears his own people . . . A treaty cannot save a rotten throne from its own people."

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression. Signed in 1937, this treaty

pledged both the U.S.S.R. and China to respect each other's territorial integrity. In case either was attacked by a third party, they agreed "to refrain from taking any action or entering into any agreement which may be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the Parties subjected to aggression." China was at war with Japan and this treaty precluded Soviet action that would help Japan. Yet on April 13, 1941, when Stalin and Hitler were still collaborators, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan. This was a tremendous advantage to Japan. Theoretically relieving her of fear of a Soviet attack, it enabled Japan to concentrate on the war with China and to prepare for the forthcoming attack on Pearl Harbor.'

Treaties with Great Britain and France. In 1942 and 1944 the Soviet Union signed treaties of alliance and postwar collaboration with Britain and France. The signatories pledged each other immediate and unconditional support in case of an attack by Germany in the postwar period. The treaties were binding for 20 years and were part of the effort during the war to ease Soviet "fears" of a resurgent Germany after defeat. During the debate in 1954 over the formation of the West German Republic and its proposed inclusion in NATO, Russia tried to wreck western plans by threatening to abrogate the treaties with Britain and France. Failing to prevent ratification of the West German agreements by threats, the Soviet Union unilaterally annulled the alliances. If Khrushchev's "fear" of Germany is genuine, why did he repudiate treaties that were designed to protect Russia, as well as the West, from another German attack?

Declaration on Liberated Europe. At the Yalta Conference in 1945 the Soviet Union agreed with the United States and Britain to help the peoples of Eastern Europe after the war set up "democratic institutions of their own choice . . . to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population . . . (to establish) through free elections governments responsive to the will of the people." However, Soviet authorities, supported by the Red Army, installed Communist regimes in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania immediately and, subsequently, in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The western members of the Allied Control Councils were ignored and their protests spurned. Direct interference by Soviet authorities, including the use of Russian troops, guaranteed the desired results in the first "elections" in these countries.*

Atlantic Charter. In signing this document on January 1, 1942,

the U.S.S.R. promised to "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;" to oppose territorial changes "that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;" to respect the "right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Since 1939 the U.S.S.R. has gobbled up 264,200 square miles of land with about 25,000,000 people.⁹ It and the Chinese Communist Party have imposed Communist governments and systems on nearly 5,000,000 square miles of other land with close to a billion people.

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with China. In return for extensive concessions to the Soviet Union in the Far East, Stalin promised the Nationalist government of China in 1945 all possible moral, economic and military aid to help reestablish peace and tranquility. The Soviets, instead, immediately gave moral, economic and military aid to the Chinese Communists in their final successful effort to overthrow the Nationalist government.

Agreements on Korea. Under the terms of the 1943 Cairo Declaration and subsequent agreements, the U.S.S.R. promised to help create a unified, free and independent Korea after the war. Instead it created a Soviet-controlled regime in North Korea (the Soviet zone of occupation above the 38th parallel), supported that puppet regime's claim to jurisdiction over all of Korea, armed the North Korean Communists and encouraged them to attack the Republic of Korea in the south in 1950.

Lend-Lease Agreement. In return for \$11 billion worth of American supplies and equipment received during the war, the U.S.S.R. agreed to cooperate with the United States in fighting the war against Hitler and to exchange information. At the end of the fighting, unused lend-lease civilian goods were to be returned or paid for. Lack of cooperation and reciprocity during the war is documented in detail in *The Strange Alliance*, by General John R. Deane, head of the U.S. Lend-Lease Mission in Moscow. The Soviets continue to refuse to settle the lend-lease account even though, in 1951, the United States offered to close the books with a payment of \$800 million. The highest Soviet offer was \$300 million. As recently as 1958, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan took pointed offense during a visit to the United States when Douglas Dillon, then Undersecretary of State, rejected the Soviet demand for an agreement on increased trade and long-term credits as the "price" of a settlement of the Lend-Lease account. Ever since Dillon has been a "Cold War warrior" to Soviet propagandists.

Thus, in spite of Russian pretense of respect for international law and the sanctity of treaties, the record confirms statements by both of Khrushchev's predecessors.

Lenin: "In war never tie your hands with consideration of formality. It is ridiculous not to know the history of war, not to know that a treaty is the means of gaining strength . . . The history of war shows as clearly as clear can be that the signing of a treaty after defeat is a means of gaining strength."

Stalin: "A diplomat's words must have no relation to action—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood."

There is one outstanding current exception to this dismal record: the Austrian State Treaty. This is often and correctly cited as justification for continuing to talk, maintain contact and even negotiate with the Soviets, however hopeless the outlook may be. Viewed in its proper context, it is a good argument. It is as stupid to say that no agreements should ever be signed with the Soviets because of their bad record as it is to expect the Soviets to respect all agreements, or to respect them forever. If the Western powers had refused to continue what seemed like fruitless negotiations with the Russians over many years, Austria would still have the Red Army on its back.

When World War II ended, Austria was occupied by the four great powers in much the same manner as Germany. The country was divided into four zones of occupation and Vienna administered jointly by the four powers. Negotiations for an Austrian treaty coincided with those for a German settlement. Over a period of ten years, 379 meetings with the Russians were held on the Austrian treaty. For reasons still not entirely clear, the post-Stalin regime in the Kremlin decided in the spring of 1955 to sign a treaty and bring to an end the four power occupation of Austria. This was the only time the Soviets have withdrawn from a substantial position gained in the war.²⁰ The Austrian treaty was part of "The Spirit of Geneva" the new Soviet leaders were engendering, and apparently was the price they were willing to pay at that time to get a Summit Conference in the summer. It was a solid gain for the West, and for Austria which, although it had to agree to be neutral and to pay high reparations to Russia, regained its freedom and got rid of occupation forces.

The record of the past 40 years justifies caution about how long the Soviets will respect the Austrian treaty. If considered essential for the Communist cause, the Soviets would not hesitate to dishonor their Austrian agreements. The Austrians in recent months have become nervous because of the political pressure Russia has been putting on another neutral, Finland.¹ The existence of the Austrian treaty, however, with the United States, Britain and France also committed to its fulfillment, would make a gross Soviet violation a *causus belli*, something that is certain to give the men in the Kremlin reason to pause.

Thus, it is not necessarily futile, foolish or dangerous to negotiate or to sign treaties or agreements with the Soviets. The soundest ones are those not dependent upon Soviet good will and good intentions, or those, like the Austrian Treaty, where the incentive to honor it is great because a violation would be an act of war. Efforts to find agreements have to go on because someday the time and circumstances again may prompt the Kremlin leaders to make concessions such as they did by getting out of Austria. The free world must be ready to take advantage of such rare opportunities when they should happen to arise.

The kind of treaty to beware of is the one recently proposed by Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei Adzubei, editor of *Izvestia*, during his November, 1961, interview with President Kennedy. Adzubei hauled out the hoary and meaningless idea of signing "A Pact of Peace," presumably a modern-day version of the ill-fated Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of the 1920's. The President was too wise even to take note of the suggestion. If pressed to do so, he could merely insist that the Soviets start acknowledging that the United Nations Charter, if it were properly respected, is history's greatest "Pact of Peace."

1. What Khrushchev really means by "peaceful coexistence" is explained on page 13.

2. *Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations*; US Government Printing Office; 1961.

3. The Bolsheviks made and broke a similar promise in return for British recognition in 1924.

4. See page 85 for Stalin's collaboration with Hitler to destroy and carve up Poland.

5. See pages 63 and 53 for details of Soviet aggression against Finland and the Baltic states, and page 92 for Russia's 1961 squeeze on Finland.

6. The Soviet delegate was boycotting the UN again in 1950 when the Communists

The West Started the Cold War

THE LIE. *The United States and Great Britain declared Cold War on the Soviet Union immediately after World War II. Capitalist forces, "obsessed with hatred for Socialist and Communist ideas," concealed their hostile designs against the U.S.S.R. during the war. Once the war was over they unleashed a campaign of "utmost aggression" against their wartime Soviet ally.*

Every Soviet leader since the war, from Stalin through Khrushchev, has propagated this lie. It is the hard core of Khrushchev's argument in his self-manufactured crisis over Berlin. On this he has no disagreement with Stalin.

The Communist allegation that the Western powers started the Cold War almost always goes back to March, 1946, for "proof" with a distortion of Winston Churchill's prophetic speech at Fulton, Missouri, in that month. With President Truman sitting on the platform beside him, Churchill told a huge audience at Westminster College of the dangers to peace caused by Soviet postwar policies and appealed for a "fraternal association of English-speaking people" to protect freedom and liberty. The Churchill speech was the first major public admission in the Western world that the wartime alliance was

invaded South Korea. His absence made it possible for the Security Council to put the Korean military action under the UN flag.

7. See page 131 for the aftermath of this neutrality pact.

8. Walter Ulbricht, the hated Red boss of East Germany, has told with remarkable candor how the Red Army helped him install a Communist regime—what he calls an "antifascist, democratic regime" in East Germany. In an article written for *Pravda* and published in Moscow on December 30, 1961, Ulbricht wrote:

"In the hard struggle (to set up his regime) we were strongly supported by the officers of the Soviet Army. They not only mounted guard over these great transformations. By their aid and advice they contributed to the resolving of all difficult political, economic, cultural and organizational tasks. The protection and the aid of the Soviet Communists, who at that time wore military uniforms, was a concrete expression of the weakening of imperialism and the change in the balance of power in favor of Socialism (Communism)."

9. See page 43 for details of Soviet territorial annexations.

10. The U.S.S.R. gave up a military base at Porkkala, Finland, in 1956. It also gave up a base at Port Arthur in the Far East in 1955, as well as its preferential position in Manchuria, but the withdrawals in the Orient were in favor of Communist China.

11. See page 63 for the story of Soviet interference in the politics of neutral Finland in the fall of 1961.

in tatters and that hope for genuine postwar cooperation by the Soviet Union had been destroyed.

The Russians have never forgiven Churchill for telling the world the truth at that time. The first Khrushchev note which precipitated the Berlin crisis, on November 27, 1958, charged that the signal to start the Cold War against the Soviet Union was given by Churchill to "the opponents of the peaceful coexistence of states . . . in his notorious Fulton speech . . . The Soviet Government sincerely hoped that after the victorious war it would be quite possible . . . to continue the fruitful cooperation between the great powers that headed the anti-Hitlerite coalition on the basis of sober recognition of the situation created by the war . . . But the pronouncements of Winston Churchill and his associates . . . had the most regrettable consequences. Government agencies and armed forces joined into the heated ideological struggle . . . The world was split into antagonistic military alignments, competition began in the manufacture and stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons. War preparations were launched."

THE TRUTH. By deeds, Josef Stalin started the Cold War against the free world before the shooting of World War II ceased. By words, Stalin proclaimed the Cold War in a Moscow speech on February 9, 1946. This was a month before Churchill spoke at Fulton, and before peace negotiations had started. He cast aside all his wartime pretensions of friendship in this speech and declared Cold War on the grounds that:

- The wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the West was dictated only by expediency and should no longer be looked upon as evidence that cooperation with the west was lasting or could continue.

- Communist doctrine proclaimed that war was inevitable until all capitalist countries disappeared or were taken over by Communist parties.

- The new Soviet five-year-plan for trebling iron, steel and coal output and for doubling oil production was "to guarantee our country against any eventuality" and lay the basis for fighting the "inevitable" future war.

- The Soviet Union was not satisfied with its World War II victory or what it had acquired as a consequence in the way of real estate; the rest of the world must recognize that "the Soviet social order is a form

of society superior to any non-Soviet social order" and thus must be promoted around the world.¹

- World War II was provoked by the capitalists. It was caused by "the crises in the capitalist system." In the beginning it was only an imperialist war, a clash between "two hostile camps" of capitalism, Hitler versus the West.

- The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Hitler (done only after Hitler had invaded Russia) converted the struggle into "an anti-Fascist war, a liberating war" which Stalin then renamed "The Great Patriotic War."

The significance of Stalin's speech was not widely noted at the time. Part of the responsibility rests with Western governments which tended to soft pedal public criticism of Soviet postwar behavior in the hope that a satisfactory accommodation could be worked out.² On the contrary, Churchill's Fulton speech, a month later, is one of the best known documents of the immediate postwar period. Out of office, Churchill was freer to tell the unvarnished story of Soviet duplicity, and was rewarded with denunciation as a "warmonger" not only by the Russians but by his own people and much of the free world, including many Americans. The hard core of Churchill's prophetic message was:

"From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic an *iron curtain* has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe—Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia. [Since Churchill's address, Vienna, by the 1955 treaty, and Belgrade, by virtue of the Stalin-Tito break of 1948, have emerged from behind the iron curtain.]³ All these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow . . .

"These are most somber facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy. And we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains . . . I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable [as Stalin had just predicted], still more that it is imminent . . . I do not believe that Russia desires war. *What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and their doctrines.*"

Seldom had an enemy of freedom and democracy so openly laid his cards on the table as had Stalin. As the staunchest friend and

fighter for freedom and democracy, Churchill warned the free world just as frankly of the imminent dangers caused by the U.S.S.R. changing from a wartime "friend" to a declared postwar enemy. The struggle already was well advanced and continues to this day in even more intensified form.

Another year was to pass before the Western governments responded to the challenge, first with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to protect Greece and Turkey from the same fate that already had befallen Eastern Europe. However, there were some in high places, in addition to Churchill, who saw clearly what was in the offing as a result of Stalin's postwar activities. The first American Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, asked Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas his impression of Stalin's speech. Douglas described it as "The Declaration of World War III."

Behind the scenes of the American government an effort was being made to end the soft-peddling of the very serious postwar difficulties and differences with the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan, now the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia and in 1946 charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, appealed to Washington to start educating the public "to the realities" of relations with Russia and to begin development of greater "cohesion, firmness and vigor" in the Western world to cope with the Russian threat:

"It may . . . be argued that to reveal more information of our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations," Kennan told Washington in one of his dispatches. "I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have the courage to face, and the sooner the better."

Sixteen years later there is nothing sensational in Stalin's 1946 speech, Churchill's remarks at Fulton or Kennan's advice. Stalin's policies are the day-to-day fare of international life; few refuse to accept Churchill's somber picture of Soviet duplicity; Kennan's advice long since has been adopted. Only the Communists and their dupes accept the argument that the West started the Cold War.

But the Soviet leaders never cease to present the world with a distorted version of history in which the facts are quite frequently reversed, as in the case of the Cold War. Today Stalin is in disgrace. But his detractors—primarily Khrushchev—never have found anything disgraceful either about Stalin's postwar foreign policy and demolition of the wartime alliance, or his lies about who started the Cold War. With growing Russian strength, Khrushchev has ham-

mered away harder and harder at the "line" Stalin promulgated in February, 1946.

The Communists misuse the phrase Cold War, as they do "peaceful coexistence," to fit their own propaganda purposes. Cold War is alleged to be pursued by the U.S. for selfish national purposes. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's Punta del Este speech in January, 1962, set the record straight:

"... Let us think clearly about what the Cold War is and what it is not. The Communist world has dedicated itself to the indefinite expansion of what it calls its historically inevitable world revolution. *The Cold War is simply the effort of Communism to extend its power beyond the confines of the Communist bloc and the effort of free men to defend themselves against this systematic aggression.* The Cold War would have been unknown to us had the Soviet Union determined, at the end of World War II, to live in peace with other nations in accordance with its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations . . . The Cold War would end tomorrow if those who control the Communist movement would cease their aggressive acts, in all their many forms . . .

"But the Cold War is not a contest between the Soviet Union and the United States which the United States is pursuing for national ends. It is a struggle in the long story of freedom, between those who would destroy it and those who are determined to preserve it. If every nation were genuinely independent, and left alone to work out its relations with its neighbors by common agreement, the tensions between Washington and Moscow would vanish over night."

An appropriate postscript is an often forgotten event that happened more than a year after the Russians claim the West started the Cold War. This was the unprecedented "Marshall Plan" suggested at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, by Secretary of State George C. Marshall. The offer of massive American aid to help Europe rebuild and recover from a devastating war was open as well to the Soviet Union and her Eastern European satellites. Marshall promised billions in sorely needed U.S. dollars if the Europeans themselves would get together and plan a cooperative recovery program.

The late British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin reacted instantaneously to Marshall's proposal and on June 27 the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Soviet Russia met in Paris to frame a preliminary acceptance. The U.S.S.R.'s V. M. Molotov arrived with 91 advisors, but immediately torpedoed any hope that all of Europe could be united in this effort. He denounced Marshall's plan as an

"imperialist plot" to gain domination of Europe and walked out of the conference. Today, when Khrushchev accuses the United States of dividing the world, he conveniently forgets that as late as mid-1947 the chance of avoiding a divided Europe was still available.

The saddest aftermath of the Marshall Plan conference involved Czechoslovakia which, on July 7, announced that its government unanimously accepted the British-French proposal (made after Molotov walked out) that all Europeans cooperate in a recovery project. Three days later Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was forced by the Soviets to announce that his government was withdrawing its acceptance. It was less than a year later that the Communists staged a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, and the body of Masaryk, son of the "father" of Czechoslovakia, was found on the pavement under an open window of his apartment in the Foreign Ministry. Whether he was murdered by the Soviet secret police or driven to suicide is not known.

The United States is a Warmonger

THE LIE. *The United States is the world's chief warmonger, the leader in the arms race and the provoker of war. The Soviet Union demobilized after World War II but had to rearm later to keep up with American militarism.*

Such reversals of postwar realities crop up every time the Russians discuss military matters. It was the excuse given by the Soviet government for its 1961 violation of the moratorium on nuclear tests:

"The United States and its allies are spinning the flywheel of their military machine ever faster, fanning up the arms race to unprecedented scope, increasing the strength of armies, making the tension of the international situation red hot."

When Russia's Minister of Finance informed the Supreme Soviet of a 44 per cent increase in the military budget for 1962, he claimed the

1. Soviet wartime territorial acquisitions are listed on page 43.

2. Harry Truman had been President less than a year and was overwhelmed with domestic problems of demobilization as well as international problems of unprecedented scope. His Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, still thought a deal could be made with the Soviets and had returned from Moscow the previous December with a brief case full of more "agreements" with Uncle Joe.

3. The story of the Stalin-Tito break which freed Belgrade is told on page 59. Russia's decision to get out of Vienna is related on page 24.

increase was necessary because "the aggressive NATO bloc is feverishly building up its armed forces, improving weapons and openly threatening war."

Nikita Khrushchev, whose country has maintained the most formidable peacetime military establishment in the history of man, expresses constant concern that the United States is trying "to achieve supremacy in strength" over the Communist world. During the last year or so he insists that the U.S.S.R. is militarily superior to the U.S., although for purposes of argument at times he has been willing to concede military equality.

THE TRUTH. There is no denying that the United States is a great military power today. President Kennedy recently pointed out that the U.S. would not swap military positions with any country in the world. The key question, however, is who compelled whom to rearm? The facts on comparative military strength of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. year by year since the war make it clear that the adjective "militarist" should be applied to the Soviet Union.

There have been periods since World War II when the American military establishment has been almost non-existent, reduced at times to the kind of token forces the U.S. was in the habit of maintaining before the war. But during such times Josef Stalin used the same arguments as Khrushchev does now to accuse this country of "militarism." This always has been part of the reason given by Russian leaders for failure to provide more consumers' goods for their people—something they could do if so much production and effort were not devoted to building the power of the state, particularly military power.

Comparative military strengths are difficult to assess in this age of unbelievable weapons. Military manpower figures certainly do not tell the story. But they do show who is lying when Khrushchev claims that the Soviet Union demobilized after World War II and that the United States did not. He reported to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960: "The Soviet Union embarked on a considerable reduction of its armed forces after World War II in the hope that the Western powers would also be guided by the ideas of maintaining peace and friendship and strengthening the relations which developed among the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition."

Then he gave figures of Soviet military manpower strength before, during and after the war. Before taking Khrushchev's own choice of a yardstick, it must be stated that there have been many ups and downs in U.S. military manpower in the postwar period. Among other

things, the United States has had to fight a major war for the United Nations in Korea in 1950. One indisputable fact is that at the end of 1945 and in 1946 the United States dismantled pell-mell the greatest fighting force ever created up to that time, and, much to its later regret, over-night converted itself from a nation with the world's most powerful military establishment into a literally defenseless nation.

Here are the comparable U.S.S.R. and U.S. figures for men under arms:

YEAR	U.S.S.R.	U.S. ¹
1927	586,000	248,396
1937	1,433,000	311,808
1940	(Not available)	458,365
1941	4,207,000	1,801,101
1945	11,364,000	12,123,455
1946	(Not available)	3,030,088
1948	2,874,000	1,445,910
1950	(Not Available)	1,460,261 ²
1954	4,500,000	3,302,104 ²
1955	5,763,000	2,935,107
1960	3,623,000	2,476,455
1962	(Not available)	2,743,227 ⁴

1. U.S. figures as of June 30 of each year. 3. Korean War peak.

2. Korean War started.

4. New Kennedy goal.

Khrushchev announced with much fanfare to the Supreme Soviet in January, 1960, that he was cutting the Soviet armed forces—from 3,623,000 to 2,423,000 men. But in the summer of 1961, when President Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's new threat to Berlin by summoning fewer than 200,000 reservists to arms, Khrushchev said he was cancelling the cut he had announced 18 months earlier.

Khrushchev also tries to make a case out of comparative American and Soviet budget figures for his charge that the U.S. military program is many times larger than the U.S.S.R.'s. The U.S. military budget for fiscal year 1963, which starts June 30, 1962, is \$52.7 billion which includes \$2.9 billion for atomic energy and \$1.4 billion for foreign military aid. In 1962 it was \$51.2 billion. The Soviet military budget for calendar year 1962 is 13.4 billion rubles (\$14,874,000,000 at the official rate of exchange)—an increase from 9.3 billion rubles (\$10,-323,000,000) for 1961. On the basis of such figures the Soviets charge that the U.S. military program is more than three times that of the U.S.S.R. This, of course, is a false charge because the Soviet military

budget does not include many things in the American budget. In the U.S.S.R. all missile research and development is in the science budget; atomic energy is not in the military budget; military pay is insignificant compared with wages paid American soldiers; and the ruble at the official rate of exchange bears no resemblance to the real relationship between the purchasing value of the ruble and dollar.

Much noise emanated from the Kremlin in 1961 about the "militaristic" activities of President Kennedy who, shortly after becoming President and immediately after his "somber" conference with Khrushchev at Vienna in June, 1961, increased U.S. military expenditures and military manpower, the latter to build up conventional forces. The Soviets complain that the United States is "flooding" West Germany and West Berlin with troops and arms. This is a reference to bringing the five American divisions in Europe up to normal strength, increasing the West Berlin garrison by a few thousand.

U.S.S.R. Threatens No One

THE LIE. *American foreign policy is based on threats and intimidation of small, weak countries. The Soviet Union's foreign policy is built on friendly relations with all countries and threats to none.*

One of Nikita Khrushchev's favorite monologues goes like this:

"Capitalism established its rule with fire and sword, but Socialism (Communism) does not require war to spread its ideals . . . The peoples of our countries are deeply interested in genuine peace in the world. *They threaten nobody*, they conduct a constant struggle for peace and against war and war threats. War is alien to the very nature of the Socialist countries."

THE TRUTH. "The peoples" of the U.S.S.R.—if that is taken literally—do not threaten anybody.¹ But Khrushchev and his Kremlin associates more than make up for the unheard voices of the Russian people. Since the Soviet Union acquired international ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, Khrushchev has threatened with annihilation almost every non-Communist country in the world, especially those aligned with the United States, and even including the United States. Missile blackmail and attempted intimidation are a familiar part of Communist diplomacy, although Khrushchev claims that his missile rattling is designed only to "cool the ardor of the imperialist mad-

men . . . who walk around the fence of Socialist (Communist) countries like hungry wolves around a sheep pen."

One of Russia's most shocking threats was made to the Greek Ambassador to Moscow and repeated by Khrushchev to the world on August 11, 1961. It was an example of what Khrushchev really means when, on other occasions, he has talked piously about the "fair, humane methods of Soviet diplomacy." Khrushchev himself has boasted about the following exchange:

Khrushchev: "Mr. Ambassador, the sanest policy for Greece is to withdraw from NATO. Then in case war does break out, Greece would not suffer."

Greek Ambassador: "I trust that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union would never give the order to drop atomic bombs on the Acropolis and other historic monuments of Greece."

Khrushchev: "Mr. Ambassador, I should not like to be unpleasant, but you are deeply mistaken. Of course, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, I shall not issue orders that bombs be dropped on the Acropolis . . . But I should without wavering give my military men the order to come down on the military bases of the North Atlantic bloc located in Greece, and naturally *they will not spare the olive groves nor the Acropolis*, because bombs do not differentiate."

Later on the same day Khrushchev added this insolent postscript: "The Russians have a proverb: if one loses one's head, there is no use weeping over the coiffure. What's the use of monuments of antiquity if the people are dead?"

On the following day Greek Premier Constantine Caramanlis responded with words that the Marxist-trained mind of Khrushchev could not be expected to comprehend: "Premier Khrushchev might well destroy the Acropolis, but he cannot destroy the ideas symbolized by this holy rock which are mightier than missiles."

This was not the first time Khrushchev had tried to scare the Greeks without success. Four times before, in an effort to influence the 1961 elections and help the pro-Communist, anti-NATO parties, he threatened Greece with missiles. The pro-Western political parties won the election, but Soviet blustering continued. On December 23, Soviet Ambassador Mihail Sergev delivered another lecture to the Greek Foreign Minister, warning Greece against letting the United

States install "foreign nuclear weapons" on Greek soil. Insensitive to revulsion caused by Khrushchev's speech threatening the Acropolis, Sergev referred to the speech as an "appeal permeated with sentiments of friendship for the people of Greece!"

A complete compilation of similar Soviet threats is impossible, but a recent State Department survey listed 45 in recent years.²

During a conversation with Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani in Moscow in the summer of 1961, Khrushchev again disclosed his delight in making shocking remarks. Khrushchev's version of his talk with Fanfani, later broadcast, is as follows:

"We said that the Soviet people love and understand the nature, culture and art of Italy. I also remarked that we like Italian oranges, and they are indeed delicious. I asked Mr. Fanfani where American rockets are located in Italy. Mr. Fanfani replied that they are stationed precisely in orange groves.

"The Soviet people have no enmity for the Italian people. But that country has been drawn into the aggressive Atlantic bloc which threatens us with war . . . The laws of war are cruel. But if the aggressive circles of the United States and Adenauer engineer a clash between our peoples . . . then we shall have to strike at the NATO military bases wherever they are situated, even if they are in the orange groves. And then, not only the orange groves of Italy but also the people who created them and raised to a high level the culture and arts of Italy . . . may perish."

The Soviets frequently have reminded the British that one well-placed hydrogen bomb would eliminate their island, and Khrushchev has warned that Britons not killed in a nuclear attack "would be doomed to a slow death as a result of the contamination of the soil and atmosphere by radioactive fallout." The Communists concentrate their propaganda on the "unilateralists" in Britain, those who believe that Great Britain should give up nuclear weapons whether anyone else does or not. This is the group, sparked by the philosopher Lord Russell, whose slogan is "Better Red Than Dead."

In an interview with West German newspaper editors in 1959, Khrushchev's bomb rattling got very precise:

Khrushchev: "You probably have an idea how many nuclear bombs with a capacity of three to five million tons would have to be exploded over the territory of West Germany in order to put it out of action." [He now boasts about bombs of more than 100 million tons].

Editor G. Braune: "Eight hydrogen bombs."

Khrushchev: "Obviously not more. And what do you think, do we have eight hydrogen bombs?"

Braune: "Surely, even more."

Khrushchev: "And how many are needed for putting out of action other Western European countries? Obviously not more."

The effrontery of this kind of talk by the leader of one of the world's great powers, one who insists that he is "peace-loving," becomes apparent if the reader considers how inconceivable it would be for any free world leader to talk to ambassadors, visiting prime ministers, or just ordinary visitors in such a manner. It is this same man who accuses the United States of saber rattling, atomic blackmail and rule of the weak by diktat.

Red Wars Are Just

THE LIE. War is necessary to the capitalist systems. Communism's aim is the abolition of war. Agression is an integral part of the capitalist ideology of hatred of man; everlasting peace is woven into the Communist ideology of love of man.

This fantastic reversal of the positions in today's world goes back to Karl Marx's thesis that the cause of wars was the division of society into hostile classes; that once these antagonistic classes were abolished there would be no more wars; that Communism aimed at a one class society; that, therefore, Communism was the standard-bearer of perpetual peace.

Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev have hewn to this line without deviation and with modifications only to keep it up to date. Today's version has been set forth in great detail in the 1960 "Peace Manifesto" of 81 Communist parties, in the new 1961 program of the Soviet Communist Party, and further elaborated upon by Khrushchev in his marathon speeches. The following excerpts from those documents show how the Communists argue that they are against war and that all non-Communists are in favor of war:

1. See 179 for a discussion of how little the Soviet people have to say about the affairs of their country.

2. *Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations*. Prepared by the Department of State for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, 1961.

"The chief aim of its (Communist Party) foreign policy is to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination . . . Imperialism [a Red term for the U.S. policy these days] regards wars of aggression as a natural means of settling international issues . . . For the imperialist countries, diplomacy has been, and remains, a tool for imposing their will upon other nations and preparing war . . . Socialism (Communism) advances a new type of international relations based on the principle of peace . . . aggression and war are organically endemic to the imperialist powers and monopoly capital."

THE TRUTH. The Communist believes there are "just" and "unjust" wars and that any war that advances the cause of Communism is, of course, "just." Nikita Khrushchev recently refined the Red theory of the "just" war by outlining three kinds of wars: world war, local wars, and wars of national liberation. World war and local wars are to be avoided, if possible, but wars of national liberation are to be encouraged.

In the old days of Lenin it was assumed that it would take force to install Communist regimes in power. The modern-day modification of this is that in some cases peaceful revolution by subversion of parliaments and of non-Communist governments is possible. The 1948 take-over of Czechoslovakia was an example of this method. The guerilla war in South Viet Nam, directed, supplied and manned by Red North Viet Nam, is a classic example for the sixties. But the 1960 Manifesto conceded that submission without a struggle was unlikely:

"In conditions where the exploiting classes use violence against the people it is essential to keep another possibility in sight—the non-peaceful transition to Socialism (Communism). Leninism teaches, and *historical experience confirms*, that the ruling classes do not cede power voluntarily. The degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle in these conditions may depend not so much on the proletariat as on the strength of the resistance of the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the use of violence by these circles at one or other stage of the struggle for Socialism."

This kind of Communist talk makes sense only if the reader has learned that "exploiting classes," "ruling classes," "reactionary circles" and similar phrases mean "democratically-elected governments"; and that "the people," "overwhelming majority of the people," "the proletariat," etc., stand for the "Communist Party" or refer to "the militant minority in favor of Communism."

Few greater lies appear in Communist statements than the claim that Communism "does not require war to spread its ideals." The facts of history are that no people ever have freely chosen Communism as a way of life or government. Where it exists it was installed by force or, as in Czechoslovakia, because of the threat of force or betrayal from within by a minority Communist Party.

The clearest refutation of the above lie was made by Khrushchev in his January 6, 1961, speech to the chief Communist theoreticians in the Kremlin. This was the speech in which he outlined his attitude toward the three kinds of wars, world wars, local wars, and liberation wars, or "popular uprisings." His conclusion was that liberation wars and popular uprisings were "just wars." His comments on each are more than sufficient to expose the fact that war is endemic to Communism, a part of its grand strategy. Here are his views on various kinds of wars:

World Wars

"Communists are the most determined opponents of world wars. These wars are needed only by imperialists to seize the territories of others,¹ and to enslave and plunder other peoples . . . Of course, there also are among the imperialist countries acute contradictions and antagonisms, as well as the desire to profit at the expense of others who are weaker; yet imperialists now must keep an eye on the Soviet Union and the whole Socialist camp, and are afraid of starting wars among themselves. (Even so) the most probable wars are wars among capitalist and imperialist countries . . .

"Wars are chiefly prepared by imperialists against Socialist countries, and in the first place against the Soviet Union. We possess increasing possibilities for placing obstacles in the path of the war-mongers. Consequently, *we can forestall the outbreak of a world war.* Of course, as yet we are unable to completely exclude the possibility of wars, for the imperialist states exist. Imperialists can unleash a war, but they must think hard about the consequences. If the crazy Hitler had realized what a devastating rout was in store for his bloody gamble² and had seen that he would have to commit suicide, he would have thought twice before starting a war against the Soviet Union.

"The picture now is quite different: the Socialist camp, which represents a mighty force, now opposes the imperialist camp . . . The peoples, by mobilization of all their forces for active struggle against

the warmongering imperialists, can indisputably prevent war and thus insure peaceful coexistence."

Local Wars

"A lot is being said nowadays in the imperialist camp about local wars, and they are even making small-caliber atomic weapons for use in such wars. A special theory of local wars (limited warfare) has been concocted . . . Certain imperialist circles, fearing that world war might end in the complete collapse of capitalism, are putting their money on unleashing local wars . . . Opportunities for imperialists to unleash these wars, too, are becoming fewer and fewer. A small imperialist war, regardless of which imperialist begins it, may grow into a world thermonuclear rocket war. We must therefore combat both world wars and local wars.

[Khrushchev cited the Anglo-French-Israeli military intervention in Egypt in 1956 as an example of a local war which, he claimed, the Soviets stopped. He dismissed United Nations condemnation and demand for a cease-fire as unimportant. "The Soviet Union's stark warning (of nuclear missile attack) stopped the war," he said.]

"(But) local wars are not excluded in the future. Therefore, our task is to be always on guard . . . for prevention of aggressive wars."

National Liberation Wars

"The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest examples of such wars. Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. *Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable*, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily." The peoples can attain their freedom and independence only by struggle, *including armed struggle*.

"A liberation war of a people for its independence . . . is a *sacred war*. We recognize such wars, we help and will help the peoples striving for their independence (by such wars) . . .

"Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there be such uprisings? There can. But these are wars which are national uprisings. In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can.

"What is the attitude of the Marxist toward such uprisings? A most positive one. These uprisings must not be indented with

wars among states, with local wars, since in these uprisings the people are fighting for implementation of their right for self-determination, for independent social and national development. These are uprisings against rotten, reactionary regimes, against the colonizers.

"The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles."

But what happens when the people of Hungary "lose their patience and rise in arms" against the "rotten" regime imposed on them by the Soviet Union? Is that a "just war" or a "sacred war" of people striving for independence and self-determination? Certainly not! That is "counterrevolution" aimed at destroying Communism which, as all good Marxists have learned, is based on "the principle of peace." Wars between imperialist states are unjust, but wars between Communist states (as in Hungary) are "just" for Moscow and "unjust" for Budapest.

"But We Were Compelled . . ."

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union was "compelled" by enemies to:*

- *Build "The Wall" through the center of Berlin.*
- *Rearm after World War II.*
- *Break the American monopoly in atomic energy.*
- *Resume nuclear tests and break the moratorium.*
- *Stop its reduction in armed forces in 1961.*

"Compel" is a favorite verb in the Communist lexicon. Soviet spokesmen sometimes sound as though the U.S.S.R. never does anything on its own but is always "compelled" by the action of others to behave as it does.

The Communists claim: they did not want to build "The Wall" in Berlin but had to "protect" East Berliners from West German "militarists, revanchists, revenge-seekers and saboteurs"; the American "militarists" started the arms race and the Soviets had to keep up; the American atomic monopoly was a "threat to peace" and had to be broken; the United States would have started a thermonuclear

1. See page 43 for Soviet seizure of territory.

2. Soviet collaboration with Hitler is discussed on page 81.

3. See page 166 for the answer to this lie.

4. What the U.S.S.R. does when the people of its colonial empire want independence of Moscow is discussed on pages 47-52.

war if the Soviets had not resumed nuclear tests; President Kennedy's "provocative" measures in West Berlin required Soviet retaliation.

THE TRUTH. The non-Communist should be wary of any Soviet statement claiming that the U.S.S.R. was "compelled" to do something as a defense against action by others. When the Soviets are preparing or have finished some action which they know will offend the rest of the world, it is a favorite technique to blame their own behavior on others.

This makes it even more dangerous to take at face value their statements that they will "never be the first" to do something. For several years every Soviet statement on nuclear testing included the claim that the U.S.S.R. never would be the first to resume nuclear testing and break the voluntary moratorium.¹

Khrushchev's "compelled" justification for Soviet deeds frequently is coupled with the argument that the action taken was unanimously supported by the Soviet people and "correctly understood" by the "peoples" of other countries, irrespective of what other governments say and despite previous Soviet promises not to do so.

It is against this background that Khrushchev's statement to the 22nd Party Congress should be read. Everyone knows, he said, "that the Soviet Union will never be the first to embark on the road to unleashing war."

The Soviet Union was not "compelled" to do any of the things listed above under "The Lie". Here are the facts:

- "The Wall" in Berlin was built because Communism could not stand the glare of competition with free West Berlin and could no longer tolerate the flow of East German refugees, fleeing from the Communist Utopia. The evidence of Communist failure was too great.²

- It was the U.S. that was forced to rearm after World War II because the Soviets maintained the largest military force in peacetime history³ and started throwing their military weight around: the Czechoslovakian coup; the Berlin blockade; the Korean War; the new threats to Berlin.

- The Soviets could have shared the U.S. atomic monopoly on a basis of equality with all other nations had the U.S.S.R. not rejected the American offer in 1946 to internationalize atomic energy.⁴

- Soviet duplicity in the resumption of nuclear tests without warning and while a conference on a test ban treaty was in session, destroyed all pretense that the U.S.S.R. was concerned about this problem.⁵

• It was the Soviets, not President Kennedy, who created the dangerous and potential war situation in and around Berlin by demanding that the Western powers vacate West Berlin and leave the people of that city at the mercy of the Communists.* That was Khrushchev's answer to President Kennedy's Inaugural Address appeal to Russia to "begin anew the quest for peace."

Throughout this book the reader will find ample evidence of who compelled whom to take prudent steps of self-defense and who is trying to compel whom to surrender to Communism in the name of "peaceful coexistence."

Hammer and Sickle—Emblem of Peace

THE LIE. *The policy of conquest is alien to the Soviet Union. Peace is the essence of the Communist system.*

During the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev used the symbol of the Soviet Union, the hammer and sickle, as "proof" of this easily refutable lie. He recalled that shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power (Communists call it "The October Revolution") the first proposal for the national emblem was a sword.

"Vladimir Ilich Lenin sharply opposed this," Khrushchev reminisced. "What is that sword for?" Lenin asked. 'We need no conquests. The policy of conquests is quite alien to us . . . The sword is not our emblem.' So, the hammer and sickle became the emblem of our country, a symbol of peaceful and creative work."

THE TRUTH. The "policy of conquest" is far from alien to Russia. It has been the policy of the Kremlin for most of the last half century under the Bolsheviks and long before that under the Tsars. Conquests have been made by subversion, deceit and threats. But it has also been by the sword, brandished or used, rather than by the peaceful

1. See page 146 for a list of these statements.

2. For a fuller explanation of the real reason for "The Wall" see page 125.

3. See page 32 for details of who forced whom to rearm.

4. For story of Soviet refusal to cooperate in the beginning to take the atom bomb out of war see pages 139-142.

5. See page 146 for details of how man's hopes in this field were killed.

6. The genesis of the Berlin crisis is covered in pages 103-123.

symbol of the hammer and sickle, that the Soviets have conquered vast areas of land and large numbers of people. As a result of World War II, the territory of Soviet Russia was increased by 264,200 square miles, an area about the size of Texas. This does not include the Eastern European satellites, over which the Soviet Union maintains hegemony or the Asian areas over which Chinese Communism rules.

The record of the Soviet Union's policy of conquest speaks for itself:

Immediate Post-1917 Period

- The Bolsheviks recognized an independent Ukrainian nation in 1917 but at the same time set up a rival Red government in Kharkov. With the help of the Red Army in 1923, this government converted the Ukraine into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and incorporated it into the U.S.S.R.

- In April and December, 1920, the Red Army invaded Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus region. On February 11, 1921, the Red Army captured Tiflis, the capital of Georgia and birthplace of Josef Stalin. All three of these Caucasian nations, over-whelmingly non-Russian in population, were forcibly incorporated into the U.S.S.R. and in the mid-thirties were made constituent republics under the new Soviet constitution.

- The Red Army tried to do the same to Poland in 1921 but was defeated at the gates of Warsaw. The "peaceful" Soviets had to wait nearly 20 years before conquering and acquiring eastern Poland with the help of Adolf Hitler in 1939.¹

Conquests During World War II

- The Red Army attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, and by treaty the following March 12, forced the Finns to cede 13,170 square miles (including the city of Viborg, the Karelian Isthmus and the shores of the Lake of Lagoda) to the U.S.S.R.

- The Red Army invaded eastern Poland on September 17, 1939, after Hitler had invaded from the west on September 1 and destroyed the Polish army. Hitler and Stalin partitioned Poland twelve days later in accordance with a secret protocol of the Stalin-Hitler pact.² That protocol had stated: "In event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately

by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San." That gave approximately one-third of Poland to Russia.

- The Red Army occupied the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in June, 1940. The Stalin-Hitler pact placed all three in the Soviet sphere of influence."

- The Red Army seized the central Asian native state of Tannu Tuva, north of Outer Mongolia, in 1944 and placed it within the U.S.S.R. as an "Autonomous Region." It has an area of 64,000 square miles and a population of 65,000.

- The Red Army marched into the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina during the summer of 1940 after the Romanian government had accepted a Soviet ultimatum. In the secret Stalin-Hitler pact, Hitler had thrown these Romanian provinces to the Russian bear by declaring "complete political disinterestedness in these areas."

All of the above conquests, except Tannu Tuva, were accomplished during the early years of World War II before the Soviet Union was in the war and while Stalin was a collaborator with Hitler. Khrushchev never has criticized Stalin either for his deal with Hitler or for his treatment of the people he conquered with Hitler's help.

Acquisitions Resulting From World War II

- In 1945, the Soviet Union forced Czechoslovakia to cede by treaty 4,900 square miles and 731,000 people in the sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the easternmost tip of Czechoslovakia.

- At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union demanded the old Koenigsberg area of East Prussia, the northern half which bordered the Baltic Sea and included the cities of Koenigsberg, Insterburg and Tilsit. The Western powers agreed in principle, pending ratification by a German peace treaty, but the Soviets incorporated the 5,400 square miles and more than a million people into the U.S.S.R. as a special territory immediately after the Potsdam Conference.

- In addition to territory acquired from Finland after the Winter War of 1939-40, the Soviet Union used the Peace Treaty of 1947 to compel Finland to cede the Petsamo corridor to the Arctic Ocean and a sizable portion of the Kuolayarvi region to the U.S.S.R.

- Without waiting for a peace treaty, the Soviet Union established its frontier with post-war Poland along the old Curzon line in 1945 and annexed former Polish lands totalling 69,900 square miles and including 11,800,000 people. The land and people were divided among the con-

stituent Soviet republics of Byelorussia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, the latter getting the ancient Polish city of Lwow and its environs.

- As a price for entering the war against Japan, the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference demanded and was promised territorial concessions in the Far East.⁴ Among them were the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, north of Japan. The U.S.S.R. incorporated these areas immediately after the defeat of Japan, without waiting for the peace treaty which the Soviets later refused to sign although clinging to their booty.

“Lies are Truth”

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union must be constantly on guard because it is threatened from the West by revanchists, militarists, spies, diversionists and subversives.*

Khrushchev's speeches and diplomatic notes are filled with talk about the alleged peril in which the U.S.S.R. lives because of people he labels with those pet names.

- The “revanchists” in West Germany aim to “swallow up” Communist East Germany and “impose their will” on it.

- The “militarists” in the Pentagon and in Bonn are plotting a march on Moscow.

- Western “spies” are everywhere; even American tourists are “spies.”

- There are even dangers to the Soviet Union within the Red world. Communist Yugoslavia, Communist Albania and, by inference, Communist China are “diversionists.”

- And, of course, anyone in the world who has not adopted the gospel of Marxism-Leninism is a “subversive.”

THE TRUTH. Anyone in the world who is not a believer or dupe of the Communist line is tagged by Moscow with a derogatory label. A recent U.S. diplomatic note to the Soviet Government explained this chicanery:

1. See page 85 for the U.S.S.R.'s policy of “peace” toward Poland.

2. For Stalin-Hitler pact see page 81.

3. Regarding the fate of the Baltic states see page 35 et seq.

4. See page 131 for details as to how Russia just squeezed into that war before the Japanese surrender.

"In Soviet usage, a 'revanchist' seems to be anyone who believes in self-determination for the German people.

"A 'militarist' seems to be one who believes in defending his home against the threat created by the large forces in East Germany.

"A 'spy' would seem to be anyone who is curious about what goes on in the world.

"A 'diversionist' may be anyone who publicly opposes Soviet views as a correct policy . . .

"A 'subversive' appears to be anyone who favors freedom of speech, assembly and movement."

This United States note was sent to Moscow on September 8, 1961, in reply to one of the many from the Soviets threatening to convert West Berlin into a "free" city—free, that is, Communist style.

"The Soviet note gives a foretaste of what the 'freedom' of West Berlin would be like as a consequence of a 'peace treaty' with the East German regime," the U.S. note said. "Although the (Soviet) note asserts again that the 'free city of West Berlin, of course, will have the right to maintain unobstructed communication with the outside world', the inference is plain that the right would not be extended to anyone to whom the U.S.S.R. or the East German authorities may choose to deny it by labelling them as a revanchist, militarist, spy, diversionist or subversive (in accordance with the above Soviet usage of those words). The people of the world are by now sufficiently accustomed to the upside-down use of words in the Soviet lexicon not to be deceived by the effort to mislead them with such labels."

All of which is reminiscent of those slogans on the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: "WAR IS PEACE", "FREEDOM IS SLAVERY", "IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH".

Right to Secede From Russia

THE LIE. *The right of peoples to self-determination is sacred. Within the Soviet Union, the separate Soviet republics such as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. Nations remain in the Communist bloc of their own free will.*

The Bolsheviks have proclaimed this myth from the very earliest days of their power in Russia. The more evidence there is that these are false claims, the louder they are shouted. The right of secession

from the U.S.S.R. is, indeed, written into the 1936 Soviet constitution, as are the basic freedoms. But no constituent republic has tried to exercise that privilege. Its hollowness is obvious if one merely examines the history of how many of those republics, such as the Ukraine and the small ones in the Caucasus, were brought into the U.S.S.R. by military conquest.¹ Yet the new Communist Party Program adopted in 1961 again promised:

"The October Revolution [the Red designation for the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917] smashed the chains of national oppression; it proclaimed and put into effect the right of nations to self-determination, up to and including the right to secede . . . The Communist Parties [in any country] are independent, and they shape their policies with due regard to the specific conditions prevailing in their own countries . . . They coordinate their actions, consciously and *of their own free will* . . . The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, like the other Communist Parties, regards it as its international duty *to abide by the appraisals and conclusions which fraternal parties have reached jointly* . . ."

THE TRUTH. The Bolshevik regime in the U.S.S.R. was born with a lie on its lips. The birth cry, the first official action of the Soviet regime on the day it seized power, November 7, 1917, was what is called "The Decree on Peace." Few major Communist documents on international policies since then have failed to mention this decree or to cite it as evidence of the claim that the U.S.S.R. from birth has been the only major power in the world truly interested in peace.

The Decree on Peace was primarily a proposal that all the belligerents of World War I open negotiations at once for "a just and democratic peace," without annexations or indemnities. In view of what has transpired since then and because the Soviets continue to swear by this Decree on Peace, which was written by Lenin, it is important to examine how the Bolsheviks in 1917 defined "annexation." They say they still subscribe to this definition:

"By annexation or seizure of foreign territory the Government (of the U.S.S.R.) understands . . . the incorporation into a large or powerful state of a small or weak nationality, without the definitely, clearly, and voluntarily expressed consent and desire of this nationality, regardless of when this forcible incorporation took place, regardless also of the degree of development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed or forcibly retained within the frontiers of the given

State, and, finally, regardless of whether this nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.

"If any nation whatsoever is retained as part of a given State by force, if, despite its expressed desire (whether expressed in the press, in popular assemblies, in the decisions of political parties, or by rebellions and insurrections against national oppression), it has not the right of choosing freely the constitutional forms of its national existence—the troops of the annexing or, generally, the more powerful nation being completely withdrawn and without any pressure being brought to bear—then its incorporation is an annexation, that is, seizure and coercion."

No one has commented more appropriately on this unequivocal definition as related to Soviet deeds than the historian, diplomat and expert Sovietologist George F. Kennan who says:

"If the continuation of the Soviet domination of Hungary does not constitute 'annexation' within the terms of this definition, then I do not know what the words mean."

A U.S. delegate to the 1961 United Nations General Assembly, Jonathan B. Bingham, put it another way after a Soviet Union delegate had said "you know very well indeed that the Soviet Union does not have military bases *on foreign territory*."

"Just to take one example," Bingham replied, "it is a fact that there are currently in Hungary in the neighborhood of 50,000 Soviet troops. Now the statement (by the Soviet delegate) can lead us to one of two conclusions. Either the 50,000 Soviet troops are living and operating from hotels, guest houses, and country inns, or the Soviet Union does not consider Hungary a foreign territory. Let each draw his own conclusions."

The case of Hungary is the outstanding proof in the last decade of the meaninglessness of Soviet words, such as those in the Decree on Peace. Seldom has there been such a clearcut "expressed desire" of a people to be freed of foreign (Soviet) domination as in Hungary in 1956; and seldom has there been such brutal action by the dominator (the U.S.S.R.) to deny the people their desire. Furthermore, it is often forgotten today that the incidents which led up to the rebellion were not anti-Communist but were anti-Russian opposition to the Stalinist regimes that the U.S.S.R. had imposed on Hungary. In fact, the spark was a resolution of ten demands adapted by the Petofi Circle, an intellectual Communist group originally formed for literary discussions with strong political overtones and which included many university students. The major demand was to rid the country of

Matyas Rakosi, the old Stalinist Bolshevik who originated the phrase "salami tactics" (a thin slice at a time) as the way to impose Communism on a nation. The return of Imre Nagy, a nationalist Communist leaning to the theories of Yugoslavia's Tito, was demanded. Demonstrations started on October 23, 1956 and late that night the Hungarian Red police fired upon the demonstrators. Up to that point the demonstrators had been primarily intellectuals and students. But within hours they were joined by armed workers from factories and later by soldiers of the Hungarian Army leaving only a few thousand security police and Soviet soldiers fighting for the old regime. Before the revolution was suppressed it became anti-Communist as well as anti-Russian.

The tragic story of what happened in Hungary has been told many times: the great joy on October 24 with the appointment of Nagy as Prime Minister which seemed to signal the revolution's success, quickly followed by Soviet intervention and the kidnaping of Nagy, and the imposition of the Soviet puppet regime of Janos Kadar. Also forgotten in the confused aftermath is that Kadar originally was part of the new Nagy regime but deserted.

Soviet duplicity was the blow that destroyed the short-lived dreams of the revolution's success. On October 31 the Soviets announced plans to withdraw their military units from Budapest to avoid "further aggravation of the situation." On November 4 they reentered the city in great force and by wholesale massacre put down the people's rebellion against Soviet domination and Soviet Communism.

Nagy, finding personal refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, was given safe conduct assurances by Kadar who promised the Yugoslav Embassy that the new regime had no intention of punishing the man around whom so many of Hungary's hopes had revolved for a few days. But when Nagy left the Yugoslav Embassy he was kidnapped and ultimately executed. Also deceived was General Pal Maleter who was lured from Budapest to alleged negotiations about withdrawal of Soviet troops. He never was seen again.

Almost every aspect of the Hungarian revolution conformed to the rights the Bolshevik "Decree on Peace" proclaimed in 1917. The desire to be rid of oppression was expressed in the press, in popular assemblies, by political groups and, finally, by rebellion. By the Bolshevik's own definition, the U.S.S.R. is guilty of annexation of Hungary in 1956 by seizure and coercion.

This is the most dramatic recent example of the fact that when the Soviets talk about self-determination they mean it only for Asians

and Africans who are not within the Communist circle—yet. When they talk about the free will of the peoples or the right of peoples or nations to secede, it does not apply to those already within the Red network.

Usually this gets involved in Communist discussions of nationalism, an exercise in semantics that confuses all except those most thoroughly initiated in the dogma. First of all, an important basic element in Communist theory is that only when Communism is worldwide can there be peace and an end of strife. This is supposed to be brought about by the fact that Communism creates a one class society and thus does away with the cause of strife, class antagonism. And as Communism spreads among nations, antagonism between nations disappears. Thus, the Communists have many attitudes toward "nationalism." If they can use it in newly emerging countries to advantage, nationalism is good, but if it is used in such countries to resist the pressure of the Communist conspiracy, nationalism is bad.

The Communists are not embarrassed by their ambivalence on such subjects. In the new Communist Party Program, which promises real Communism in Russia by 1980, there are two different comments on nationalism:

Bad Nationalism. "Nationalism is the chief political and ideological weapon used by international reaction and the remnants of the domestic reactionary forces against the unity of the Socialist (Communist) countries. Nationalist sentiments and national narrow-mindedness do not disappear automatically with the establishment of the Socialist system. National prejudice and survivals of former national strife are a province in which resistance to social progress may be most protracted and stubborn, bitter and insidious. The Communists consider it their prime duty to educate working people in the spirit of internationalism, Socialist (Communist) patriotism and intolerance of all possible manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism. Nationalism is harmful to common interests of the Socialist community . . . Nationalism can gain the upper hand only where it is not consistently combatted." (In other words, once a country starts on the road to Socialism or Communism, nationalism must be wiped out because loyalty then must be to Moscow. The peoples of Eastern Europe have learned this the hard way. The new nations of Africa and Asia, so nationalistic today in the first blush of their independence, will ignore this side of the U.S.S.R.'s attitude toward nationalism at their own peril).

Good Nationalism. "In many countries, the liberation movement

of the peoples that have awakened proceeds under the flag of nationalism. *Marxist-Leninists draw a distinction between the nationalism of the oppressed nations and that of the oppressor nations.* The nationalism of an oppressed nation contains a general democratic element directed against oppression, and Communists support it because they consider it historically justified *at a given stage.* That element finds expression in the striving of the oppressed peoples to free themselves from imperialist oppression, to gain national independence and bring about a national renaissance . . . The Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their *national independence* . . . " (But once independence is won, nationalism is bad because it resists the efforts to make a country subservient to the international Communist cause. And once a nation is within the Communist orbit, either as a constituent republic of the U.S.S.R. or a satellite, its right to secede, as Hungary discovered, remains meaningless words in Soviet documents. Such a move becomes counterrevolutionary—the epithet used to describe the Hungarian revolt.)

Soviet Diplomacy is Humane

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union practices "fair and humane" diplomacy and respects the wishes and rights of all nations, large and small. The non-Communist world, on the other hand, is run by a ruthless financial-industrial oligarchy, and diktat is the rule of its diplomacy.*

The upside down Communist lie characteristically claims for itself the virtues of others and attributes to others its own evil practices.

The new Communist Party Program, adopted in 1961, contains a classical example of this technique. In the following excerpt from that program the United States and its allies are represented by the word "imperialism" and the Soviet Union and its satellites are represented by the word "Socialism":

"Imperialism knows no relations between states other than those of domination and subordination, of oppression of the weak by the strong. It bases international relations on diktat and intimidation, on

1. See page 44 for the early history of Bolshevik aggression and conquest.

2. George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, p. 35, Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1961.

violence and arbitrary rule. It regards wars of aggression as a natural means of settling international disputes. For the imperialist countries, diplomacy has been, and remains, a tool for imposing their will upon other nations and preparing wars.

"Socialism . . . advances a new type of international relations. The foreign policy of the Socialist countries, which is based on the principle of peace, the equality and self-determination of nations, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, as well as the *fair humane methods of Socialist diplomacy* are exerting a growing influence on the world situation."

THE TRUTH. A complete refutation of this lie would be encyclopedic.¹ The Western nations are not 100 per cent perfect and have not always practiced what they preach or lived up to their proclaimed ideals. But they generally have pursued in recent decades the kind of foreign policy the Soviets claim for themselves. Transgressions such as India's invasion of Goa, the British-French-Israeli action at Suez, and the U.S. support of the abortive attempt by Cuban rebels to overthrow Fidel Castro, have been exceptions to the rule rather than *the* rule. On the other hand, the facts are indisputable that Soviet foreign policy has been an exact replica of the kind the Kremlin attributes to the United States and its allies.

"Domination . . . oppression of the weak . . . diktat . . . intimidation . . . violence . . . arbitrary rule": these are the rules of Soviet foreign policy. Is more of a reminder necessary than instances such as recent Soviet pressure on Finland, the brutal massacre and suppression of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters, the construction of "The Wall" through the center of Berlin, the explosion of the 50 megaton terror bomb, the threat to destroy the ancient Acropolis in Athens, the proclaimed policy of holding 100 megaton bombs over the heads of the free world "like the sword of Damocles"? *

For the purposes of this discussion, let us take a too often forgotten example showing the true nature of this alleged "new type" of Soviet foreign policy.

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, tiny neighbors of the U.S.S.R., won their independence in 1918 at the end of World War I. They had been part of the old Tsarist Empire. The new Bolshevik regime in Russia, flushed with its successful seizure of power and hoping in the post war chaos to "plant its red banners over the entire world," invaded the three Baltic countries because, as *Izvestia*, the Soviet government newspaper, said, "these regions stand between Soviet Russia and

revolutionary Germany." Lenin expected Communists to seize power in Germany and was ready to help them. But there was no German revolution and the Red Army was forced by civil war at home to withdraw behind Russia frontiers.

The Soviet Union finally signed peace treaties with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1920 in which it promised:

- "Irrevocable" renunciation of all rights over the Latvian people and territory which formerly belonged to Russia.
- Unreserved recognition of Lithuania's independence, and abandonment of all sovereign rights, etc.
- Renunciation, "voluntarily and forever," of all Russian rights in Estonia.

The subsequent history of each of the three nations is almost identical. What happened to Lithuania, the largest and from the Russian point of view the most important of these tiny neighbors, was typical.

From 1920 until 1939 there was periodical renewal of a Soviet-Lithuanian non-aggression pact in which the "inviolability of the frontiers" was pledged and in which both parties agreed not to participate in any political agreements with third parties that would be directed against the other signatory. But on August 23, 1939, a secret protocol in the Stalin-Hitler pact placed Lithuania (as well as Latvia and Estonia) within the Soviet sphere of influence.* A month later the Soviets forced Lithuania to sign a Treaty of Mutual Assistance on the pretext of denying Great Britain a base of operations in the Baltic. The Russians obtained military bases, port installations and the right to maintain troops in Lithuania, in return for another Kremlin promise to "infringe in no way upon the sovereign rights" of Lithuania, "particularly in its economic system and political structure."

On October 31, 1939, Soviet Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov⁴ assured Lithuania and her two tiny neighbors they had nothing to fear: "We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies." Russia's "common enemies" then were Britain and France; her friend and ally was Hitler.

By spring of 1940 the Soviet Government began complaining to Lithuania of alleged kidnappings of Red Army men on Lithuanian territory. The Soviets rejected a Lithuanian suggestion that a mixed

commission investigate the incidents, and on June 14 the Lithuanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were summoned to Moscow and handed an ultimatum. It accused Lithuania of violating the mutual assistance pact with Russia and of preparing an attack on Soviet garrisons in Lithuania. It demanded that top Lithuanian officials be brought to trial, that a new government be formed, and that a large number of Soviet troops be stationed in the most important centers of the country as well as at bases. The time allowed for a Lithuanian reply was less than 24 hours.

Lithuania had no alternative but to acquiesce in Soviet interference in its internal affairs. The government resigned and the Red Army marched into the country. On June 17 a Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs "helped" create a new Lithuanian government."

Preparations for "elections" started immediately—again a process that has become a familiar pattern throughout Eastern Europe since the war. All civil guard organizations were disarmed. Government officials were dismissed in large numbers, branded "reactionary elements," and replaced with Soviet nominees. Political commissars were appointed to all army units. "Workers' committees" dominated by Communist cadres were set up in all industrial and commercial enterprises. Each electoral district was provided with a Russian "instructor." Voting was compulsory. Each voter had his identity card stamped as evidence that he was a "friend of the people." Soviet troops guarded the polling places. No opposition candidates were allowed. The voter could vote for the official list of candidates or leave his ballot blank. The latter was made impossibly dangerous because the chairman of each polling booth had the right to put the name of the voter on the back of his ballot paper—the Soviet idea of "free and secret" elections.

The results were Communist "victories" in all three Baltic states. The first action by the newly-"elected" National Assemblies was to declare their countries Soviet Socialist Republics. Then, without dissent, the Assemblies appealed to Moscow to be "admitted" to the Soviet Union. They were. When the Soviet Union is reminded today of these gross violations of international behavior, Khrushchev screams that the 1940 "elections" are proof of self-determination by the Baltic people. In its rebuttal to the remarks made by President Kennedy on November 25, 1961, to the editor of *Izvestia*, that newspaper had the gall to state that peoples such as the Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians had "made the first really free choice in their history, the choice of Socialism (Communism)."

It is all well and good for *Izvestia* to pretend to speak for the Baltic peoples. Moscow wouldn't dare let them speak for themselves, even if they were still there to speak. Their forcible incorporation into the U.S.S.R. was followed by complete Sovietization of each country, brutal liquidation of the "remnants of capitalism," and mass deportation of more than 700,000 persons to Siberia.

With appropriate variations to fit the case, this has been and remains the basic pattern of Soviet foreign policy wherever the U.S.S.R. has been able to bring its military pressure to bear. This is what Khrushchev calls "respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, as well as the fair, humane methods of Soviet diplomacy."

Khrushchev has accused Stalin of many internal crimes, but he has not called Stalin to account for his crimes against the peoples of the Baltic states.

Russians Never Intervene

THE LIE. *One of the principles of "peaceful coexistence" is non-interference in each other's internal affairs "for reasons of economic, political or ideological nature." This is a keystone of U.S.S.R. foreign policy in contrast to the intervention of the imperialists in the affairs of other nations.*

This is an old stand-by of the Kremlin's leaders. The major modification of it by Nikita Khrushchev is the claim that the Communist bloc of countries is so strong today, and balance of power has shifted so far in its favor, that the Western powers are desperately interfering to prevent the triumph of Communism.

1. See page 18 *et seq* for a list of major treaty violations.

2. The story of Russian pressure on Finland is told on page 35, the Hungarian tragedy on page 49; the threats to Greece and other countries on page 35; Soviet atomic blackmail on pages 34-37.

3. See details about Stalin's betrayal of the Baltic countries and Poland in the Stalin-Hitler pact.

4. The Soviets used the words "Commissar" and "Commissariat" until after World War II. They changed them to "Minister" and "Ministry" in an effort to appear, at least on paper, less blunt.

5. The same ultimatum procedure was followed on June 16 in Latvia and Estonia. It was in Latvia that the late Andrei Vyshinsky, who was to perform the same job at the end of World War II in Romania, got his first experience in "helping" to create pro-Soviet governments.

"Alarmed by the scale of the revolutionary struggle," Khrushchev told the 22nd Party Congress, "the imperialists continue their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of peoples and states. For this purpose they have assumed for themselves, in their military pacts and agreements, the right to armed intervention in the case of so-called 'internal disorders'; that is, the right to put down revolution, to put down demonstrations of the masses of the people against reactionary regimes."

By now the reader will be sufficiently knowledgeable about Communist jargon to realise that when Khrushchev talks about "revolutionary struggle" he is talking about efforts to stage a Communist take-over. And when he talks about non-Communist "rights to put down revolution" he means efforts to prevent a Communist coup d'etat.

A typical Khrushchev claim of "non-interference" was in the article he wrote for *Foreign Affairs* in October, 1959, during his tour of the United States: "We have always stood and we stand today for the non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. We have always abided, and we shall abide, by these positions."

Or, later at the 22nd Party Congress, there was this variation: "Among us Communists there are no adherents of capitalism. But this does not mean that we have interfered or plan to interfere in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism still exists."

THE TRUTH. Such statements are part of the "theory" of Communism but bear no relation to the "reality" of that movement. Whether it has been the Soviet Government, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the International Communist Movement represented at various times by such organizations as the Comintern or the Cominform, interference in the affairs of other countries has been the keystone of U.S.S.R. foreign policy.

It is not called interference. It is referred to as coming to the aid of peoples struggling against "reactionary regimes" or against colonialism. There can be no "interference" as such by the Soviet Union because the inevitable trend is toward Communism and anything the U.S.S.R. does is justified because it helps that trend. Anything the non-Communist powers do is obstructing that trend and therefore is labeled interference, such as aid to a government freely elected by the people which is under attack by forces fomented and aided by Moscow. Basic Soviet doctrine condones permanent intervention anywhere and

at any time that it is considered in the interests of the international cause of Communism.

The post-1917 history of the U.S.S.R. is primarily a history of efforts to extend the domain of Bolshevism and the influence and domination of the Soviet Union to all parts of the world. There have been critical periods inside the Soviet Union when such activity has been subordinated to internal crises, such as during the struggle for power in the Kremlin after Stalin died. But once the internal crisis was resolved, the emphasis returned to the greater and overriding global policies.¹

The following examples of blatant interference in the internal affairs of other countries in the post-World War II period are evidence that the Soviets usually mean and do the opposite of what they say:

• *Czechoslovakia.* The Communist subversion and take-over of this free, democratic country in February, 1948, is the major postwar example of Soviet success without using armies to cross frontiers. It is also another refutation of the Soviet claim of respect for treaties.²

During World War II the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia (represented by the free government-in-exile headed by Eduard Benes) signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Collaboration (December 12, 1943). Each promised to pursue, after re-establishment of peace, a policy of "non-intervention in internal affairs of the other state."

Immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union actively aided the Communist minority in Czechoslovakia. Soviet agents worked clandestinely in the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, disguised as Czechoslovak Communists, and finally provoked the February, 1948, government crisis. By that time not only the police forces of the country were dominated by Communists, but the Soviet-infiltrated Interior Ministry had armed the Communist-led factory guard groups. When the showdown came there were no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, but the Red Army surrounded four-fifths of the Czechoslovak frontiers, ready to march if necessary. Agents of the Kremlin participated in meetings and demonstrations. Soviet agents also were among the armed militia in the streets of Prague. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin, currently the U.S.S.R.'s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations, was at that time the principal Kremlin agent in Prague. It was Zorin who directed the Communist take-over and the creation of a totalitarian dictatorship under the late Klement Gottwald, whose body, like that of

Stalin's, was removed in 1961 from a place of honor in Prague as part of the anti-Stalin campaign.

• *Yugoslavia.* The Soviet doctrine of permanent intervention is not limited to the non-Communist world, and it hasn't always succeeded. Yugoslavia is the example of a Communist nation defying the high priests of international Communism in the Kremlin and getting away with it. Yugoslavia remains a Communist nation but pursues a brand of Communism of its own—an achievement the originators of the Hungarian revolt sought to imitate.

The secrecy that pervades the Communist world normally hides even the most routine matters from view. But the break between Josef Stalin and Marshal Tito in 1948 is an exception. The correspondence and exchange of insults that led to the break were published in the summer of 1948 after a Cominform communique announced the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.⁴

The Stalin-Tito correspondence exposes many of the techniques the U.S.S.R. uses in both Communist and non-Communist countries to penetrate and subvert existing regimes and make them subservient to the Kremlin. The Yugoslav charges against the Soviets included:

Espionage: The Soviet espionage agencies sought confidential information and tried to recruit Yugoslav citizens as Soviet agents. The Soviets didn't deny the charge explicitly but claimed they had a right to engage in such activities.

Economic pressure: Yugoslav resistance to Soviet efforts to gain control of the country was answered by Moscow with economic reprisals. The Soviets also withdrew their military advisors and instructors without advance notice, and subsequently all civilian personnel engaged in economic construction. The Soviets refused to sign another trade agreement.

Subversion: Soviet espionage agencies created dissension among Yugoslav Communists by trying to turn the masses and rank-and-file of the party against Tito.

While Stalin lived, the break with Tito was complete. Khrushchev has made several attempts to end the quarrel. But he cannot tolerate the degree of ideological independence the Yugoslavs insist upon. Red China considers Tito international Communism's No. 1 renegade or, as the Red jargon puts it, a "revisionist" of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung, in the eyes of Tito, is an extreme Stalinist or dogmatist.

• *The Congo.* The chaos which followed the independence of this former Belgian colony in July, 1960, was made to order for Soviet exploitation, and the Kremlin was quick to take advantage of it. In total disregard of the United Nations' efforts to prevent a civil war, Nikita Khrushchev, within two weeks of Congo independence, announced his intention "not (to) shrink from resolute measures" in opposing "western aggression" in the Congo. The threat of Soviet intervention was repeated again during UN Security Council debates and in August, 1960, the threat was carried out. The U.S.S.R. started moving substantial quantities of personnel, aircraft and trucks into the Congo. The Soviets claimed it was in response to UN requests, but in fact it was done outside of UN control and was delivered to Congolese supposedly sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

This situation prevailed until Patrice Lumumba was ousted as Prime Minister in September. President Kasavubu severed diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and threw out of the country all the Soviet "technicians." Subsequently the Soviet Union has done everything within its power to frustrate the almost impossible job the UN assumed in the Congo, including the launching of an unprecedented personal attack on the late UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld who played a major role in frustrating Soviet efforts to exploit an unstable situation.

Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of a nation is not always subtle or behind the scenes. Soviet officials visiting foreign countries have not hesitated to make insulting statements which have provoked criticism by the hosts of such boorish behavior.

While on a state visit to neutral Austria in the summer of 1960, Khrushchev repeatedly ridiculed the capitalist system, urged exacerbation of Italian-Austrian disputes, insulted the United States and West Germany in the presence of Austrian officials, and criticized Austria's membership in the European Free Trade Association, the Outer Seven. Khrushchev posed not only as the sole protector of Austria's neutrality but as the only judge of whether Austria was remaining neutral. American and German protests led to a public repudiation of Khrushchev's remarks by the Austrian Chancellor. The Austrian press criticized the Soviet leader for seeking to strain Austria's relations with other countries and of having used during his visit language which "up to now had been restricted to the vocabulary of the Chinese Communists."

In the same summer of 1960, Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan was using the same crude tactics during an official visit to Norway, a mem-

ber of NATO. Mikoyan's public attacks on NATO, threats to Norway if it remained in NATO, and efforts to set Norwegian citizens against their government led to this typical press comment: "In Norway we find it painful to accept the use of our hospitality to direct attacks against other countries which are our good friends."

During a visit to India, in February 1960, Khrushchev bitterly attacked the motives behind foreign aid from the West and suggested that the Indians didn't seem to be aware that they were being exploited by the "capitalists." The *Madras Mail* reacted typically: "It is unfortunate that distinguished visitors from Moscow . . . have fallen into the habit of lecturing Indians on matters which they are capable of deciding for themselves."

Mikoyan went to extremes during his August, 1961, visit to Japan where he concentrated insulting public remarks on Japan's security treaty with the United States. He told Japanese Premier Ikeda: "We cannot expect Japan to remain an onlooker when another war breaks out over the Berlin issue." He then talked threateningly of Soviet military might in the Far East. Ikeda's response to Mikoyan and to an equally insulting letter from Nikita Khrushchev made no effort to conceal the widespread Japanese feeling that their hospitality had been abused: "To interpret unilaterally and subjectively and to denounce the foreign and defense policies of another country and then to call on that country to change those policies is, I must say, quite inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries which Your Excellency [Khrushchev] has stated as being the policy of the Soviet Government."

Russia has no illusions about the strength of the U.S. Communist Party, which is virtually nil. But this did not prevent the Kremlin in the 1956 election campaign from attempting to meddle in American politics. The then Soviet Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, in one of a long series of letters to President Eisenhower, stepped out of bounds when he wrote on October 17, on the eve of the election, that during the political campaign "there has been obvious distortion of the policy of the Soviet Union concerning the question of disarmament . . . This applies particularly to statements by Mr. Dulles. [Secretary of State John Foster Dulles] . . . We fully share the opinion recently expressed by certain prominent public figures in the United States concerning the necessity and the possibility of . . . prohibiting atomic weapons tests."

The latter was a reference to Democratic Presidential Candidate Adlai E. Stevenson's campaign statement that, if elected, he would

propose negotiations with the Russians for suspension of nuclear tests.⁴ Eisenhower's reply was angry:

"The sending of your note in the midst of a national election campaign, expressing your support of the opinions of 'certain prominent public figures in the United States', constitutes an interference by a foreign nation in our internal affairs of a kind which, if indulged in by an ambassador, would lead to his being declared *persona non grata* . . . Your statement with respect to the Secretary of State is not only unwarranted but is personally offensive to me . . . You seem to impugn my sincerity. However, I am not instructing the State Department to return your letter to your embassy. That is not because I am tolerant of these departures from accepted international practice, but because I still entertain the hope that direct communications between us may serve the cause of peace."

Soviet ambassadors abroad do not always conduct themselves courteously, especially in countries where the Soviet regime thinks arrogant behavior will constitute effective pressure. The most outstanding recent example of a Soviet ambassador who periodically has breached the rules of international diplomatic conduct is Andrei Smirnov in West Germany. Incidents that he provokes are so frequent that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is deliberate.

In late 1960 Smirnov interrupted a speech in Bonn by West German Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard at a public meeting during West German-African Week. Erhard had referred to "Communist totalitarianism" as "worse than colonialism." Smirnov rushed to the rostrum and shouted: "You talk about freedom. Germany killed 20,000,000 people in our country. Germany brought nothing but misery to Africa." Erhard replied: "I did not come here to talk to you but with our African friends." Smirnov was ushered out of the hall but not before the presiding officer told the audience and Smirnov: "The Soviet Ambassador enjoys the protection of his diplomatic status, but it is not customary at such events here to behave in this way."

In the fall of 1961 Smirnov was involved in another undiplomatic public shouting match with Hamburg's Lord Mayor, Paul Nevermann, about "The Wall" in Berlin. Subsequently, on December 21, he again overstepped the normal limits of propriety by comparing West German General Adolf Heusinger, chairman of the permanent NATO Military Committee in Washington, with convicted Nazi Adolf Eichmann. The incident occurred at a Foreign Press Association luncheon in Bonn after the Soviet Government had made the ridiculous request

that the U.S. Government turn Heusinger over to the Russians for "trial."¹ The U.S. rejected the demand.

"Intervention!—Who, Us?"

THE LIE. *"Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet government had not the slightest intention of intervening in Finland's domestic affairs."*

This sentence appeared in a statement by the Finnish government on November 14, 1961. The Finns were not lying. They were merely making public the lie that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko told Finnish Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen at the peak of the 1961 crisis. Gromyko's disavowal of intent to intervene in Finnish politics was made while the Soviets were in the process of intervening. Gromyko passed the word to the Finns that the Kremlin was dissatisfied with Finland's domestic political situation, but would relax diplomatic pressure (no intervention, mind you!) if it were quickly corrected.

THE TRUTH. Finland has been under almost continuous and heavy pressure from Soviet Russia since gaining its independence after the collapse of Tsarist Russia. Russia invaded and fought a war with Finland in 1939.

The crisis of 1961 was conducted by the Kremlin with a combination of heavy-handedness and subtlety which in the end added up to a blitzkrieg diplomatic offensive that included intimidation, threats, and interference in Finland's internal affairs. It was caused by Russian annoyance with the political opponents of the incumbent Finnish President in the campaign for elections in the summer of 1962. The opposition did not quarrel with Finland's policy of neutrality, but it insisted that being neutral with respect to the Soviet Union did not require the Finns to love the Bolsheviks.

1. See pages 43-46 for a catalogue of Soviet conquests by force or the threat of force.

2. For the long list of Soviet treaty violations to which this one could be added see page 18.

3. For the full text of all the documents involved in this extraordinary case see *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, 1948, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

4. See page 144 for details of how President Eisenhower, although denouncing Stevenson in the campaign, did this in 1958.

5. See page 206 and footnote on Heusinger.

The men in the Kremlin will not tolerate criticism by the Finns. Not trusting genuine democratic elections, they decided to eliminate all political opponents of the existing Finnish regime (which combines friendship with neutrality) in advance of polling. How Moscow forced Finland to junk its plan for a normal election for the presidency is a tidy example of the U.S.S.R.'s alleged diplomacy of non-intervention.

On October 30, 1961, the U.S.S.R. delivered a long note to the Finns outlining in an ominous tone alleged imminent and great dangers both countries faced by the aggressive intentions of West Germany in the Baltic Sea. The Soviets called upon the Finns "to hold consultations (with the Soviets) on measures for insuring defense of the frontiers of both countries from the threat of military attack." It referred to the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and Finland which provides for such consultations.

This Soviet note was delivered while Finnish President Urho Kekkonen was completing a state visit to the United States. It sent shivers up and down the spines of even the tough Finns who feared the call for "consultations" was the prelude to a demand for Soviet bases in Finland again. The Soviets had given up their base at Porkkala in 1956.

It soon became apparent that the Soviets were not really afraid of West German aggression but worried lest Finland elect a President and a new parliament not inclined to steer the narrow, difficult course of *friendly* neutrality with the U.S.S.R. Gromyko offered the Finnish Foreign Minister an alternative to "consultations" a week after the note had been delivered: "In the present situation the Soviet Government would like assurance as quickly as possible that the present foreign policy of Finland will continue and that nothing will prevent the development of friendly relations."

Gromyko made it very clear that the Soviets would be satisfied only if new elections were held quickly to get rid of the democratic process of campaign oratory and debate, and if Kekkonen continued as President. Otherwise "consultations" on military matters would have to be held.

The Finns conceded the first point. Kekkonen ordered elections, previously scheduled for the summer of 1962, moved up to February. Unsatisfied with this, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov summoned the Finnish Ambassador to his office in Moscow and renewed the demand that "military consultations" be held "as soon as possible." Kekkonen, who in recent years has had good relations

with Khrushchev, then asked for a personal meeting, and the two men met a week later in a dacha on the outskirts of Novosibirsk in Siberia. While Kekkonen was en route home, a joint communique was published, saying: "President Kekkonen suggested that the Soviet government should not insist on its proposal (for military consultations) . . . The Soviet Government considered that it could put off the military consultations it had proposed."

Speculation on what was behind this strange performance lasted until the next night when Kekkonen reported to the Finnish people. He appealed to his political opponents to retire from the scene and leave the job of guaranteeing Finland's independence in his hands. Without referring to the idea of neutrality-without-friendship with the U.S.S.R., he warned that "unrealistic political attitudes" would have to be abandoned because "defiance and recklessness are now national dangers." Dr. Olavi Honka, a candidate the Russians did not trust, withdrew from the race, leaving Kekkonen sure of victory. But Kekkonen also disclosed another "price" paid to Khrushchev: a promise that Finland would "closely follow the development of the situation in Northern Europe and in the Baltic area and, if necessary, would transmit to the Soviet Government its views on any measures that might be called for." Behind those words was the obligation to keep an eye on her Scandinavian neighbors, Norway and Denmark who are members of NATO, and to report to Moscow on any NATO "threat."

Kekkonen was elected overwhelmingly by Finland's electoral college in January, 1962, for a second term in contrast to a margin of only two votes for his first term six years ago. The parliamentary elections that followed, however, gave a better indication of how the Finnish people reacted to Soviet pressure. The Communist Party, previously the largest, lost three seats, dropping from 50 to 47. The Agrarians, to which Kekkonen belongs, won 53 seats giving a majority to the center and conservative parties.

Well, the Finns are improvisers and realists. They are not happy about these developments, but they have "put off" the Soviet military demands. What else could a small nation do with virtually no military establishment and, because of its neutrality, no allies? The lesson here is an extraordinary and clear-cut example of what Khrushchev really has in mind when, as in a 1962 New Year's statement, he eschewed any intention of intervening in the internal affairs of any people. The Finns know better.

Russia Loves the United Nations

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union views the United Nations as a very important international organization that should be respected by all nations and helped to work effectively for peace.*

The Communists dominate every annual session of the UN with speeches asserting that the U.S.S.R. and its satellites are the only nations which interpret the UN Charter honestly, and that the United States constantly violates the Charter and uses it as a tool of American foreign policy.

On the eve of Nikita Khrushchev's arrival in New York for four hectic weeks at the UN in the fall of 1960, Moscow Radio announced: "In the struggle for peace the Soviet Union attaches no small importance to the United Nations. It is precisely for this reason that Comrade Khrushchev is leading the UN Soviet delegation to the 15th session of the UN General Assembly."

In his opening address, Khrushchev denounced "some members" of the UN who do not treat "with due respect" the organization "in which mankind reposes such hopes."¹ It is the United States, he charged, that has "ruined" the UN by "imposing its will" on others and undermining the foundations of the organization.

THE TRUTH. In actuality, the Soviet Union never has hidden its contempt and disdain for the United Nations; has made extraordinary efforts to show it disrespect in words and deeds; has obstructed and sabotaged the efforts of others to make it a truly effective international organization; and has unashamedly pursued a policy of "rule or ruin" at the UN. From the very first day, the U.S.S.R. has shown amazing versatility in frustrating the limited work the UN can do in the cause of peace in such ways as:

- Walking out and boycotting the UN Security Council when it has refused to toe the Soviet line.²
- Abusing the veto in the Security Council by using it 99 times through December 31, 1961.³

Refusing to pay its share of special annual assessments of the UN. The U.S.S.R. pays less than 10 percent of the amount the United States contributes to UN operations.⁴

- Attacking personally the first two Secretaries General, Trygve Lie

and Dag Hammarskjöld, and the international UN secretariat, and seeking a Soviet veto over their activities.

- Ignoring rules of procedure to disrupt meetings; and disregarding all decisions unpalatable to Moscow.

This list could go on interminably. The most damning indictment is that the U.S.S.R. never has complied with any resolution directed against it⁶ and contemptuously has made it clear that it never will honor such resolutions, or, in fact, any resolution with which it disagrees. The Soviets time and again have shown that they regard the UN Charter, like other treaties, as a piece of paper to be exploited when possible to advance the cause of Communism, but to be spat upon and ridiculed when it threatens to interfere with the Communist conspiracy of world domination.

Khrushchev does not hide his true feelings when put to the test. During his disruptive visit at the 1960 UN session, he demanded that the late Dag Hammarskjöld resign, "if he has the courage." When asked at a press luncheon whether he would accept the result if two-thirds of the UN membership voted for Hammarskjöld to remain as Secretary General, Khrushchev shouted:

"Even if such a decision as you speak about were made by a two-thirds majority—even if it were made by a majority of 99 per cent—we would not agree with such a situation anyhow. The principles of majority which you determine by two-thirds in solving disputable issues are quite acceptable within a country when domestic questions are decided. But in this case we are dealing with a complex international question. This question is decided by countries belonging to the UN. But this is not a parliament but an international forum which has been established in order to solve questions in such a way that its decisions would not harm any state belonging to this forum."⁷

He expressed the same philosophy the following summer: "Even if all the countries of the world adopted a decision which did not accord with the interests of the Soviet Union and threatened its security, the Soviet Union would not recognize such a decision and would uphold its rights, relying on force."⁸

This is Khrushchev's "respect" for the Charter and his answer to the pledge by each signatory to forego the use of force or the threat of the use of force in the settlement of disputes. But it is not necessary to rely only on Communist words to disprove their professed respect for the UN and its Charter. Soviet deeds in the UN over 16 years speak louder than words.

First, and most important, has been the wrecking of the Security Council's activities. It was to have been the major UN organ for the maintenance of peace and security in the postwar world; the organ whose decisions were to be mandatory, in contrast to the "recommendations" of the General Assembly of all members. The Security Council has 11 members—the five great powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and China, as permanent members, plus seven others elected for two year terms in a manner to give the Council geographical representation.

The word "veto" does not appear in the Charter, but it has become the most common word in the history of the organization because of the Charter's voting provisions for the Security Council. On all routine matters, such as approval of agendas, adjournment, etc., decisions are made by an affirmative vote of any seven of the eleven members. But on all important matters decisions are taken by the affirmative vote of seven members, provided the seven includes each of the five permanent members. Thus any negative big power vote constitutes a veto and prevents a decision.

In writing the Charter, no issue caused so much controversy or took so long to settle as this voting procedure. It was the last of the big issues to be agreed upon at the founding conference in 1945 at San Francisco, and then only after Harry Hopkins had made a special trip to Moscow to persuade Josef Stalin to accept a big power statement interpreting the voting procedure in a way acceptable to the little powers.

Among other things that five power interpretive statement said: "In other words, it would be possible for five nonpermanent members as a group to exercise a 'veto'. *It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their 'veto' power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.*"

But from the very first meetings of the Security Council in London in early 1946, the Soviet Union has done exactly what the five powers at San Francisco promised that a big power would *not* do: It has used its veto "willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."

Throughout the years Russia's flouting of the wishes of overwhelming majorities never has been more crude than in vetoing the admission of new members to the UN. Fifty-one of its 99 vetoes were used in this way. Italy had to wait more than eight years for UN membership because the Soviet delegate vetoed the Italian application six times between August 26, 1947 and final admission on December 15, 1955.

The Soviets vetoed membership applications of Japan, Jordan, Portugal, Ireland and Ceylon four times each before letting them in. Even Finland and Austria were kept waiting for years because of three Soviet vetoes against each. Nepal, Libya, Laos, Cambodia, Spain and Mauretania suffered from such vetoes. Kuwait, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Viet Nam are still denied membership by the Soviets. The indiscriminate use of the veto to block membership for years is part of Soviet blackmail diplomacy—demanding concessions in return for its approval. The authors of the Charter never contemplated that the veto would be applicable to membership.

In contrast to the 99 Soviet vetoes, the other four great powers have cast only seven vetoes among them: France four; United Kingdom two; China one; United States none.

The second, and in the long run possibly the Soviet action which could be most disastrous for the United Nations, has been Moscow's refusal to pay its share of the UN's financial costs. The U.S.S.R., plus its constituent Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, are more than \$40 million in arrears on special funds such as the UN forces in the Middle East and the Congo. Soviet refusal to contribute to any special UN activity parallels its belief that the organization should be only a debating society. For several years, as a result of this attitude of the Soviet Union and other delinquents, the UN has teetered on the verge of bankruptcy.⁸

The third and most recent effort of the U.S.S.R. to whittle down the UN to ineffectiveness, or make it subject to Soviet dictation, was the personal attack on Hammarskjöld and the Soviet effort to introduce the "troika"* principle into the administration of the organization at every level, from the Secretary-Generalship on down.

The Russians were not deterred by the fact that such a system for the Secretary-General would violate the UN Charter's strict provisions for selection of a single man with no commitment to any nation or group of nations. As usual, the Russians demand the privilege of interpreting the Charter as they wish. They have insisted at times on a rigid, literal interpretation when it benefits their cause and have ignored or sought perverted interpretations when that serves Moscow's purposes.

Khrushchev launched this campaign at the 1960 Assembly—the session at which he outraged public opinion by pounding his fists on the table, insulting the presiding officer, rowdy efforts to create disorder with his "points of order," and, finally, in that unforgettable

scene where he took off his shoe and threatened to throw it at the President of the Assembly.

This campaign was two-pronged: unprecedented public villification of international civil servant Hammarskjold, and the insistence that Hammarskjold be fired and replaced by three Secretaries-General: one a representative of the Communist countries, one a representative of the western bloc (NATO), and one a representative of "neutral" countries. Each of these three would have a veto over any action by the UN Secretariat, theoretically down to the purchase of paper clips. Having prevented the Security Council from taking effective action with its veto, the Soviet game was to extend the veto principle to the office of the Secretary-General where, under Hammarskjold, methods of exercising "executive action" had been found and used.

After the death of Hammarskjold, the Soviets delayed for nearly two months selection of a temporary successor to fill out the remaining 18 months of his second term. Finally, they temporarily shelved the "troika" principle for an "Acting" Secretary-General and allowed election of the much respected Burmese diplomat U Thant. But in 1963, when U Thant faces election for a full five year term, the Soviets have made it clear they will refrain from vetoing his election and from reviving the "troika" plan *only* if U Thant has done nothing to annoy the U.S.S.R. Russian delegate Valerian Zorin has stated that Soviet approval of U Thant for a full term would depend on "how he carries out his job." If U Thant performs as his predecessors, he will be subjected to the same kind of abuse Khrushchev heaped upon Hammarskjold at the UN on October 3, 1960, when he said:

"I want to repeat: we do not and cannot trust Mr. Hammarskjold. Unless he himself shows enough courage and resigns, which would be a chivalrous act, so to speak, we shall draw the necessary conclusions . . . A man who has trampled upon elementary justice is not fit to occupy such an important post as that of Secretary-General."

Even men who disagreed with Hammarskjold found something macabre in listening to Khrushchev denounce Hammarskjold for "trampling on elementary justice"—Khrushchev, who supervised the execution of unknown numbers of fellow-Ukrainians in Stalin's purges; Khrushchev, who ordered the Red Army to liquidate the Freedom Fighters of Hungary.

Hammarskjold's response to Khrushchev from his chair on the rostrum of the Assembly Hall was a masterpiece of rebuttal to a bully and tyrant:

"By resigning, I would . . . at the present difficult and dangerous juncture, throw the Organization to the winds. I have no right to do so because I have a responsibility to all those members for which the Organization is of decisive importance, a responsibility which overrides all other considerations. It is not the Soviet Union or, indeed, any of the big powers who need the UN for their protection; it is all the others . . . I shall remain in my post during the term of my office as a servant of the Organization in the interests of all those other nations, as long as they wish me to do so.

"The representative of the Soviet Union spoke of courage. It is very easy to resign; it is not so easy to stay on. It is very easy to bow to the wish of a big power. It is another matter to resist. As is well known to all members of this Assembly, I have done so before on many occasions and in many directions. If it is the wish of those nations who see in the Organization their best protection in the present world, I shall now do so again."

The ovation that followed was the longest in the history of the UN—nearly two minutes of loud and sustained applause from all but the Communist bloc. The Red claque joined Khrushchev in pounding the desks in disapproval.

Russia's lie about "high regard" for the United Nations is also exposed by the infrequent mention of the organization in Communist documents, speeches, and editorials by *Pravda* or *Izvestia*. There is no reference whatever to the UN in the new Communist Party program which purports to set forth policies on international and domestic activities for the next 20 years. In the two-day long speech Khrushchev made to the 22nd Communist Party Congress, the UN merited only one minor reference:

"The question of an essential improvement in the mechanism of the United Nations has long since come to a head. In the years of the cold war, this mechanism has become rusty and its work intermittent. The time has come to clean it up, to remove the accumulated sediment and to pour in fresh strength . . . The time has finally come to grant the Chinese People's Republic its lawful rights in the United Nations. (Tempestuous, prolonged applause). It is time to implement in all UN bodies the full equality of rights of the three groups of states which have come into being in the world: Socialist, neutralist, and imperialist. It is time to end the attempt to use this organization in the interests of the military groups of the Western powers."

Khrushchev did not end his boorish behavior toward the UN with his 1960 visit. After returning home he continued his campaign to dis-

credit the organization in the eyes of the Russian people who have never been given an honest version of what actually happens at the UN.²⁰

Here is the way Khrushchev went about building "respect" for the UN in a report to the Russian people:

"If you could see how delegates of the United Nations behave! They get much money and spend time in restaurants with their wives. They do not participate in work, but just sit there and wait around in case there's any voting. There are people who are well paid who go around shopping for their wives, and sometimes they buy things for women who are the devil knows what! That is the way they defend themselves against Socialism in the United Nations. *It's a terrible organization.* And you must understand that these are heads of government who come to New York to save capitalism. These are people who are incapable of deciding questions."

Revolutions Are Not Exportable

THE LIE. *Communists are opposed to the export of revolution. Communism cannot be imposed from without. That would be interference in the internal affairs of a nation, and Communists never would think of doing that.*

This is a favorite Khrushchevism which usually is linked to the

1. See pages 69-72 for details of Khrushchev's "respectful" behavior at the UN in 1960.
2. This boomeranged when the Council voted action in Korea in 1950. It was done during a Russian boycott. The men from Moscow have not tried that since.
3. The 99th Soviet veto was cast in December, 1961, against a resolution that would have called on India to cease its military action against the Portuguese colony of Goa and to withdraw from that area. There were seven votes for it, but the Soviet veto killed it.
4. See pages 199-202 for how the Soviets forget their claims of phenomenal Communist economic feats and plead poverty when asked to put up money for the UN.
5. The U.S.S.R. ignored all resolutions passed almost unanimously on the Hungarian question. It even forbade Hammarskjöld to visit Budapest although Hammarskjöld then was in favor in Moscow.
6. The U.S.S.R. always has looked upon the UN as merely a forum for debate.
7. Soviet "security" includes international Communism and its advancement.
8. The U.S.S.R.'s policy on UN financial matters is discussed on pages 199-202.
9. A troika is a Russian sleigh or wagon drawn by three horses.
10. See page 182 on the vacuum within which the opinion of the Russian people is formed.

allegation that "we are guided wholly by the instruction of Lenin to the effect that revolutions are not exportable."

"The imperialists assert that the Communists are exporting revolution," Nikita Khrushchev told the 22nd Party Congress. "This slander is necessary for the imperialist gentlemen to disguise in any way possible their claims to exportation of counterrevolution . . . Communists are against the export of revolution . . . But we do not recognize anyone's right to export counterrevolution . . ."

"The Communists are opponents of a forcible, artificial implantation of this or that social-political system in other countries . . . (But) the people of one country or another who rise to fight will not find themselves alone in the struggle against world imperialism."

This double-talk by Khrushchev adds up to a promise to intervene against non-Communist governments to promote revolution (calling it non-intervention) and to a denunciation of any legitimate government that puts down a Communist-inspired revolution (calling it intervention).

THE TRUTH. Lenin might admire Khrushchev's double-talk, but he must spin in his glass showcase casket in the Red Square mausoleum every time his name is used to support the claim that Communists are opposed to the export of revolution.

All of the principles of "peaceful coexistence" as expounded but not practiced by Khrushchev are, of course, violations of Lenin's theories. Lenin was an *international* revolutionary and proud and boastful of it. He was an outspoken practitioner of Marxism with no apologies for the 1848 Communist Manifesto's goal of communizing the world by whatever means may be required. He favored exporting the revolution—"by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." And so does Khrushchev. Lenin's works contain thousands of statements which make what Khrushchev says, in contrast to what he does, a betrayal of Leninism. For example:

"History has given us, the Russian toiling and exploited classes, the honorable role of the vanguard of *international* social revolution . . ."

"There is one and only one kind of internationalism in deed, working wholeheartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy and material aid) such and only such a struggle and such a line in every country without exception."

The author does not intend to suggest that Khrushchev is really opposed to Lenin's doctrines of international revolution. On the contrary, it is apparent that his continuous claim that Communists are against "export of revolution," meaning the extension of Communism, is merely another exercise in deceit, aimed at gullible non-Communists.

The ridiculousness of his supplementary slogan, "no export of counter-revolution either," is clear to anyone who understands what a Communist means by the word "counterrevolution." To a Marxist a "counterrevolutionary" is anyone who is opposed to Communism or anyone who will not submit meekly to the imposition of Communism on himself or his country. For example, the people of Hungary, who revolted initially not against the Communist system but against the Soviet brand of Communism and its heavy-handed rule, were "counterrevolutionaries." The millions of East Germans who fled the Communist "paradise" to become refugees in the West were "counterrevolutionaries." As early as 1918, at the ill-fated Constituent Assembly in Russia which met shortly after Red seizure of power, all the non-Bolshevik delegates, who constituted a huge majority, were considered "counterrevolutionaries" by the Bolsheviks.

President Kennedy's interview with Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of *Izvestia*, and the Soviet rebuttal are most revealing. The President explained at great length that Khrushchev's insistence that today's contest is between Socialism (Communism) and what the Soviets call capitalism is totally erroneous. The basic contest between the two countries is not over which form of economic or social system prevails; the President was emphatic in stating that the U.S. was not opposed to a Communist system if the people freely chose it and refrained from imposing it on others. The basic contest, rather, is between freedom versus totalitarianism, or whatever name one wishes to apply to a system where the people have no voice.

Moscow's disdain for the President's argument, which exposes the entire "peaceful coexistence" thesis of Khrushchev as a fraud, came in *Izvestia's* rebuttal in speaking of the peoples of Eastern Europe on whom Communism has been imposed against their will:

"These peoples [in Eastern Europe] have made their choice once and for all, and they do not care whether this choice is regarded 'free' or 'unfree' beyond the ocean."

The peoples of Eastern Europe had no choice. Those who have tried to exercise a choice, the Hungarians and East Germans, have been brutally suppressed. While the attitude expressed by *Izvestia* prevails in Moscow, all the slogans about exporting revolution, "peace-

ful coexistence," etc., are just slogans used for tactical advantages, with no relation to Soviet policies. The Soviets not only ignore, they reject President Kennedy's definition of what the contest is all about: human freedom, the right of people to choose and to alter their social and economic systems freely, to choose their leaders, and to enjoy the fundamental freedoms.

Unhappily, there is no evidence that the Soviets are in any manner prepared to accept our concept of a "world of free choice" as a substitute for their "world of coercion." This—not which system can produce the most steel—is the basis of the controversy that divides the world.

There Are Three Worlds

THE LIE. *The world is neatly divided into three groups of nations: Communist, capitalist and neutral. International organizations must take this "reality" into account and each of the three groups must have an equal voice in reaching decisions.*

These three divisions, when elaborated by Soviet spokesmen, break down this way: the Communist group includes all nations where Marxist-Leninist regimes are in power; the capitalist group includes those militarily aligned with the United States; the neutralist group includes the new nations of Asia and Africa, plus some in Latin America which are alleged to be freeing themselves from the U.S. hegemony.

The neutralist group does not include such traditionally labeled neutrals as Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. Although they are not aligned in military pacts with the U.S., they are lumped by the Soviets in the "capitalist" group.¹

This "three camps" theory would appear to be in conflict with the fundamental Marxist thesis of "two camps"; one communist, one capitalist. But inconsistency, foolish or otherwise, has never bothered the Communists, and Khrushchev has made it clear that in many respects he considers the nations he calls neutrals in or near the Communist camp on international problems.

THE TRUTH. The nations of the world are not separated into three categories, or three blocs, with the members of each following the same policies. Only the Communist bloc of nations fits that pattern,

and even that is not impervious to fissures and differences. Yugoslavia, Albania and Red China are testimonials against Khrushchev's neat packaging of the world even in the Communist camp.

The nations which are aligned with the United States in military pacts have some common, basic goals. The most important is the desire to engage in collective security for the defense of freedom against the threats of the Soviet Union. But an examination of difficulties in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over how to proceed in the Berlin crisis or whether to support the United Nations' use of force in the Congo, plus the long-standing lack of unanimity in the South-east Asian Treaty Organization over the problems in Laos and Viet Nam, underscore the absurdity of Khrushchev's charge that America's allies are satellites.

As for Khrushchev's attempt to lump the new nations of Asia and Africa, plus Latin America, into a "neutral" bloc, a cursory examination of the voting records in the United Nations destroys the thesis that they usually function as a bloc. The Afro-Asian nations frequently meet at the UN to discuss problems, but it is only on the rarest occasions that they have agreed. That group, in fact, is divided into half a dozen or more groups. Furthermore, it includes nations which are aligned with the U.S. in pacts: Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan and Thailand.

Although most of the nations in the Afro-Asian group are "unaligned" it would take a Solomon to sort out their ideological leanings or positions on international problems. For example, there are these "bloes" within bloes:

- The so-called Belgrade Conference group. It met in Belgrade last September. It numbered 24 UN member nations plus the Algerian rebel FLN. Although the majority were Afro-Asian nations, it also included Cuba, Yugoslavia and Cyprus. Thus it was composed of Communists (Yugoslavia and Cuba), Arabs, Asians, Africans and Europeans.

- The Brazzaville group. It is composed of 11 of the new central African nations which gained their independence from France. But Mali and Guinea, former French colonies, never have belonged.

- The Casablanca group. This is the smallest group, a sort of unholy collection of extremist African and Arab states in Africa: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic. It does not include any of the moderate, pro-western Arab countries in

Africa, such as Tunisia and Libya, nor any of the moderate black Africans.

• The Arab League. Divisions and confusion among the Arab states have made the direction of this group unclear in recent years except on strictly Arab issues such as opposition to Israel.

Given such subdivisions of what Khrushchev blithely calls a neutral bloc, it would produce quite a donnybrook if that group had to select one man to represent it in a "troika" Secretary-Generalship.

Khrushchev's attempt to compartmentalize the world neatly may be nonsense as a practical matter. But it does reflect one of the basic changes he has made in Soviet foreign policy since Stalin's death. This is the recognition of the existence of unaligned states and acceptance of the fact that they are potential victims if handled properly. Stalin's theory was that nations not for him were against him. He had only disdain for nations like India. Khrushchev's new theory is that those who do not speak against him shall be counted for him. Henry Pachter, diplomatic correspondent for *Die Deutsche Zeitung* of Cologne, Germany, has described this new theory and new concept of the world's "camps" brilliantly in a recent article in *Problems of Communism* (Vol. X No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1961):

"Under this theory, the Kremlin no longer sees a world divided into two rigidly defined camps but a series of concentric zones, beginning with Hell at one pole, and passing through Purgatory to Heaven at the other, like Dante ascending from Inferno to Paradise. At the center of Hell, where once the London City held the place of honor, we now have 'American ruling circles.' Close to them, a congeries of co-conspirators, retainers, beneficiaries, profiteers and fascists are organized in NATO. It would be futile to try converting them to peace. They are aggressors leading aggressor nations, imperialists who scheme to recapture lost colonies. To break these countries out of the NATO circle, one must threaten them with violence and kindle disaffection in their rear.

"Purgatory (to continue the metaphor) consists of two zones: first there is a group of states critical of the Soviet Union in various degrees but opposed to, or afraid of, the bloc policy of the United States. Together they form a neutral belt running from Sweden via Austria and Yugoslavia to North Africa, through the Arab countries to India and Indonesia. In the United Nations many of them often vote with the Soviet Union, or at least occasionally vote against the United States. They can often be included in the greater 'camp of

peace.' The diplomatic strategy toward these nations consists in creating issues which repeatedly force them into alignment with the U.S.S.R. Questions of disarmament, overseas bases, colonialism, and incidents like the U-2 flight are especially suited for this purpose.

"In the second zone are countries, notably in South America and Southeast Asia, whose upper classes side with the United States but whose peasant populations are ripe for revolution and often vent their wrath first against foreign influence. In Africa and Asia too, where so many countries have recently risen from colonial status, smoldering resentments can be mobilized against Western policies. Some governments of these countries have learned to blackmail the United States, by inviting Soviet influences; others lean toward the U.S.S.R. because its diplomacy caters to their national ambitions; some dictator may follow Soviet leads or become dependent on Soviet friendship in order to maintain his one party regime; still other countries are geographically so close to the Soviet empire that they cannot afford to antagonize the Kremlin even in their domestic policies.


"Finally, we have the environs of Heaven—a ring of People's Democracies forming a protective glacis around the Soviet Union where there was once a hostile *cordon sanitaire*. These countries have no foreign policies of their own, but they occasionally are allowed initiatives for which the Kremlin does not want to take responsibility.

"This great variety in the political complexion of the world permits Soviet diplomacy to participate occasionally in majorities at the United Nations and to speak of a large 'camp of peaceful states.' Instead of a Socialist and capitalist camp, we now see around the Soviet Union a 'Socialist camp,' around the Socialist camp an 'anti-imperialist camp,' and around the anti-imperialist camp a 'camp of peace.'

"The Soviet strategy is to weld the 'camp of peace' into a more permanent association, to draw members of the outer ring into the inner rings and to fortify the camp so as to prevent defections. All these aims can be served by maintaining and constantly increasing the pressure on the enemy camp and by leading the uncommitted nations to ever-increasing demands. Soviet initiatives keep before the world burning issues—real or artificial—which prevent the camp followers from falling out with one another or from following interests of national policy which might lead them in different directions."

1. How Khrushchev would apply his "three camps" (troika) theory to the United Nations is described on page 69.

Part Two
ALLIES AND ENEMIES



The Stalin-Hitler Pact

THE LIE. *The Western powers were partners of Adolf Hitler and connived to bring about a war between Hitler's Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Russia.*

One of Khrushchev's favorite slanders, this blatant lie is aimed at keeping alive old fears of Nazi Germany. On the eve of World War II, his story goes, "the imperialist quarters . . . wanted to crush the Soviet Union by means of Hitler's war machine. By their policy of *flirting* with Hitler, the Western powers pursued only one aim: to spearhead German aggression against the Soviet Union. They had a far-reaching scheme which was to destroy the Soviet Union and at the same time to weaken Germany in order to have undivided domination over the world, and to dictate their own terms to everyone."

That was the theme of Khrushchev's speech on June 21, 1961, the 20th anniversary of Hitler's invasion of Russia, shortly after the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna.

THE TRUTH. It was Josef Stalin, not the West, who was "*flirting with Hitler*" in the spring and summer of 1939, prior to the start of World War II in September.

It was Josef Stalin who, as early as March 10, 1939, started making sly overtures to Hitler by telling him in a speech that the U.S.S.R. wanted to establish friendly ties with everyone, including Fascist countries. Stalin also defended Hitler against "malicious rumors" that the Nazis intended to annex the Soviet Ukraine.

It was Josef Stalin's ambassador in Berlin who, on April 17, 1939, took the initiative in suggesting the possibility of a Stalin-Hitler deal when he told the Nazi Foreign Office:

"Russian policy has always moved in a straight line. Ideological differences of opinion . . . do not have to prove a stumbling block with regard to Germany. Soviet Russia has not exploited the present friction between Germany and the Western democracies . . . nor does she desire to do so. There exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with Germany on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better."

Hitler and his colleagues got "the message" both of Stalin's speech and of Stalin's ambassador, and within months the infamous Stalin-

Hitler pact was consummated. On the day it was signed, Stalin was reminded by Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that his March 10 speech had opened the way for the deal. "That was precisely my intention," Stalin replied.

Further confirmation was furnished immediately in a toast by Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov who chortled: "It was Stalin himself who, by his speech in March, which was well understood in Germany, has brought about the reversal in political relations [between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia]."

Stalin climaxed the celebration by raising his glass to Hitler: "I know how much the German nation loves it Fuehrer; I should therefore like to drink to his health . . . On my word of honor the Soviet Union will not betray its partner."

The real history of that period leaves no doubt about who was flirting with whom. The Stalin-Hitler pact, signed on August 24, 1939, by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow, gave the Nazis a go-ahead to invade Poland. It promised Stalin in a secret protocol a "sphere of influence" in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in return for Soviet "neutrality" once war started. This bogus "neutrality" was pursued later by Soviet agreement to furnish Nazi Germany much needed food and raw materials: one million tons of grain, 900,000 tons of oil, 100,000 tons of cotton, plus phosphates, chrome ores, scrap and pig iron, platinum, etc.

That this was a deal to allow Hitler to start World War II was well known to Stalin. Less than a week before it was signed, Molotov was told by the Nazis that speedy agreement was essential because hostilities against Poland would start any day. They started September 1, less than a week after the pact was signed.

That Stalin connived with Hitler to start World War II is amply documented in the Nazi archives published after the war. But perhaps the most damning document is a secret telegram sent by Moscow to the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo in 1940, after the Stalin-Hitler Pact but before Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941. The ambassador was warned not to seek a comprehensive agreement with Japan but to settle for a neutrality pact only because, the Soviet Foreign Office cabled, "Overall agreement with Japan . . . would not instigate the Japanese-American War which we desire. So we are planning not to develop the negotiation into an agreement but merely to alleviate tension between Japan and the Soviet Union. We concluded an 'Agreement with Germany' because a war is required in Europe."¹

All of the documents, including memoranda of conversations, per-

taining to the Stalin-Hitler pact were captured by the Western allies in the records of the German Foreign Office. Anyone with doubts about who connived with Hitler before and during the first two years of the war will find the answer in *Nazi-Soviet Relations: 1939-41*, published by the U.S. Government in 1948. That documentary record also gives the lie to such Khrushchev statements as this: "In the summer of 1939 the Soviet Government suggested (to the British and French military missions in Moscow) absolutely concrete plans for joint actions by the armed forces of the Three Powers in the event that Germany provoked a war in Europe."

The documents show that the Soviets were dicker with Hitler long before the military talks with Britain and France started. They were used primarily as a foil to force greater concessions from Hitler. The Soviets knew Hitler was going to war. On the other side, the British and French, having learned the lesson of appeasement and its tragic aftermath at Munich in 1938, committed themselves to go to war with Hitler's Germany as early as March, 1939, if Poland were attacked. That was the same month Stalin started his approaches to Hitler.

Khrushchev poses as an expert in all matters pertaining to Stalin. He was one of Stalin's henchmen. In his effort since 1956 to exorcise the Stalin legend, he has, nevertheless, given a very wide berth to the period when Stalin and Hitler were friends. The best excuse Khrushchev has found for that period of Soviet-Nazi collaboration is this very lame excuse: "The Soviet Government had no other recourse but to enter into negotiations with Hitler, although it realized that it was striking a deal with the devil incarnate. We could not act otherwise."

On the 20th anniversary of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party, January 20, 1962, however, Poland's Red boss Wladyslaw Gomulka surprised the Communist and non-Communist world by publicly mentioning the secret protocol in the Stalin-Hitler pact for carving up Poland. Communists long have avoided mentioning this part of the deal, and even Gomulka's anniversary speech distorted the facts. He left the impression that the pact resulted from Hitler's initiative and that Nazi threats left Stalin no alternative except to sign. Gomulka placed the major blame for Poland's 1939 defeat on the anti-Soviet policies of the pre-war Polish government. Here is Gomulka's version of how Stalin and Hitler "connived" to destroy Poland:

"In preparing his attack on Poland, Hitler was afraid, although

unnecessarily, that the Polish Government might seek help from the Soviet Union. Therefore, he wanted to insure himself against this through the conclusion of a German-Soviet non-aggression pact. Proposals on this issue, alternated with threats, were put forward by the German government at the beginning of July 1939. They remained unanswered.

"The Soviet Union was at that time still hoping to conclude a mutual aid pact with Britain and France and hoping that these countries might persuade the Polish government to give its consent to making its territory available to the Soviet forces to fight the Germans. The Moscow military talks eliminated these hopes completely.

"On August 20, Hitler cabled Moscow: 'Once more I propose that you receive my foreign minister on Tuesday, August 22, or, at the latest, on Wednesday, August 23. The foreign minister will have all the plenipotentiary powers to work out and sign a non-aggression pact.'

"In the situation that arose the Soviet government considered itself forced to accept this proposal. The non-aggression pact was concluded. At the same time the Soviet government made a reservation¹ that in the event of a Polish-German war, the Germans must not seize Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian lands forming a part of the Polish state, and that, in event of Poland's defeat, those territories would be occupied by the Soviet Army. These are the facts which preceded the Hitlerite attack and Poland's September defeat."

The facts are quite different. Gomulka conveniently omits the important part of Hitler's cable to Stalin on August 20—the part which confirms Soviet initiative in seeking a deal with Hitler. In fact, the draft of the non-aggression pact was a Soviet document.

1. Ernest B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations*, Macmillan, New York, 1956, p. 326.

2. The archives of the Nazi Foreign Ministry show no such fine-sounding "reservation"—implying that Stalin's only interest was in protecting those areas from Nazi aggression. On the contrary, the archives are filled with proof that from the start of negotiations with the Nazis, Molotov insisted that the non-aggression pact would have to be accompanied with a secret deal on German and Russian "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe. What Gomulka calls a "reservation" was the secret protocol signed along with the pact carving up Poland and tossing the Baltic states and the Romanian province of Bessarabia to the Russian wolf. The text of this secret protocol is printed in *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*, The Department of State, 1948, on page 78. A supplementary protocol was signed on September 28, 1939, after the fall of Poland. It merely confirmed the partition of Poland between the Nazis and the Soviets. (ibid, page 107). The full text of Hitler's August 20 cable. (ibid, page 66).

Moscow Was Poland's Friend

THE LIE. *The Western powers were the cause of all of Poland's misfortunes before, during and after World War II.*

The Communist leaders of Poland, a country that suffered severely at the hands of both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, parrot this Moscow lie.

Poland's Communist Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka, who has had his ups and downs with the Kremlin hierarchy both during Stalin's and Khrushchev's reign, knows the true story. But in a speech in September, 1961, he disregarded the truth to declare:

"The Socialist (Communist) states are determined to prevent the policy of the Western powers, *which 22 years ago made it possible for Hitler to unleash a war*, from again precipitating Europe and the world into a new, and a hundred times more destructive disaster."

THE TRUTH. Two jackals pounced upon Poland: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. Gomulka made his statement on the 22nd anniversary of the Soviet Union's invasion of Poland (September 17, 1961), but did not mention it.

The story of what the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany did to Poland in 1939 is best told in this brief chronology—

August 24: The Stalin-Hitler pact was signed in Moscow. Stalin promised not to interfere with Hitler's plans to attack Poland. A secret Stalin-Hitler protocol promised the Soviet Union the eastern half of Poland, most of which the U.S.S.R. still holds.

September 1: Hitler invaded Poland and Stalin applauded.

September 3: Britain and France, honoring their mutual assistance pacts with Poland, declared war on Nazi Germany and became allies of Poland.

September 17: Soviet Russia invaded Poland to collect on Hitler's secret promise. Poland's armies had already been destroyed by the Nazis.

September 29: Soviet Russia concluded a treaty with Nazi Germany partitioning Poland for the fourth time in its bloody history. The eastern half of Poland was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Soviet Russia cynically "explained" its aggression against Poland in violation of Soviet-Polish non-aggression pacts this way: "The Polish

State and its Government have virtually ceased to exist. Treaties concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have thereby lost their validity." Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, who later was to pose as the great friend and benefactor of Poland, boasted to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. that "a quick blow against Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, sufficed to leave nothing remaining of *the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty*."

After Hitler invaded Russia in 1941 and Stalin became an ally of the West, the Kremlin attitude toward "the ugly offspring" of Versailles changed. The new policy was to create a Communist Poland but to retain for the Soviet Union much of the Polish territory acquired by aggression. All the former Polish territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, is now part of Soviet Russia. It was promised Stalin at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in return for his promise, which he broke, to establish a "representative and democratic government" for post-war Poland.

Stalin's violation of his half of the deal is the reason Gomulka is the boss of Poland today. But Khrushchev continues to demand legalization of his ill-gotten Oder-Neisse frontier as well as the new western frontier of Poland, which now puts large areas of former German territory in Polish hands.

In spite of what Gomulka says, the policy of the Western powers in September, 1939, was loyalty to its commitments to prewar Poland and a declaration of war against Nazi Germany because of the invasion of Poland.

And what was the policy then of the U.S.S.R.? It was collaboration with Nazi Germany, partnership with Hitler in carving up Poland, and violation of treaties with Poland.

Russia Defeated Hitler

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany almost single-handed. American aid was given grudgingly and was only a minor factor in the ultimate victory.*

Never does a Soviet leader point out that the U.S.S.R. changed sides in the war, that for almost the first two years of World War II it was on Hitler's side. Nor do the Soviets ever cite the fact that the West did not hesitate to aid the Soviets once Hitler attacked Russia. On the contrary, Soviet comments more often have disparaged the

West's role by complaining about the delay in opening the second front in Europe; belittling battles in North Africa, Italy and on the high seas; and claiming a major role for Russia in the war against Japan in which it failed to become a belligerent until the last few days.¹

East Germany's Communist boss, Walter Ulbricht, continues the legend that it was Russia alone that won the war. As recently as January, 1962, he told a Columbia Broadcasting System reporter in an interview: "The U.S.S.R. defeated the German troops in a man-to-man fight. And if the United States had not intervened in the war, the U.S.S.R. would have defeated German Hitlerite fascism singlehanded . . . even on the Rhine, not just in Berlin."

Soviet references to its wartime allies have been filled with disgraceful accusations of duplicity and perfidy. Nikita Khrushchev "amused" a public meeting on the 20th anniversary of Hitler's invasion of Russia with this fairy tale:

"This scheme of the West to destroy the Soviet Union and at the same time weaken Nazi Germany was expressed most cynically by Harry Truman, a former Senator, and later President of the United States of America. He said: 'If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia; and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany; and that way we let them kill as many as possible.' *Such a policy*, the essence of which was so bluntly set forth by Truman, *was carried through by the Western powers*. These ideas are still alive in the minds of the aggressive imperialist quarters of the West."

THE TRUTH. Khrushchev's mischievous allegation of Western dishonesty in its wartime alliance with Russia may be caused by his own guilty conscience (if he has a conscience) and his knowledge that the dishonest, suspicious and uncooperative partner in the wartime alliance was the Soviet Union.²

The Soviet Union suffered greater losses, in human lives and property, than any other belligerent in World War II. Its casualties were greater than all the other allies combined. Every political and military leader of the Western allies repeatedly has paid tribute to these tragic facts. For several years after the war they weighed heavily in the formulation of Western postwar policy toward the Soviets, inhibiting the West and often giving the Russians benefits of doubt that they did not deserve.

Khrushchev's 1961 version of the history of 1941 overlooks an important incident in that June of 20 years ago that probably saved the

Soviet Union from defeat. That was the immediate and unequivocal decision of Winston Churchill to welcome Russia as an ally the day Hitler invaded the Soviet Union even though Britain had been waging war virtually alone against Hitler since September 1, 1939. And during those two years Stalin had been helping Hitler in his war against Britain.

Stalin haughtily ignored Churchill's warning in the spring of 1941 that Hitler was going to attack Russia. Six days before the attack came on June 21, 1941, Churchill cabled President Franklin D. Roosevelt that in case of Soviet-Nazi hostilities "we shall of course give all encouragement and any help we can spare to the Russians." He sought Roosevelt's approval, and FDR promised immediate and public support of "any announcement that Churchill might make welcoming Russia as an ally." On the evening Hitler's legions marched into Russia, Churchill kept his word.

In an historic and unforgettable broadcast to the world, Churchill recalled his long record of opposing Communism, his frequently repeated statement that "Bolshevism should have been strangled at birth," and declined to take back a single word. But then he announced:

"We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime . . . We shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until, with God's help, we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its people from his yoke.

"Any man or state who fights Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe . . . That is our policy and that is our declaration. It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people. We shall appeal to all our friends and allies in every part of the world to take the same course and pursue it, as we shall, faithfully and steadfastly to the end."

There were many times during the next few years, before Hitler's Reich collapsed in rubble and the Fuehrer committed suicide in his Berlin bunker, when the Western allies could have double-crossed Stalin, as Khrushchev now tries to give the impression they did.

But they didn't double-cross him. They pursued their wartime alliance with Soviet Russia and Stalin, as Churchill had promised, "faithfully and steadfastly to the end" and beyond the end into the immediate postwar period." Often they did it by sacrificing their own immediate interests and, in the process, made many postwar promises and concessions to Stalin that they lived to regret.

Only Khrushchev's version of history fails to confirm this. Like his

predecessor, Stalin, Khrushchev is an ugly distorter of history.

The Soviet Union's postwar behavior on lend-lease is equally disgraceful. Lend-lease to Russia, alone, was not responsible for the defeat of Hitler. But it is certainly not an exaggeration to say that without the \$11 billion in lend-lease aid, the Red Army would have been unable to mount the massive offensives which ultimately drove Hitler out of Russia or to have held out in such epic battles as that at Stalingrad. Often shipments were made to Russia during crucial periods at the expense of supplies to the Pacific War theater. Then there was the problem of getting the supplies to Russia, which includes a story as epic if not as well-known as Stalingrad about the battles of the convoys in the North Atlantic en route to the Arctic port of Murmansk. (Russia's battle with the Nazis was on land. She never had to cope with Hitler's formidable fleet of submarines.)

Today there is not even a minor favorable reference by Soviet leaders to the program of lend-lease.⁴

The Kremlin is Scared of Germany

THE LIE. *Resurgence of German militarism is the greatest danger in the world today. The United States never has sympathized with Russia's fears. It increased them by rearming rather than disarming Germany immediately after the war.*

World War II was a long way from its end when Josef Stalin first raised the cry about Russian fears of postwar Germany. During wartime conferences he demanded, and in many cases obtained, Western concessions aimed at relieving his alleged fears. Nikita Khrushchev has expanded that false cry to charge that the United States is delaying a German peace settlement because it wants to build up a "militaristic" Germany to attack Russia again.

With all their military might, the Soviets harp upon their "fears" of Germany, not because they really fear Germany in a military sense but to exploit the latent wartime fears and hatreds of those who

1. Russia's role in the war against Japan is described on page 131.

2. See *The Strange Alliance*, by General John R. Deane, The Viking Press, 1946, for a full account of that frustrating period.

3. As late as 1947 the United States was offering to let the U.S.S.R. participate in the Marshall Plan.

4. See page 23 for Russia's refusal to settle the lend-lease account.

suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Khrushchev even resorts to such myths as this one before the 22nd Communist Party Congress: "Disregarding the interests of the people, *immediately after the end of the war* the Western powers, headed by the United States, set a course toward the rebirth of German militarism . . ."

THE TRUTH. It was the Soviet Union that "set a course toward the rebirth of German militarism immediately after the war."¹ It was the United States that offered to abandon 170 years of isolationism and to stay in Europe 40 or 50 years to guarantee that Germany remained disarmed. This offer the Soviets rejected. The last thing the Soviets wanted was American troops remaining in Europe, knowing they would block Soviet plans to dominate Europe.

Wartime sympathy in the West for Stalin's professed fears of post-war Germany was very great. After all, Hitler had conquered most of the continent and vast areas of European Russia before he was stopped. The United States even toyed for a while with such ridiculous ideas as the "Morgenthau Plan" to convert the industrial nation of Germany into a nation of shepherds and farmers. There was no lack of willingness or readiness to take drastic steps to prevent once and for all the rise of another Nazi Germany or another "militaristic" Germany.

At the very time the Soviets were planning the remilitarization of its Communist-dominated zone of Germany, that is, as early as December, 1945, the United States offered to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union to keep Germany "totally disarmed and demilitarized" for 25 years. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes first suggested it to Stalin because, he said, he had been impressed by Stalin's remark at Yalta that "twice within 25 years Russia had been invaded through the Polish corridor and thus feared a revival of German military power." Stalin thought "well of the idea" when informally suggested. But when Byrnes submitted the draft treaty to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov at Paris in the spring, according to Byrnes, the following occurred:

"Mr. Molotov adopted a tactic the Russians often employ—he assumed the offensive. The period of the treaty, he said, was not long enough; it should run for at least 40 years. I immediately agreed to make it that. It was, he went on, 'completely inadequate . . . its provisions for disarmament and demilitarization not sufficiently comprehensive'."

When Byrnes said the terms were the same as those the Soviets

had agreed to in the surrender paper, Molotov parried by saying total disarmament of Germany should be *completed* first, and then a treaty signed to keep it that way.¹ Finally, Molotov got to his real objection: "The treaty ignores the necessity of delivering to the Soviet Union reparations totalling \$10 billion which President Roosevelt agreed to at Yalta." Byrnes, who was at Yalta with Roosevelt, knew that there was agreement at Yalta *only* to use the Soviet request for \$10 billion in reparations "as a basis for discussion." He also knew of the Russian refusal to carry out the later Potsdam agreement to treat postwar Germany as an economic unit. Beginning to see that Russia's alleged "fear" of Germany was a convenient tool for getting as much war booty as possible, rather than genuine fear, Byrnes refused to be blackmailed.

This extraordinary treaty offer of the United States thus died aborning.² However, it was offered again by Byrnes' successor, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, at the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow in 1947, and again rejected with absurd and irrelevant criticisms plus renewed Soviet efforts to get \$10 billion in reparations.

Russia's Germans Are Unarmed

THE LIE. *West Germany is armed to the teeth. It is a militaristic state poised to invade and destroy the "Soviet motherland" any day. All of Europe has reason to be frightened by the resurgence of German militarism.*

Day after day for years, under both Stalin and Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's basic theme has been "hate the West Germans . . . suspect the West Germans . . . watch the seeds of aggression and militarism ripening in West Germany."

No opportunity to repeat this is overlooked, but no mention is ever made of what has been going on in Communist East Germany. This simulated hysteria reached a peak in the Soviet Government's statement of August 30, 1961, announcing Russia's unilateral decision to

1. The facts about Soviet remilitarization of East Germany are on pages 92-95.

2. An explanation of how Soviet views on disarmament haven't changed are on pages 152-7.

3. See page 22 for Russian's repudiation of treaties with Great Britain and France to guard against another German aggression.

break the nuclear test moratorium. It was repeated in the false crisis precipitated with Finland in November, 1961,¹ with allegations that an attack on both Finland and the U.S.S.R. by West Germany was imminent.

One section of the August statement said the Soviet decision to resume nuclear tests was an answer to President Kennedy's moves to increase the defenses of West Berlin. But another section placed the major "blame" on West German "militarists" and "revanchists" who are "feverishly engaged in military preparations . . . and equipping themselves for new adventures." The latter also was the Soviet thesis in the Finnish crisis.

"Adenauer and the forces that stand behind him pursue a course of turning West Germany into a militarist state, armed to the teeth," this Soviet tract went on. "The main goal of the foreign policy of West Germany is revenge."

THE TRUTH. Khrushchev's professed fear of an invasion by the West Germans has about as much validity as would a claim by the President of the United States that this country's security was endangered by "militaristic" Canada or Mexico.

West Germany's planned 12 divisions (ready at the end of 1962, with 350,000 men in the armed services) can hardly terrify the Soviet High Command which has well over 100 active divisions, as many more in 30-day reserve units, and nearly 4,000,000 men under arms. Twenty-five Soviet armored divisions are stationed in East Germany. It is doubtful, too, that any Red Army generals lose much sleep over the possibility that NATO's 20-odd divisions in Western Europe will start an aggression. After all, the old military maxim for conventional warfare that offense requires a three-to-one ratio over defense has not changed.

The constant cry of alarm about West German "militarism" by the Soviets is hypocritical. Khrushchev himself sometimes exposes this attempted deception and discloses that Russia's expressed fears of West Germany are fraudulent. After warning Finnish President Urho Kekkonen² of an imminent German attack, he also boasted that the present Germany army is "like a small dog barking at an elephant—no real military threat to the Soviet Union." But the more Khrushchev shouts about West German "militarism" the more it tends to hide East German Communist "militarism" which the table on the next page puts into authoritative perspective.

WEST GERMANY (area: 95,918 sq. miles)

Population	54,376,000
Military forces:	
Regular armed forces (Bundeswehr)	269,000
Trained reservists	100,000
Frontier Guards	14,000
State and local police	103,000
Total regular forces	486,000
Semi-military forces	None

EAST GERMANY (area: 41,645 sq. miles)

Population	17,260,000
Military forces:	
Trained reservists	200,000
Regular Armed Forces (People's Army)	110,000
Frontier police	50,000
"People's" Police (infantry weapons)	78,000
Total regular forces	468,000
Semi-military forces:	
Workers' Fighting Squads	350,000
Sport and Technical Societies	400,000*
Total semi-military forces	750,000
Grand total for East Germany	1,218,000

*The societies are trained in infantry tactics and are equipped with rifles and machine guns.

These figures for mid-1960 give the size of the two military establishments when Khrushchev reactivated the Berlin crisis in 1961. Both sides now have more men under arms. The major change in West Germany is that the Bundeswehr is closer to its planned strength of 350,000. Communist East Germany proclaimed conscription in January, 1962.

Thus, East Germany had about 70 persons in some form of military training for every 1,000 inhabitants in 1960, while the ratio in West Germany was eight to every 1,000.

Communist East Germany, with only one-third the population and less than one-half the area of West Germany, has about the same number of men in regular military units as there are in West Germany. And if the semi-military forces are counted, East Germany has about three times as many men as West Germany in military or semi-military units. If West Germany had an army as large as East Germany's, in proportion to its relative population, it would number well over a million men under arms.

More preposterous still is Khrushchev's absurd charge that Adenauer is following in Hitler's footsteps. Hitler had over 10,000,000 men under arms when he came close to conquering Russia. West Germany, for all

practical purposes, has no navy and no air force while Hitler had a vast submarine fleet, surface marauders and the Luftwaffe. The West Germans have about 400 airplanes (short-range fighter-bombers, reconnaissance, interceptor and training craft)—hardly a threat to the thousands of Soviet military aircraft, strategic bombers and uncounted missiles with nuclear warheads.

Khrushchev's "fears" about West German militarism are a smoke screen to hide the illegal, relatively much vaster "militarization" of Communist East Germany by the Soviets without so much as a by-your-leave of the East German people.

The Potsdam agreements at the end of the war, which the Soviets are so fond of alleging that the Western powers broke, included this cardinal aim: "complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany." This meant all of Germany. As recently as the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in June, 1961, the Soviets handed President Kennedy a memorandum accusing the U.S. of failing to implement the Potsdam demilitarization clauses. It had the insolence to claim that "only" Communist East Germany "recognizes these agreements and adheres to them." In other words, East Germany is disarmed and demilitarized while West Germany is "a strong military base for aggressive plans, to foster a dangerous hotbed of conflict on German soil."

But what really happened? Barely three years after Potsdam, in September 1948, the Soviet Union started illegal remilitarization of the East Germans. In that month it created armed paramilitary police units, equipped them with infantry weapons far in excess of normal police requirements and quickly established a strong military force.

By May, 1950, the Western powers were protesting to Russia: "In that part of Germany subject to Soviet control, a police force has been created which, by reason of its organization, training and equipment, has the character of an army . . . in military formations, which include artillery, tank and infantry battalions." By then these units, organized on the basis of *Bereitschaften* (Alert Squads), totaled about 50,000 men. In that same month of May, 1950, there was not a single German soldier in West Germany. As a matter of fact there was not one American combat division left in Germany—just a U.S. Army constabulary for routine occupation purposes.

After Communist aggression in Korea in June, 1950, and the military buildup in East Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization discussed the problem in September. In December NATO agreed in

principle that a West German contribution to the common Western defense effort should be explored with the government of West Germany.

It was not until 4 years later, in the fall of 1954, that satisfactory arrangements were made for the integration of proposed West German forces into a Western European Union. This included a Control Agency to guarantee that West Germany would remain within the limits set for its military forces and would refrain from the manufacture of prohibited weapons. Two more years elapsed before the West German Bundestag (parliament), after a long, bitter debate and with much opposition to any rearmament, approved the plans and passed a bill for very limited conscription.

And what was happening in East Germany? By the end of 1953, while the West still talked about West German rearmament, the East German Communists had a "police force" of 100,000 men plus 140,000 military personnel, including three mechanized divisions and an air force.

The ceiling set for West German military forces is 350,000 men and 12 divisions. All of those divisions are committed to NATO and, thus, subject to NATO rather than to national command.

Khrushchev's rantings about West German "militarism" are not new—although the pitch has been higher in recent years. Even when West Germany remained completely demilitarized, and while the Soviets were illegally and secretly creating an East Germany Army and calling it a "police force," the Soviets made the same wild allegations about the "swift militarization of West Germany." The facts show that the Soviets abided by the Potsdam "demilitarization" protocols only long enough to impose a Moscow-directed Communist regime on the East Germans and then rearmed it under the watchful eye of Communist activists and political officers.

1. See page 63.

2. See page 64.

3. The four power occupation statute for Berlin prohibited the presence in that city of any German military organizations. This agreement still is strictly adhered to in West Berlin. Not a West German soldier ever has set foot in that city. Only allied troops are there. But each May Day East German military forces stage a big parade in East Berlin, and on August 13, 1961, the East German army in great force closed the East-West Berlin border and helped erect "The Wall." See details elsewhere in this book.

Adenauer Follows in Hitler's Footsteps

THE LIE. *West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is the reincarnation of Adolf Hitler and is trying to lead Germany into another "military adventure" against Russia.*

Few men in the non-Communist world have been subjected to so much Soviet calumny as Adenauer. Highest priority of the Kremlin before German elections has been given to attempts to discredit the West German Chancellor and to slander him as a neo-Nazi.

Adenauer and Nikita Khrushchev reached a sort of gentleman's agreement in the spring of 1961 not to attack each other personally. Like many other Khrushchev promises, it was immediately broken and Khrushchev reached unprecedented heights of anti-Adenauer hysteria in the weeks preceding the September elections. Here are some samples of Khrushchev's name-calling:

"Chancellor Adenauer is shouting himself hoarse for weapons. What does Adenauer need nuclear weapons for? Twice German militarism has engineered world wars . . .

"Herr Adenauer did not fight (in World War II), and evidently wants to make up for it in his old age . . . *He loves to pass himself off as a victim of Hitler, yet he follows in Hitler's footsteps . . .*

"There is too much evidence . . . that the Germans who live in West Germany are again succumbing to the opium of revenge and are permitting latter day Fuehrers to carry them along the path to war. What other explanation could there be for the fact that at each of the Bundestag [parliament] elections the West German population votes docilely for Chancellor Adenauer . . . Germans voting for Adenauer cannot but know that Adenauer . . . (has) adopted those very slogans of anti-Communism and revanchism under which Hitler came to power and subsequently unleashed World War II . . . Every nation is free to place at the helm of the state those political figures it wants.¹ But no man can deprive other nations . . . of the right to raise their warning voice against the tragic events of the past being repeated which must be heard by every German . . ."

Khrushchev does not hesitate to stoop to vulgar, personal offense such as this remark at a Kremlin press conference on March 19, 1959:

"What can I say about Chancellor Adenauer? He is quarrelsome like a young fighting cock . . . He is a man belonging to a Christian party, and it seems that he ought to have such qualities which would make him a peace loving man. Yet he strives for war. If priests of his

religion [Adenauer is a Roman Catholic] would try to influence Mr. Adenauer, for instance, excommunicate him, maybe this would have an effect. If even this would have no effect, it would mean he is beyond hope."

THE TRUTH. Konrad Adenauer has many political enemies, inside and outside of Germany. But even the most bitter ones would defend him against the calumnious charge that he is another Hitler. That is like accusing Sir Winston Churchill of being a carbon copy of Neville Chamberlain, who tried to appease Hitler, or of trying to persuade the world that Franklin D. Roosevelt was just another Calvin Coolidge.

The record of Adenauer's leadership of West Germany during the 12 years of his first three terms as Chancellor is there for anyone to look at freely. If only the monstrous prison into which Stalin and Khrushchev have converted East Germany were such an open book! It is not Adenauer's success in creating a prosperous West Germany alone that irks Khrushchev; it is the fact that West Germany under Adenauer has disproved everything that Khrushchev claims about the superiority of the totalitarian Communist system over the free democratic system. And no where was this more evident to the world than in the city of Berlin before Khrushchev built "The Wall" to hide the colossal failure on his side.

As for Khrushchev's libel that suggests a relationship between Adenauer and Hitler, again the record is there if Khrushchev were interested in facts rather than fiction. Adenauer was 54 years old when Hitler came to power. He could have chosen the easy path, as many Germans did. But he didn't. Instead he defied Hitler at a time when Stalin and Hitler were signing pacts of friendship. In 1939, when Stalin was Hitler's collaborator, Adenauer was under house arrest by the Nazis. He had been imprisoned by the Nazis in 1934 and was to be imprisoned by them again in 1944. Before the Nazis stripped him of all his public duties, Adenauer had served 13 years as Lord High Mayor of Cologne.

It was Stalin who gave Hitler what he needed to set forth "along the path to war."² About the only thing Khrushchev doesn't boast about these days is the fact that he was one of Stalin's closest associates in those days. The way Khrushchev has been acting and talking of late (exploding 50 megaton hydrogen bombs, threatening to explode 100 megaton bombs, etc.), it is fair to turn his own words about Adenauer upon himself:

"He [Khrushchev] loves to pass himself off as a victim of Hitler, yet he [Khrushchev] follows in Hitler's footsteps."

The West Violated Potsdam

THE LIE. *The World would not be plagued today with a German problem if the Western powers had not consistently violated the Potsdam agreements. The Soviet Union alone has abided by those 1945 promises to create a "peace loving and democratic" Germany.*

Many volumes have been written on the agreements reached at the Potsdam Conference on the postwar treatment of Germany. They were complex agreements which aimed at a reunified, democratic Germany. Like all other wartime agreements with the Soviet Union, they have been honored in the breach by the Communists. Yet Nikita Khrushchev's story goes like this:

"Proceeding in policy from the positions of the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet Union has been actively working to have postwar Germany develop as a united, democratic and peace loving state . . . We would have readily concluded a treaty with a united Germany had a united Germany existed. But there is no united Germany.

"I do not want here to go into the reasons for the existence on the territory of the former Germany of two states with directly opposite economic and political systems, even though a lot might be said on the subject . . . If this (a united Germany) did not come to pass, the fault was not with the Soviet Union or the other Socialist (Communist) countries, but with those as far back as 1947 who began carrying out one after another separatist measures aimed at splitting Germany . . . However I once more repeat that I do not wish right now to engage in historical research on this matter."

THE TRUTH. The signatures on the Potsdam agreements (America's Truman, Britain's Attlee and Russia's Stalin) were hardly dry before the Soviets started violating them. The Soviet Union systematically and flagrantly broke almost every agreement on Germany, persistently sought to terminate unilaterally Western rights in Germany, and methodically and deliberately split Germany in two, imposing a Communist system upon the eastern part under Soviet occupation.

1. See page 163 for details about Soviet interference in Finland's election.

2. For Stalin-Hitler pact see page 81.

No wonder Khrushchev says he doesn't want "to go into the reasons" for the existence of two Germanys today, or to "engage in historical research on this matter." The evidence against his allegations is overwhelming. The following highlights of the ruthless behavior of Soviet Russia in postwar Germany are enough to suggest why Khrushchev's attitude is: What's mine is mine; never mind how I got it:

- The Potsdam Protocol guaranteed the German people fundamental personal and political freedoms, such as freedom of speech, press and religion, and guarantees of a democratic judicial system and free trade unions. In its zone the Soviet Union created a judicial system with a *political* basis and used it to arrest and deport to the Soviet Union thousands of anti-Communist East Germans. Freedom of speech and the press were limited to freedom for Communists only. Education was subordinated to Communist aims and principles. Soviet military forces suppressed the strikes and uprisings of the East German workers in 1953 who protested against working conditions. Freedom of religion has been restricted, and the churches subjected to increasing harassment.

- Potsdam promised "uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany." From immediate postwar days the Russians treated the Germans in their zone in typical Communist fashion. In June, 1952, they climaxed this attempt to isolate East Germans from West Germans by separating East from West with a five-kilometer-wide frontier between the two. The immediate frontier was plowed for over 200 miles, all the way from the Baltic to Czechoslovakia, barricaded with barbed wire and watch towers, and mined. The population, including in some cases whole villages, was evacuated from the five-kilometer area. Ten years ago the Soviets created along the entire East-West German frontier a wall similar to "The Wall" built in the summer of 1961 between East and West Berlin.

- Potsdam guaranteed local self-government and the existence of all democratic political parties. The Soviets forced the merger of the Socialist Party with the Communist Party in East Germany in early 1946, calling it thereafter the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and decreeing all other parties illegal. They "vetoed" the free election of Ernst Reuter as Mayor of Berlin in 1947 and installed their own representatives in the police force which, under Soviet orders, defied the legally-elected government of Berlin. In 1948 Russian army trucks brought rioters to the City Hall in Berlin to break up the elected government which was forced to move to West Berlin.¹ Without prior discussion

or free elections, the so-called German Democratic Republic was established in East Germany by Soviet order in October 1949. First elections in 1950 were held under the "bloc system": candidates of the National Front, a Communist-front organization, being the only choice.

- Potsdam promised to treat Germany "as an economic unit" during the occupation period. There was to be a common policy for all occupation zones on export-import programs, reparations and removal of industrial war potential, transportation and communication. The story of how the Soviet Union stripped East Germany of everything that wasn't nailed down, and much of what was, is well known. In less than a year, the Soviets insisted that each zone should be responsible for its own trade and refused to accept the common export-import plan. The Soviets never lived up to the agreement to ship food, coal, timber and other needed commodities from East Germany to West Germany in return for the United States turning over West German industrial equipment to Russia as reparations. As a result, the U.S., by shipping reparations to the U.S.S.R., while furnishing basic necessities to its own zone, was in effect allowing the Soviets to collect reparations from the United States.

- Potsdam called for "complete disarmament and demilitarization" of Germany. Soviet violations started within two years of the end of the war.³

- Potsdam set up a four-power Allied Control Council, composed of the four commanders-in-chief in the separate zones, to exercise supreme authority over Germany during occupation, pending creation of an all-German government, and to administer jointly all matters affecting Germany as a whole. The Soviet Commander peremptorily adjourned a meeting of the Council on March 20, 1948 and walked out, never to return. The three western commanders still meet.⁴

- The great powers agreed at Potsdam that German prisoners of war in their territory would be returned to Germany by December 31, 1947. No violation of the Potsdam agreement exposes more clearly the real meaning of what Khrushchev calls "Communist humanism" than this one.

On March 12, 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov admitted that 890,532 German prisoners of war were in Soviet custody. Two years after the Potsdam deadline for their repatriation the United States protested against Soviet failure to furnish information on prisoners still held, noting that only half of the number Molotov conceded

were in the U.S.S.R. (447,367) had been returned. The Soviets replied that "repatriation of war prisoners will be completed during 1949." But as late as May 5, 1952, the Soviets announced that the "last group" numbering 17,538 had been sent home although 9,717 were still being held as war criminals and others were being "investigated." At that time the West German government, on the basis of letters to families from men in Russia, estimated that more than 100,000 German war prisoners were still there and alive.


In fact, only about 11,000 German prisoners were released by the Soviets from May 1950 to August 1955. Another 11,000 came home after special pleas by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1955 during his negotiations with Nikita Khrushchev for West German diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R. Several hundred thousand German soldiers remain unaccounted for to this day. The United Nations Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War reported in September 1957, that the Soviet Government had not even replied to a request to discuss further the prisoner-of-war problem.⁴

1. See page 121 for the role of this incident in the early postwar Russian policy to divide Berlin and Germany.

2. Regarding Russia's responsibility for rearmament of Germany see page 91.

3. See pages 118-122 for a similar Soviet breakup of the four power Kommandatura for Berlin.

4. Similar Soviet treatment of Japanese war prisoners is dealt with on page 135.



Part Three

CRISIS IN GERMANY



"Let's 'Normalize' Germany"

THE LIE. *If the United States, Britain and France would join the Soviet Union in signing a peace treaty with the two Germanys—Communist East and democratic West—they would eliminate the last vestiges of World War II; normalize the situation in Europe; restore the world to peace; eradicate the major threat of World War III.*

The U.S.S.R. argues that because two Germanys exist today, the victorious powers of World War II should sign a peace treaty with both, and then let the Germans try to work out ultimate reunification between Communist East Germany and democratic West Germany.

Nikita Khrushchev insists that the two Germanys are the "legal" heirs of the defeated Germany, but conveniently ignores how Germany came to be artificially divided after the war. He argues that the two parts of Germany are separated by "deep-seated differences in their internal way of life" but says not a word about the Communist way of life being imposed on the East Germans. When the Western powers attempt to live up to the promise of the victors to let all the German people freely choose their way of life, Khrushchev accuses them of "manipulating the slogan of self-determination . . . a cheap trick." And if anyone thinks the Russians intend to give the East Germans another choice, there is Khrushchev's ominous response to President Kennedy's interview with *Izvestia* in a subsequent editorial: "These people have made their choice *once and for all*, and they don't care whether this choice is regarded 'free' or 'unfree' beyond the ocean."

THE TRUTH. Khrushchev's proposed peace treaty with two Germanys would do exactly the opposite of what he predicts and would legalize the U.S.S.R.'s illegal acquisition of East Germany as a Communist satellite.

The "main remnant" (Khrushchev's phrase) of World War II is the division of Germany. The Soviet plan¹ would perpetuate that "remnant" and get the Western powers to endorse it by formal treaty. Instead of "normalizing" the situation in Europe, it would keep it abnormal by continuing the partition of Germany in opposition to the legitimate aspirations of the German people. It would deny the right of self-determination, a treaty commitment made to all people by all signatories of the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet plan for two Germanys would prevent efforts to "stabilize peace" and would retain a German situation that would be a constant source of trouble. A divided Germany would remain a source of international tension, a seat of insecurity in the center of Europe, and a breeder of German irredentism. It would prevent a long-range settlement of the future of Germany, prevent agreement on European military and security arrangements which would accompany German reunification, and prevent the conclusion of a valid peace treaty.

Legally there is no basis for Khrushchev's claim that "two German states" exist, because only West Germany came into existence in a manner that any international tribunal would consider legal. The East German "state" came into being because the Russians, in violation of the Potsdam agreements, cut it off physically from the rest of Germany immediately after the war and imposed upon the East Germans as their "leader" Walter Ulbricht, a German Quisling who spent much of his life in Russia, held Soviet citizenship and rode back to Germany with the Red Army's occupation forces.

The Soviets never have allowed the people of East Germany to vote freely. In 1953 when they tried to express their feelings by revolting, Red Army tanks suppressed them just as they did the Hungarians in 1956. And now the Communist regime has imprisoned the remaining East Germans by constructing "The Wall" through Berlin, thus closing the only escape hatch for those who still wanted to "vote with their feet."

Khrushchev keeps suggesting negotiations between the "two Germanys." What he is in fact proposing is negotiations between West Germany and the Soviet Union, because Ulbricht is only a Kremlin proconsul, and represents no one except the U.S.S.R. and other German Communists.

To understand what Khrushchev is up to, it is necessary to review how the present situation in Germany developed. It is complex and confused, factors which Khrushchev counts and plays upon and adds to with his distortions of the history of the last 17 years.

It began during World War II when the Western allies and the Soviet Union discussed at great length the future of Germany. They considered many proposals for the partition of postwar Germany, some of them for the division of Germany into five or six Germanys. Even at the Yalta Conference, only three months before the German surrender, the allied powers had not made up their minds on this fundamental question. But by the time of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, after the defeat of Germany, plans to partition or

dismember Germany had been abandoned. The Americans and British had junked the idea and, in his victory speech on May 9, 1945, Josef Stalin appeared to do likewise when he said: "The Soviet Union celebrates victory, although it does not intend to dismember or destroy Germany."

Thus the participants at Potsdam agreed that there should be just one Germany, although the boundaries previously agreed upon were nibbled away by the division of East Prussia between Russia and Poland and the ceding of large areas of prewar East Germany to Poland. This was to compensate Poland for large areas of prewar Eastern Poland acquired by Russia. Final approval of these territorial changes was to await the peace conference, but the Western allies agreed to support them at the conference.

Pending a final German settlement, arrangements for "initial control" of the country were agreed upon: *temporary* occupation of Germany by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France, each of which was assigned specific zones. But there was to be "uniformity of treatment" of the German people and the country was to be treated during occupation as "an economic unit."

Once the treaties with Hitler's allies, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, were signed, the great powers turned to the problem of a German peace treaty late in 1946, and continued to discuss it at major meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow early in 1947, in London late in 1947, and subsequently in Paris, Berlin and Geneva on several occasions.

The first and most important issue was the creation of a German government that could sign and thus assume responsibility for carrying out the peace treaty once it was concluded. From the end of the war until late 1955, the Soviets gave lip service to the principle that there must be reunification of Germany. But negotiations failed to make any progress because the gap between Russia and the West over how that was to be achieved was very wide, and as time passed grew wider and wider. The Western powers eventually unified their zones of occupation which, by free elections, became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). In contrast, the Soviets, who had from the start refused to treat all Germany as a unit, created the so-called Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany) by decree. Despite this, the Soviets pretended that they still favored German reunification.

As recently as July 23, 1955, at the Summit Conference in Geneva attended by President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Anthony

Eden, French Premier Edgar Faure, and Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, who at that time comprised Soviet leadership, the Soviets signed their name to this statement: "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and *the reunification of Germany*, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and *the reunification of Germany by means of free elections* shall be carried out in conformity with the *national interests* of the German people and in the interests of European security."

On the way home from the Geneva Conference, after signing that statement, Khrushchev and Bulganin stopped in East Berlin. They assured Ulbricht that he need not worry about the Geneva talk about reunification. A month later, after West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev returned to East Berlin, again to reassure his jittery East German Communist representatives: "We said quite frankly to Herr Adenauer: 'Do not demand from us things we are unable to give you. We cannot cooperate in your plan for the reunification of Germany'."

As for his promise at Geneva to seek reunification through "free elections" (an idea to scare the most confident Communist), Khrushchev told Ulbricht to stop worrying: "The reunification of Germany should be carried out in such a way as to make the United German State *peace-loving and democratic*." To a Communist the only "peace-loving and democratic" states are Communist states or those in Eastern Europe dominated by Communism. Free elections never have been allowed in any state where Communists have seized control.

When the Big Four Foreign Ministers met in Geneva in December, 1955, to carry out the Geneva directive of the Heads of Government, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov flatly repudiated the reunification promise and opened the subsequent campaign for recognition of two Germanys. On December 30, 1955, after collapse of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, Khrushchev buried the "Geneva spirit": "There is no real possibility of reuniting these two German states which differ so much." During a tour of Finland 18 months later, he was even more adamant: "We have no wish to discuss the German question with anyone . . . There are two Germanys . . . Those who can still think realistically cannot ignore existing reality."

This campaign has reached the stage where Khrushchev demands that the Western powers sign *his* treaty with two Germanys, thus creating by international contract the two Germanys that would con-

tradict all earlier agreements. If they do not, he threatens to sign a separate treaty with East Germany to formalize the partition.⁴

If Khrushchev proceeds with his plan, he again would be violating all the understandings, agreements and treaties bearing on the German problem that were started during the last war, were formalized at the Potsdam Conference, and were reaffirmed as recently as the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference. He would "legalize" illegality.

U.S Threatens Atomic War

THE LIE. *The United States threatens to start World War III—a thermonuclear war—if the U.S.S.R. is "compelled" to sign a separate peace treaty with Communist East Germany. But the Soviet Union will have to sign such a treaty if the Western powers refuse to sign one with two Germanys.*

This has been Nikita Khrushchev's cry for more than three years. Why should anyone threaten war because someone else signs a peace treaty? He asks this question over and over again and always answers it by saying only a warmonger could contemplate such action.

He has many variations of this absurd lie, depending upon the audience. To Western Europeans the emphasis is on the danger of their total destruction if they let the United States persist in whipping up "war psychosis" over Germany and Berlin. To Russians and Eastern Europeans, under the Kremlin's yoke, he claims that the real American fear is the rapid progress of Communism and that capitalists will risk war to stop it. But always there is this statement: "Our country, our people and the countries of the Socialist [Communist] camp are threatened *only* because we intend to sign a peace treaty [with East Germany]."

1. Khrushchev started the present crisis on Germany and Berlin in November, 1958 when he demanded "conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, the formation of a free city for West Berlin [but not East Berlin], the assurance of free access to West Berlin [to be granted] on the basis of agreement with the country [Communist East Germany] through whose territory these lines of communication pass." See page 000 for an explanation of the fraudulent nature of the promise of a "free" city and "free" access.

2. See page 98 for Soviet violations of Potsdam.

3. Regarding the flight of East Germans see page 124.

4. The consequences of Khrushchev's threat are explored on page 116.

THE TRUTH. The United States could not care less how many pieces of paper, even if they are called "peace treaties", Khrushchev signs with Communist East Germany's Quisling, Walter Ulbricht. But it does care if either the Soviets or the East Germans, treaty or no treaty, interfere with or attempt to abolish the basic rights of the Western powers in West Berlin or the freedom and rights of the people of West Berlin. It is for the latter that the Western powers will fight, if necessary. That is the crux of the Berlin crisis, not some "paper arrangement" between Khrushchev and Ulbricht which would be the same as Khrushchev signing a treaty with himself. Ulbricht "rules" East Germany only because the Red Army is there to support and protect him.

President Kennedy repeatedly has tried to impress upon the Soviets that he is not concerned "with any paper arrangements the Soviets may wish to make with a regime [Ulbricht's] of their own creation, on territory occupied by their own troops and governed by their own agents."

"It is absurd to allege that we are threatening a war merely to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from signing a so-called 'treaty of peace'," he told the United Nations last fall. ". . . No such action can affect either our rights or our responsibilities . . . The Western powers have calmly resolved to defend, by whatever means are forced upon them, their obligations and their access to the free citizens of West Berlin and the self-determination of those citizens."

The United States and its allies would not consider the signing of a separate peace treaty between the U.S.S.R. and East Germany a beligerent act, even though it would be a violation of wartime agreements. What the Western powers consider dangerous is the Soviet suggestion that a separate treaty will deny them their rights in West Berlin: rights won in the war; rights that were agreed to by the Soviet Union at the end of the war; rights which the Western powers insist must continue. If, after such a treaty is signed, the East Germans started interference with Western rights, there would be trouble, but not because of the piece of paper; rather, because of East German action.

President Kennedy spelled this out again in his last November interview with the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*: "If the Soviet Union attempts in that treaty to turn over jurisdiction of West Berlin to East German authorities, against the wishes of the people of West Berlin—if the lines of communication and access, from West Berlin to the outside world and the West, are completely under the control of East

German authorities to cut any time they so wish—then this treaty does not bring peace, it only increases tension.”

Sign a separate treaty with East Germany if you wish, but don't believe that the East Germans can use that treaty to deny the Western powers their rights in West Berlin with impunity. That is the Western message to Moscow.

If the Soviets proceed with their separate treaty plan, it wouldn't be the first time they have signed a “treaty” with East Germany. The last one was on September 20, 1955, less than two months after the Geneva Summit Conference at which the Soviets promised to seek reunification of Germany through free, all-German elections.¹

That “treaty” purported to establish a “German Democratic Republic” in East Germany as a “sovereign state” and promised that henceforth East Germany was “free to decide questions concerning its internal and foreign policy.” The East German regime is no freer today to do that than ever. Both internal and foreign policies of East Germany are decided in the Kremlin. When that “treaty” was signed, however, the Soviets made clear in a separate exchange of letters that the status of the four wartime powers in Berlin, and their access thereto, would be unaffected by this “treaty.” Russia retained its responsibilities under the wartime quadripartite statute for Berlin. The U.S. protested that “treaty” as a violation of the four-power agreements but otherwise dismissed it as a worthless piece of paper. It did not affect U.S. rights and the U.S. refused to accept it as in any way relieving the Soviet Union of its obligations or responsibilities to the Western powers on the future of both Germany and Berlin.

The conclusion of the proposed so-called “peace treaty” would be worth no more as a valid international document than the “treaty” of 1955. But this time the Soviet Union threatens to let the East Germans interfere with Western rights after it is signed. Thus it is not the signing of the treaty but what happens afterwards that is at issue. Khrushchev claims that once the treaty is signed:

- The status of West Berlin will be altered to what he considers a “free” city.
- The rights of the Western powers to remain in West Berlin will be voided.
- Western access to the city will depend on the wishes of the East German Communist regime.

Those threats to the position of the Western powers in West Berlin,

and the consequences for West Berliners are what the United States and its allies deny Khrushchev the right to carry out.

Americans Oppose German Settlement

THE LIE. *"Throughout 15 years the U.S. Government has not once suggested that a peace treaty with Germany be started and has avoided stating what provisions should be reflected in a peace treaty."*—Nikita Khrushchev in a television-radio speech to the Russian people on August 7, 1961.

This is a major part of the Soviet justification for proceeding on its own with its peace treaty either with the two Germanys or with East Germany alone. Khrushchev frequently says, as in his memorandum to President Kennedy at Vienna in June, 1961, that "the Soviet government is ready to examine any *constructive* proposals by the United States government" on a German settlement. But then he either acts as though the United States never had submitted any proposals, or he suggests that nothing the Americans would propose would be "constructive." To be constructive to a Communist, the proposals would have to advance the cause of Communism. This is an aim toward which U.S. proposals definitely are not pointed.

THE TRUTH. The United States not only has suggested countless plans for reaching a settlement of the German question, but also still stands on its latest offer, submitted to the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in the spring of 1959.

Khrushchev is correct on a hair-splitting technicality: that the U.S. has not spelled out the detailed provisions of a final treaty. But the connotation of Khrushchev's remarks is false because the United States correctly insists that a peace treaty should be negotiated and signed with an all-German government, freely elected by all Germans. Khrushchev would proceed with a dictated peace (the treaty he has drafted in Moscow) and would dictate it not only to the Germans but also to the Western powers.

Khrushchev keeps yelling about "the bone in our throat," by which he means West Berlin and West Germany. But the real "bone in his throat," and the reason why he acts as though the United States never

1. See page 105 for details.

has suggested a German peace plan, is that all Western proposals are based on the right of the German people, those in East Germany as well as those in West Germany, to self-determination of their way of life and future government. Khrushchev insolently refers to "self-determination" when applied to the German question as a "cheap trick" in this kind of language:

"The right of self-determination is defended by those who in real life serve as a bulwark of colonial order and every time block the way to this or that people when it begins the struggle for the right to independent national development.¹ Manipulations with the slogan of self-determination of the German nation in the conditions when two independent German states exist are a rather cheap trick . . . It is a matter for the Germans themselves to search for a way to unite their two states which are developing in different directions."²

If Khrushchev would look back at the 1959 Western proposal on Germany he would discover that it *is* based on the idea that "the Germans themselves" determine their future. Khrushchev, of course, is not willing to let his enslaved East Germans do this and insists that the Communist regime and the East German Communist Party be the agents for the East German people. That's what Khrushchev means when he talks about "the Germans themselves," just as when he talks about the Soviet "people" running Russia, he means the Communist Party.

The Western proposal of 1959³ is a plan for a settlement which would give all the German people—East and West—a free choice. It is worth repeating in outline form:

Stage I. Reunification of East and West Berlin as a single city through free elections, as a first step toward reunification of all Germany. (This was proposed before "The Wall" was built.)

Stage II. Creation of a Mixed German Committee with 25 members from West Germany with a population of about 54 million and 10 members from East Germany with a population of close to 17 million. Members would be appointed by the present authorities in West and East Germany. The Committee would formulate proposals for increasing contacts between the two Germans, ensuring freedom of movement, guaranteeing human rights, and drafting a law for "general, free and secret elections in all of Germany." An agreed upon electoral law would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany. If the Committee failed to agree, West and East Germany would draft separate electoral laws and both would then be submitted to all the voters of Germany for a free choice between them.

Stage III. Not later than two and one-half years after agreement on an electoral law, general elections for an all-German Assembly would be held. The Assembly would draft an all-German constitution. Once an all-German government was elected under the new constitution, it would replace the two existing regimes in West and East Germany and assume responsibility for negotiating with the big powers a peace treaty for all of Germany.

For readers familiar with Communist techniques, it will not be difficult to understand why Khrushchev not only rejects such a program, which is traditional and consistent with representative government, but also why he acts as though such a plan had never been proposed. The idea of the people—really, the people—having a free choice is anathema to Communism.

And what does Khrushchev propose?: "that a peace conference be called without delay, a German treaty be concluded, and the question of West Berlin as a free city be settled on this basis."

Article two of the Soviet draft treaty anticipates the continued partition of Germany in these words: "Pending the unification of Germany *in one form or another* the expression 'Germany' in the present treaty will be understood to include the two existing German states—the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)—and all the rights and obligations of Germany, foreseen in the treaty, will relate to the German Democratic Republic, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany."

The Soviets would acknowledge the right of the Germans to reunification but would leave it to the East Communist regime and the West German government to work out details, if 17 million East Germans were granted a voice equal to 54 million West Germans. All-German elections are not mentioned and the Soviets would outlaw "in particular, revanchist parties." According to the Communists, all German political parties except the Communist Party are "revanchist."

In his notes and speeches, Khrushchev is vague about how he conceives reunification of Germany. The truth, of course, is that he neither conceives it nor has any intention of allowing it to happen. Khrushchev proposes:

"The four powers will urge the German *states* to agree in any way acceptable to *them* on the questions pertaining to a peace settlement with Germany and reunification . . . In case of a positive outcome of the talks between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany a single peace treaty would then be agreed on and signed. If the German states are not able to agree on the afore-

said questions [author's note: a certainty], measures will be taken for the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states or with one of them, at the discretion of the countries concerned."

The man who suggests this fuzzy idea is the same one who accuses the U.S. of "not once" suggesting a plan. As early as 1946 the U.S. proposed a commission to draft a German treaty.

U.S. Created Berlin Crisis

THE LIE. *The United States deliberately created a dangerous situation in Berlin and whipped up a war psychosis. The American capitalists always have to have a crisis; their profits increase as they keep mankind on the brink of war.*

Khrushchev often combines this lie with the charge that the Western world is afraid of Communism's victory. One of the most remarkably dishonest documents in the Berlin crisis files is a speech by Nikita Khrushchev at the Polish Embassy in Moscow on November 18, 1958, nine days before he sent his threatening note to the Western powers.

"Why are the political and military leaders of certain Western powers afflicted by outbursts of war psychosis?" he asked his captive audience. "Because the tycoons of finance and capital, the monopoly owners, need a tense international situation so that they can constantly intensify the arms race and grow rich at the expense of the working people . . . The imperialists have turned the German question into a source of constant international tension."

This kind of talk about the "superprofits" of "tycoons" is a favorite topic with Communist audiences. Another is the familiar Communist slogan that capitalist countries are out to cut each other's throats. Khrushchev used this variation at the 22nd Communist Party Congress:

1. See page 166 for explanation of which countries really have granted independence to millions of people and page 47 for the Soviet attitude when the Hungarians demanded "independent national development."

2. U.S.S.R. note to the U.S. in August, 1961.

3. The full text of the Western proposal is in The Department of State's publication 6972, *Background of Heads of Government Conference—1960*.

4. See page 47 for Khrushchev's definition of "revanchist"—anyone who favors self-determination for the Germans.

"U.S. imperialists are constantly pushing West Germany onto the road of the arms race. It suits them, in the event of a war being unleashed, to pay for the new trouble mainly with the blood of the German people . . . They calculate by this policy to exhaust the West German economy and thus reduce its ability to compete in world markets."

For European audiences, however, he reverses himself and blames the West German "revanchists" and "militarists" for pushing the United States into a new military adventure against the Soviet Union.

THE TRUTH. No better answer to Khrushchev's charge that the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, provoked the Berlin crisis has been given than that by President Kennedy six weeks after his conference with Khrushchev at Vienna.

"The Soviet Union . . . speaks of peace," declared President Kennedy, "but threatens to disturb it. It speaks of ending the abnormal situation in Germany but insists on making permanent its abnormal division. It refers to the four power alliance of World War II but seeks the unilateral abrogation of the rights of the other three powers. It calls for a new international agreement while preparing to violate existing ones. It offers certain assurances while making it plain that its previous assurances are not to be relied upon. It professes concern for the rights of the citizens of West Berlin while seeking to expose them to the immediate or eventual domination of a regime which permits no self-determination . . .

"Today there is peace in Berlin, in Germany and in Europe. If that peace is destroyed by the unilateral actions of the Soviet Union, its leaders will bear a heavy responsibility before world opinion and history . . . The world knows that there is no reason for a crisis over Berlin today—and that, if one develops, it will be caused by the Soviet Government's attempt to invade the rights of others and manufacture tensions."

The simplest facts refute the charge that the U.S. created the Berlin crisis. Back in 1948 the Soviet Union blockaded the city of Berlin and did not lift the blockade until the spring of 1949. Then, for nearly a decade, the situation in Berlin was relatively peaceful. There were no crises. The West Berliners reconstructed their city and built a thriving economy. The Western powers exercised their rights in the city and their rights of access to the city with only minor difficulties.

Out of a blue sky in November, 1958, Khrushchev threw down the

gauntlet to the Western powers by threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, to make West Berlin a "free" city, and to force the Western powers out of the city. The crisis has been hot and cold ever since, and was heated up to very high temperatures immediately after the Kennedy-Khrushchev conference of June, 1961. Tensions relaxed in January, 1962, but by mid-February the Soviets were buzzing Western airplanes in the West Berlin-West-German air corridors. Only in the distorted language of Communism could anyone find the words to claim that the United States provoked this crisis.

Khrushchev's allegation that the United States would like to see the West Germans exhaust themselves economically by war is the kind of nonsense unworthy of rebuttal. Suffice it to say that the United States played a major role in financing postwar reconstruction in West Germany and in restoring that country to its position as one of the world's major traders and competitors. The U.S. Government contributed over three billion dollars to that effort through the Marshall Plan.

As for the profits of American "tycoons" depending on an arms race, Khrushchev has visited the United States and seen the kind of consumers' economy that exists here, and therefore knows this old Communist cliché is not true.

But these puerile arguments, including the one that the U.S. is the provocateur, are repeated again and again to support demands for negotiations on Soviet terms, or as President Kennedy has described their negotiating attitude: "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable."

When Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was invited to the White House in the fall of 1961 for exploratory talks to see if there was any basis for negotiation, the President finally told the dour Gromyko that the U.S.S.R. was asking the U.S. for an orchard and offering only an apple in return. "We don't do business that way in this country," President Kennedy added.

Khrushchev, who likes to regale his Communist audiences with old Russian proverbs, turns out not to have a sense of humor when the technique is used on him. He complained of that Kennedy remark at the 22nd Communist Party Congress:

"The charge is being raised that in solving the German problem, somebody wants to take the orchard and give an apple in exchange. Perhaps the image is to the liking of its authors, but in the case in

question this image does not convey the real picture . . . What have the orchard or the apple to do with it?"

Communists Do Not Threaten Berlin

THE LIE. *The Soviet proposal for a "free city status" for West Berlin will guarantee the people of that part of the city a chance to choose their own way of life. There is no intention of intervening in the affairs or life of the West Berlin population.*

Nikita Khrushchev first put forward the "free city status" idea for West Berlin at the end of 1958. But it is noteworthy that he never has proposed that East Berlin be made a "free" city. In fact he attacks any suggestion that all of Berlin be made a "free city" as "unrealistic."

"We do not threaten West Berlin in any way," Khrushchev wrote in his propaganda pamphlet, *The Soviet Stand on Germany*, in the fall of 1961. "We propose that a German peace treaty should provide . . . that its population live under whatever political and social system it wants to have. We propose to put in the record that no one is entitled to interfere in the affairs of West Berlin and impose his rules on its population.

"What then is the trouble?

"If the U.S.A. is really guarding the rights and interests of the West Berliners, it has no grounds for concern, since no one intends to encroach on these rights and interests . . . We are prepared to pledge solemnly to respect and defend the freedom, independence and rights of the free city of West Berlin."

THE TRUTH. West Berliners already are living under the political and social system they want, freely chosen in free and regular post-war elections. West Berliners want the Western powers to keep their garrisons in the city. They have freely expressed this desire in every election since the war.

Being able to see over "The Wall" into East Berlin what "freedom" means under Communism, West Berliners do not want anything that Khrushchev describes as "free." Nor are they impressed by Khrushchev's pious promises not to intervene in their lives. The Soviets have done so ever since the war.

Khrushchev plays upon the need to "normalize" the situation in

Berlin. He could "normalize" the situation, as much as it ever can be short of reunification of all of Germany, by tearing down "The Wall" and letting the city of Greater Berlin, both East and West, live and function as a great metropolitan area.

The claim that under Moscow's plan for a "free" city of West Berlin the people will live as they please is a disguise for denying them that right, which they now have. It also would deprive West Berliners of the presence of western military garrisons which is their only defense against being gobbled up by the East German Communist regime. While the garrisons are in West Berlin, any overt Communist move would mean war.

Conveniently overlooked in all of Khrushchev's talk about a "free city status" for West Berlin is the fact that West Berliners are the only Berliners who have had a chance to exercise a free choice about their way of life and form of government.

The results of all the postwar elections for the West Berlin city parliament disclose why Khrushchev has had to concoct his "free city" idea as a way of getting rid of what he calls "the bone in our throat"—a truly free West Berlin.

The first municipal elections in Berlin after the war were held on October 20, 1946. All Berliners, both East and West, voted for members of an all-city council. The Communists, who call themselves the Socialist Unity Party in Berlin, had the same chance as all other parties. They took a terrific beating. The population of the entire city then was 3,100,000; those eligible to vote numbered 2,300,000; the number who voted was 2,091,055. The Communists ran a poor third, getting only 405,992 votes, or 19.8 per cent of the total, even though 37 per cent of the voters were in the Soviet sector of the city.

When the next municipal election was due in 1948, the Soviets refused to let the East Berliners participate. They did not dare risk a worse defeat. West Berliners have continued to hold elections for their city parliament which still maintains 67 empty chairs in its chamber for the representatives of their East Berlin neighbors whenever they are allowed to participate in self-government.

The last election in West Berlin in 1958 brought out a record 1,632,373 voters of an electorate numbering 1,752,861. It can not be said that Berliners are not interested in their elections. The Socialist Unity Party (Communist) was on the ballot and obtained only 31,520 votes, or 1.9 per cent. All of the other parties (non-Communist) were adamantly opposed to Soviet proposals for West Berlin. In other words, the candidates for whom 98.1 per cent of the West

Berliners voted favored unequivocally not only their present status but also the presence of the Western military garrisons in West Berlin. No wonder Khrushchev never has proposed putting his "free city" idea to a vote in a really free election. He would be clobbered.

Khrushchev says "no one is entitled to interfere in the affairs of West Berlin." But that is what he has been threatening to do incessantly ever since he manufactured the crisis over the city. In fact, there wouldn't be two Berlins, let alone two Germanys, if the Soviets had lived up to their agreements and refrained from interference in the original plans for Germany. The basic agreement on post-war Germany called for four zones of occupation but "a special Berlin area, which will be under *joint occupation*" by the great powers.

Khrushchev forgets the early postwar history of Berlin. He high-handedly announces the four power agreements "null and void" but doesn't mention that the Soviet Union has violated them almost from the day they were signed. A brief review of how the Soviets broke up the "special Berlin area" into East and West Berlin as early as 1947-48 is in order. A State Department White Paper of January, 1959 (*The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis*) stated:

"The U.S.S.R. not only disrupted unity on the allied quadripartite level but also destroyed those united German democratic institutions which already existed in 1947-48. An example is the destruction of the political and legal unity of Greater Berlin during 1947-48. First the Soviets interfered in the democratic processes of government in 1947, and then during 1948 they formally and 'legally' disrupted the city."

Here are some often forgotten highlights of Berlin's early post-war history:

- In the beginning Berlin was treated as a single city, no "East", no "West" Berlin. The Soviets had captured the city and took advantage of being there first to *appoint* a provisional government.

- In 1946, hoping to "legitimize" Communist rule both in Berlin and in their zone of Germany, they forced the merger in East Germany of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Communist Party (KPD) into what they called the Socialist Unity Party (SED). This favorite Communist technique was aimed at "capturing" Socialist (non-Communist) votes in Berlin and East Germany. The "merger" occurred April 19, 1946.

- But the SPD in Berlin (strongly anti-Communist) resisted the merger and insisted on running as a separate party in the first post-

war Berlin elections, October 20, 1946. The Communists suffered a severe defeat, as pointed out above, with 80.2 per cent of the more than 2,000,000 votes against them. This was the only city-wide election held since the war.

- When this first democratically-elected city parliament assembled (in the eastern part of the city) the Communists had only one-fifth of the seats. The first Mayor elected by the parliament resigned after a vote of no confidence and then the parliament elected Ernst Reuter, SPD leader—a strong political figure and a shrewd anti-Communist, having been one himself many years before. The Soviets on the Allied Kommandatura “vetoed” his election because they were certain he would replace with men of his choice administrative officials they had “appointed.”

- The first crisis in Berlin followed when the new city government, even without a mayor, insisted on making civil officials subject to its authority, especially the police force. But the Soviets had installed their men in the police who refused to submit to legal Berlin government controls and continued to take orders from Soviet officials. The crisis came to a head when the Western allies and the legal municipal government opposed arbitrary Soviet interference. The issue ultimately was resolved in the western sectors of the city, but the Communist police officials defied the Allied Kommandatura and the Berlin Government to the very end.

- The Russians walked out of the Allied Control Council for all of Germany on March 20, 1948 and left the Allied Kommandatura for Berlin on June 16, 1948.

- Currency reform in West Germany, to get the country off cigarette and chocolate bar currency and start building a viable economy, was extended to the western sectors of Berlin on June 23 after the Russians had issued new currency in East Germany and Berlin.

- June 23 was a crucial day. The Soviets ordered the SED party members to stage riots around City Hall. Demonstrators were brought to the scene in Red Army trucks to break up the city council meeting.

- June 24, the Soviets imposed a full blockade on the city.

- From August 26 to September 6-7, Communist demonstrations at City Hall were carried out under Soviet direction.

- October 25, the Soviets vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution for lifting the Berlin blockade.

- November 30, the Communists formally split the city government by establishing a “rump” government in East Berlin which

it promised to legalize with free elections. These elections were never held.

- The majority of the legal city deputies withdrew to West Berlin. The second municipal election for the entire city was scheduled for December 5, 1948 and approved by the Allied Kommandatura. The Soviets refused to let the Berliners in their east sector vote in this election.

- After the election, the elected deputies who could not return to the City Hall in the Soviet sector of the city organized themselves in West Berlin and elected Reuter the Mayor of the entire city. But their writ and Reuter's authority, in practice, could be enforced only in the Western sectors.

"This is the story of how the united city of Berlin was divided, the Western part being and remaining democratic under the legally elected government of the whole city, the East becoming a 'rump' which was eventually to claim to be the 'capital' of the equally undemocratic 'German Democratic Republic,' the White Paper concluded. "It is over this 'Western' Berlin that the struggle is once again being intensified."

When Khrushchev tells this story, of course, he accuses the West of dividing the city of Berlin! Who knows, ten years from now he probably will accuse us of building "The Wall" through Berlin!

Free Access to Berlin

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union will give "firm guarantees" of "free access" to a "free" city of West Berlin for all nations. Occupation rights of the Western powers will cease, but they will be allowed to go to and from West Berlin like everyone else.*

This sounds fine when glibly stated by Khrushchev, but experience with Soviet "guarantees" as shown elsewhere in this book have not been satisfactory. The 1948-49 blockade of Berlin was contrary to four power agreements and Russian "guarantees".

Khrushchev's plan for a "solution" of the German-Berlin problem would make the East German Communist regime sovereign. Because Berlin lies 110 miles inside East Germany, access by road, rail, air and canal is through East German territory. In the future, East Germans

would determine who could pass. Today official traffic of the Western powers passes freely to Berlin under agreements with Russia. The East Germans control only German traffic.

THE TRUTH. The joker in the proposal to make West Berlin a "free" city is the transfer of control of Allied access routes to East German Communist boss Walter Ulbricht.

Whom Ulbricht will allow to pass is not very difficult to figure out in advance. Throughout the continuing Berlin crisis, he has made inflammatory statements about what he will do to traffic to and from Berlin once authority is in his hands. Among other things he has threatened to close down the main airport in West Berlin (Tempelhof) because, he claims, the noise bothers the neighbors near by!

But even such threats are not the only indications of the Communist plot. Khrushchev himself has spelled out in great detail how he would give the East German Reds a free hand to interfere, hinder or cut off completely traffic to West Berlin.

In his interview with Alexsei Adzhubei, son-in-law of Khrushchev and editor of *Izvestia*, President Kennedy tossed out a tentative idea of an international administration on the autobahn leading to Berlin "so that goods and people can move freely in and out."

Few statements made by the President in that interview have been subjected to so much ridicule and criticism by the Soviets. During an address in Moscow on December 9, 1961, Khrushchev accused President Kennedy of proposing to "let us play traffic controller" along an international corridor.

"Extraordinary people!" Khrushchev exclaimed. "They are in something like a trance. They think all the time that this is still the same Soviet Union that it was in the first year of the revolution. But, you know, we have long changed our shorts for our fathers' long trousers. It must be supposed that the authors of this idea themselves do not take it seriously. Are they perhaps thinking of persuading us to assume so invidious a role? This idea is clearly unrealistic."

Izvestia, news organ of the government of the U.S.S.R., also replied to the President's suggestion with scorn. Calling the proposed "international administration" of the autobahn to Berlin a "worsened version of occupation rights," the newspaper stated:

"Such plans are doomed to failure. No state which prizes its sovereignty has ever allowed the establishment of international control over its roads . . . On what grounds then does the President deem it

possible to impose such a humiliating procedure on the GDR [East German regime]? Is this not an expression of disregard for other countries, an attempt to dictate to them one's will with the help of the 'big stick' of American policy? Let there be no misunderstanding: This policy has never been nor shall be successful with Socialist (Communist) states, including the GDR. The sooner this is realized in Washington the better."

The significance of statements such as this and the total Soviet threat to the western position in West Berlin as well as to the status of West Berliners IS realized in Washington. And that is why the United States has rejected the Soviet proposals. The U.S. is prepared to negotiate if possible a peaceful settlement but, as President Kennedy vowed in his 1962 State of the Union message: "We are prepared to talk, when appropriate, and to fight, if necessary."

Refugees Fled Utopia

THE LIE. *The United States pledge to defend the freedom of West Berliners is only a pretext for starting a war against the Soviet Union to prevent the imminent victory of Communism.*

This is a variation on the Soviet propaganda line about the Berlin crisis that is used with Communist audiences.¹ Nikita Khrushchev expounded this thesis in extreme form on August 11, 1961, at a Soviet-Romanian Friendship meeting in the Grand Kremlin Palace:

"The United States declares that it would fight allegedly for the freedom of Germans in West Berlin. But this is a fairy tale. West Berlin has 2,200,000 inhabitants, but if war is unleashed hundreds of millions might die. What person in his right senses would find such arguments of the imperialists convincing? Under the pretext of the defense of freedom, upon which no one is encroaching,² the imperialists want to test our determination. *They want to do away with Socialist (Communist) gains.* Your hands are too short, Messrs. imperialists!

"The imperialists approach us as they did when Russia was known as the land of bast shoes. But we have put the bast shoe into the museum . . . we fly in jet planes . . . we have already circled the globe 17 times in a space ship within 24 hours. And the imperialists want to frighten the Soviet people! They are probably trying to frighten us *because they themselves are afraid of the new Socialist*

path along which we are irresistibly advancing towards the victory of Communism . . . It is this that you are afraid of, Messrs. Imperialists!"

THE TRUTH. No place in the world is the failure of Communism more unequivocal and obvious than in East Germany. And nowhere has the glare of the spotlight shone more brightly on Communist failure than in Berlin, on the contrast between Communist East Berlin and free West Berlin.

It is truly a "fairy tale" to claim that Western fear of Communist progress provoked the Western powers to create a crisis over Berlin. There, in fact rather than in words, is stark evidence of the superiority of the free way of life. The contrast between East and West Berlin was so damaging to the Red cause, that on August 13, 1961, the Communists erected "The Wall" through the middle of the city primarily to stop the flight of tens of thousands of East Germans from Communist "Utopia" to the "decadent" world of the West.

The construction of "The Wall" between East and West Berlin was far more than a cruel, inhumane act separating families and making prisoners of one-third of a great metropolitan city. It was, in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a confession of failure of a system, which the Communists are trying to cover up by shouting about Communist victory in the competition with the West and by wild accusations of Western plans for "unleashing" World War III.

"The wall certainly ought not to be a permanent feature of the European landscape," was Rusk's comment when asked whether its removal should not be a condition of any agreement on Berlin. "I see no reason why the Soviet Union should think that it is to their advantage in any way to leave there that monument to Communist failure in East Berlin and East Germany, that prison wall to demonstrate for all to see that they are having to keep people behind walls and barbed wire at a time when it was perfectly obvious to them that the purpose of the wall could not be to keep somebody else out."

Before "The Wall" was built anyone could see for himself the differences between East and West. East Berlin is drab and dismal, with only a few show places of postwar reconstruction (such as Stalinallee now renamed Karl Marx and Frankfurter Allee in deference to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign); West Berlin is a bright, booming city, alive with construction, and the largest single industrial city in all of Germany, East or West.

Khrushchev's own words give the lie to his allegations that the Western world is afraid of competition with Communism. In the

same speech at the Soviet-Romanian Friendship meeting, he repeated a sentence to which he gives frequent lip service: "Advancing toward Communism, we are championing the idea of peaceful competition between countries with different social systems . . . *The people themselves will choose the best system.*" But when the people choose to leave, as they have been doing in East Germany since the war, Khrushchev erects "The Wall". Khrushchev always shouts about "let's compete and let the people decide," but when his system loses, as it has in Germany, he is unwilling to accept the consequences. The history of the flight of East Germans from Communism is one of the stirring stories of the postwar era. The statistics alone are overwhelming:

- In July, 1961, the last full month before "The Wall" was erected, 30,444 East Germans fled the Communist "paradise," most of them escaping through Berlin. Between August 1 and 13 (the day "The Wall" went up), more than 15,000 got away.

- The East German refugee total reached a high of 331,390 in 1953, the year the Red Army suppressed an East German revolt against the Communist regime.

- About 50 per cent of the refugees have been under 25 years of age, making East Germany progressively a nation of elderly people as well as the only major area in the world with a decreasing population.

- Since 1954 more than 12,000 "People's Policemen" (Vopos in Berlin lingo) have become refugees. There have been large numbers of Vopos among the escapees since "The Wall" went up.

- Professional men and women, including lawyers, teachers, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, etc., have fled in droves. There has been an acute shortage of doctors in East Germany for years. More than 2,000 doctors fled in the last two years. In 1960, 142 university professors and 2,000 other teachers left.

- The grand total of refugees between 1949 and June 30, 1961, was more than 2,600,000 East Germans who decided to "vote with their feet" in favor of freedom.

The stories of all these refugees and why they fled is available in the files of the refugee center in West Berlin for those who are interested in the truth. Because Khrushchev is not interested in truth, but only in finding excuses for East Germany's failure, his version of the flight of refugees reaches this flight of fancy: "From

West Berlin, the West German Government . . . directed a whole army of recruiters who used deceit, bribery and blackmail to impel a *certain part* of the East German population to move to West Germany. There these people were made to serve in the Bundeswehr, to work in military production and were drawn into various subversive organizations."

The day "The Wall" was erected, the East German Communist regime declared it necessary because Western "espionage organizations are systematically luring citizens of [East Germany] and organizing regular slave traffic."

And then to climax this blatant fabrication, Khrushchev indirectly concedes economic difficulties in East Germany. Who is to blame? Not the system, but the Western powers and West Germany who have "turned West Berlin into the main base of incessant economic sabotage against East Germany."

East German Communist boss Walter Ulbricht, also makes the West the scapegoat for his failures. In his 1961 year-end review, he conceded that "the majority of the old intelligentsia" of East Germany formerly worked for industries which he alleged had been "the organs of the imperialist state."

"No little difficulties were encountered in training a young intelligentsia from among the workers class," he admitted. "The West German concerns intentionally recruited such specialists to hamper in every way our economic construction. Some" citizens left the Socialist camp and entered the imperialist camp. The training of the labor force which was later recruited by the West German monopolists cost us alone more than 30 billion marks, that is, almost 40 per cent of the national income of 1961."

"The Wall"

THE LIE. *"There are people in West Germany who would like us to mobilize the building workers of East Berlin to put up a wall (between East and West Berlin). I am not aware of any intentions, since the building workers in our capital are chiefly engaged in the*

1. See page 109 for the Soviet argument that the U.S. threatens war "only" because the Soviets want to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

2. The Soviet threat to West Berlin freedom is outlined on page 118.

3. Possibly the understatement of that year to refer to tens of thousands of refugees as "some."

housing program, and their time is fully occupied. Nobody intends to put up a wall." (East German Communist Party boss Walter Ulbricht at a press conference in East Berlin on June 16, 1961.)

THE TRUTH. On August 13, 1961, two months later, "The Wall" between East and West Berlin was erected and the sector border was for all practical purposes sealed for Berliners. Some fifty thousand East Berliners who formerly worked in West Berlin were out of a job, not being allowed to cross the border.

Each day since then "The Wall" has been made higher and stronger with barbed wire, cinder blocks and concrete, and in certain sections reinforced with anti-tank barricades. It is 27 miles long, and in some places seven feet high and almost as thick. But "The Wall" has not stopped the flight of East Germans completely. Every day some reach freedom. Almost every week there is a spectacular escape—a train driven through a barrier, an escape by tunnel dug under "The Wall", men and women crawling through sewers.

Part Four

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN



Russia Helped Defeat Japan

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union played a major role in the war against Japan; entrance of the Soviets into that war was the decisive action in the defeat of Japan.*

Both Stalin and Khrushchev have repeatedly claimed major rights and privileges in postwar Japan on the basis of this perversion of history. Khrushchev has not hesitated to try to foist this fable on the American people who bore the brunt of that part of World War II. In a "Letter to American Readers," published late in 1961 as a preface to a propaganda pamphlet, *The Soviet Stand on Germany*, Khrushchev, with contemptuous disregard of the facts, wrote:

"It is a known fact that we fought Japan together with the United States. In 1945 the Soviet Army routed *the basic nucleus* of Japanese troops, the Kwantung Army in Manchuria."

THE TRUTH. The Soviet military contribution to the defeat of Japan was nil.

The course of events of World War II in the Far East changed so quickly and so radically in the summer of 1945 that the Soviet Union almost missed becoming a belligerent. Josef Stalin had to be bribed handsomely with concessions at the expense of China—not Japan—to *promise* to participate at all. But the Soviets have made the most ever since of having squeezed under the wire at the last moment by becoming a nuisance, mischief-maker and major threat to the peace in the Far East. By getting a voice in the postwar settlement for Korea, the U.S.S.R. was able to keep Korea divided, arm the Red North Korean regime, and order it to start the Korean War in 1950.

The U.S.S.R. didn't enter the war against Japan until five days before Japan surrendered and four days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The Soviets would not have entered that quickly had they not perceived that the Japanese were frantically seeking to surrender.

Throughout the war, Stalin had played a diabolical and clever diplomatic game with the United States over Japan. A major American objective, from the earliest days after Pearl Harbor, was

to get the Russians into the war with Japan because of fears that the final assault on the Japanese mainland, without Russian help, would be long and difficult. At times, the U.S. literally begged Stalin for at least a promise, and in the end had to buy that promise in the secret Yalta agreement.

Stalin's wartime excuse was that his hands were full on the German front, as they were for several years. That did not deter him, however, from bargaining with the United States for spoils in the Far East, if and when he declared war on Japan. By the time the summer of 1945 rolled around, after Hitler's defeat, Stalin had a bag full of pledges of political and territorial concessions to him in return for a very vague promise to enter the war against Japan "two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated." All this was very secret. Stalin did not participate in the allied declaration at Potsdam (July 26, 1945) calling on the Japanese to surrender. He was still standing publicly on adherence to his neutrality pact with Japan.

The Soviets and the Japanese had signed that pact on April 13, 1941, before either of them were belligerents.¹ That was two months before Hitler invaded Russia and eight months before Pearl Harbor. Both the U.S.S.R. and Japan promised to stay out of each other's wars with third parties. Stalin's earlier thinking about keeping out of the war in the Far East² was as selfish as his motives, finally, in getting into it. The first time the subject came up with President Roosevelt at Yalta, Stalin didn't hesitate to go to the root of the matter by bluntly stating, "I would like to discuss the *political conditions* under which the U.S.S.R. will enter the war against Japan."

Unwitting allies of Stalin in this game were the American military leaders. Before it was known that the atomic bomb would be a success, they had anticipated a difficult invasion of the main Japanese islands against a long kamakazi-type (suicidal) resistance. Another year or more of war was expected after Germany was defeated. Russian participation, it was hoped, would reduce American casualties. This attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prevailed as late as the Potsdam Conference in July-August, 1945, during which the first atomic bomb was successfully exploded in New Mexico.

The atomic bomb changed a lot of thinking in the Pentagon and in the Kremlin, especially after it was dropped on Hiroshima. The American military chiefs no longer cared whether Russia came into the war; but the Soviets for the first time were anxious to get in,

fearful lest they miss the boat. One historian describes the Kremlin mood thusly:

"The Soviet Government was poised to throw its forces against the Japanese Armies in Manchuria and Korea. Stalin and Soong (China's Foreign Minister T. V. Soong) were still at odds over some elements in the Sino-Soviet accord about which they had resumed talks. [This accord incorporated into a treaty the secret concessions Roosevelt made to Stalin at Yalta]. But the Soviet government did not wait, as Stalin and Molotov had repeatedly said it would, for Chinese concurrence in the Yalta accord, before plunging into the war. The Red Armies hurried to be in at the kill."

Stalin declared war against Japan on August 9, 1945. Japan surrendered August 14. But those five days were enough for the Soviet armies to move into Manchuria and Korea and for the Soviet Government to claim ever since an "equal" voice in the postwar decisions on Japan.

As for Khrushchev's claim that the Soviet Army "routed *the basic nucleus*" of Japanese troops, the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, the records of the Japanese High Command showed after the war that the Kwantung Army long before had been depleted of its best troops for service in other war theaters. Only a shell of that formidable fighting force was in Manchuria and the Japanese themselves had decided not to try to hold all of Manchuria against an expected Soviet attack, but to retreat into southeastern Manchuria and Korea.

The war with Japan was all over before the Red Army could deploy any units for a battle—even had the Japs planned to fight at the frontier.

U.S. Denied Russia a Role in Japanese Peace Treaty

THE LIE. *Why does the United States make a fuss about Soviet plans to sign a separate peace treaty with Communist East Germany? That is what the United States did with Japan, ignoring the U.S.S.R.*

Soviet leaders have wailed in this fashion about the Japanese Peace Treaty since 1951. In his report to the Russian people after the

1. See page 21 for details how this pact violated the 1937 Sino-Soviet treaty.

2. See page 82.

3. *Japan Subdued*, by Herbert Feis, 1961, Princeton University Press.

Vienna conference with President Kennedy in June, 1961, Nikita Khrushchev falsely alleged: "Leaning on its superiority in atomic weapons, the United States sought to dictate conditions not only to conquered Japan but also to its allies in the war against Japan . . . Our peoples [Russians and Americans] shed blood together against Japan . . . Our Allies disregarded the views of the Soviet Union and signed a separate peace treaty with Japan . . . [That was the way] the United States treated its ally in that case."

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told a similar tale to the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations: the Western powers "concluded a peace treaty with Japan *without* Soviet participation."

THE TRUTH. The Soviet Union was not "disregarded" in the preparation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, as Khrushchev claims. The Soviets participated in the Japanese Peace Conference, but they were not permitted to veto the wishes of 49 other nations who, unlike the Russians, "shed blood" against Japan.¹

Khrushchev and Gromyko conveniently overlook these important facts about the Japanese Peace Treaty which make it quite a different kind of case from Germany:

The peace treaty with Japan was brought about in traditional diplomatic fashion. After the Communists invaded South Korea in mid-1950 with Soviet connivance and leadership, President Truman designated the late John Foster Dulles as his special ambassador to negotiate a Japanese Peace Treaty. Dulles spent more than a year preparing a draft, consulting with all the countries involved, and getting agreement with all (including Japan) except the Soviet Union.

A peace conference was held at San Francisco in September, 1951, and attended by 52 nations. The Soviet Union and two of its satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia, participated in that conference with the same rights and privileges as all other conferees. They consumed much time at that conference, as at others, trying to frustrate the will of the majority. But meeting in the midst of the Korean war, the non-Communist participants, several of whom had soldiers fighting and dying under the United Nations flag in Korea against the Communists, were in no mood to be frustrated.

When the roll was called for signature of the treaty at the end of the conference, the Soviet Union, Communist Poland and Communist Czechoslovakia refused to sign. All the others, including the representative of the Japanese government, did sign. And when

the treaty ultimately was ratified by the freely-elected legislatures of the signatory countries, it went into effect.

The contrast between the situation in Japan and Germany is very great. In Japan there was a freely-elected, representative government of a unified nation that was willing and ready to sign the treaty with the overwhelming majority of those nations whose military efforts had brought Japan to her knees. In Germany there is no representative government of a united Germany and certainly no representative government in Communist East Germany. Germany remains divided and the U.S.S.R. now seeks to legalize that division which violates all the wartime and postwar allied agreements to create a unified Germany.²

The Japanese peace treaty did not affect any tangible rights of the Soviet Union in Japan. On the contrary, in signing the treaty, Japan renounced its sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and the southern part of the peninsula of Sakhalin, both of which President Roosevelt at Yalta agreed to give to Stalin in return for his promise to enter the war against Japan. In Germany, the Soviets do propose in their threatened separate treaty to deprive the United States, Britain and France of their rights in Berlin and to turn over control of the access routes to and from Berlin to their East German Communist puppets.

"Don't Ask Us About Japanese Prisoners"

THE LIE. *The United States violated the "rights" of the Soviet Union in Japan after the war and ousted Soviet representatives from Tokyo.*

"We had definite rights and *commitments* resulting from Japan's surrender and stipulated in corresponding agreements . . . [but] our allies did not consider us." That is the argument of Nikita Khrushchev.

THE TRUTH. Khrushchev usually concentrates on alleged Russian "rights" that he claims have been denied the Soviets. But in the above quotation, from his preface to the Soviet propaganda pamph-

1. See page 131.

2. Regarding the Soviet plan to legalize the division of Germany see page 105.

let, *The Soviet Stand on Germany*, he conceded that the Soviets had some "commitments" too. He doesn't explain that, as in Germany, Russian "commitments" in Japan were for the most part dishonored. One of the most unequivocal commitments by the Soviet Union was on Japanese prisoners of war. On July 26, 1945, at Potsdam, the United States, Britain and China in defining terms for a Japanese surrender promised: "Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

At that time the U.S.S.R. was still pretending to abide by its neutrality treaty with Japan and didn't sign the Potsdam protocol. But when the Soviets did declare war on Japan on August 8, 1945 they announced: "True to its obligations as an ally, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the allies and has joined in the declaration of the allied powers of July 26 . . ."

Here's how "true to its obligation as an ally" the Soviets were on the promise of repatriation of Japanese war prisoners who had surrendered to the Soviets in Manchuria:

- In 1949, four years after the end of the war, the Japanese claimed that 376,929 Japanese still were held by the Soviets, and in the spring of that year the official Soviet news agency, Tass, admitted that 95,000 Japanese prisoners of war still were in Soviet hands.

- In 1957, twelve years after the end of the war, the Japanese Government stated that 8,069 Japanese still were held by the Russians in the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia, 1,392 in the Soviet-held Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, and 2,629 in North Korea.

The United Nations Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War has had no better luck on this problem than with that of German prisoners of war still held by the Russians.¹ The Soviet Government has refused to discuss either the Japanese or German prisoner of war issue for several years.

1. See page 100 for similar Soviet treatment of German prisoners.

Part Five

NUCLEAR TESTS AND DISARMAMENT



U.S. Is Atomic Blackmailer

THE LIE. *The United States has indulged in atomic blackmail ever since World War II, especially in the immediate postwar years before the Soviets acquired an atomic bomb. It tried to keep its original monopoly and has done everything within its power to prevent atomic energy being used for peaceful purposes.*

This was the Communist propaganda line before the Soviet Union exploded its 57 megaton terror bomb equivalent to 57 million tons of TNT. And the line hasn't changed since then.

When Nikita Khrushchev met President Kennedy at Vienna in June, 1961, the deadlock at the conference on a nuclear weapons test ban was a major issue for discussion. One of the reasons the President described it as a "somber" meeting was the distortion of history Khrushchev submitted to President Kennedy in an aide memoire:

"There was a time when a monopoly of atomic weapons existed in the world, and the United States tried to retain it . . . Brandishing the atom bomb, United States officials were trying to dictate their will almost to the whole world, to blackmail the Communist countries . . . The Soviet people were compelled to mobilize all their material and spiritual resources to break the atomic monopoly of the United States which became a threat to peace."

In his report to the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party a few weeks later (after breaking the test moratorium), Khrushchev expanded this thesis. Blaming "gluttonous" capitalists for the continued emphasis on the use of atomic energy for weapons rather than for peaceful purposes, he cited Lenin as predicting as far back as 1913 that mankind was capable of solving immediately all tasks before it.

"But capitalism prevents this," Khrushchev asserted. "It has accumulated piles of riches and made people slaves to these riches. It solved the most complicated questions of technology (atomic energy, electronics, and jet-rocket technology) but blocked the implementation of technical improvements to remedy the poverty and darkness of millions of people because of the narrow self-interest of a handful of millionaires."

THE TRUTH. The atomic age was less than one year old when the United States made the unprecedented offer to turn its atomic

energy monopoly over to an international organization under the United Nations. It was the Soviet Union that guaranteed continuation of the U.S. monopoly in the immediate postwar years by rejecting the American offer of sharing its secret with the world and by vetoing the plan in the United Nations.

The American plan, popularly known as the Baruch plan because Bernard M. Baruch represented the U.S., was presented to the UN on June 14, 1946. All of the world, except the Communists, hailed it as one of the most extraordinary, revolutionary and unselfish international proposals ever made in the history of nations. The Baruch Plan was designed to prevent the start of the kind of fantastic atomic arms race in which the world is enmeshed today.

As the only nation in the world possessing either atomic bombs or the knowledge and plants for building them, the United States proposed:

- To destroy the few atomic bombs it had built.
- To outlaw forever the manufacture of such weapons.
- To place the development of atomic energy in all its forms under the full control of the United Nations.
- To transfer ownership of all its plants for producing fissionable material to the United Nations.
- To turn over to the UN all information bearing on atomic science and technology.

This is what Khrushchev perverts into an allegation that the United States tried to keep the secret of the atom for itself!

Whatever American shortcomings have been in the atomic age, the United States cannot fairly be accused of not seeing the awful consequences of atomic weapons and of not moving quickly to put this power under international control for peaceful uses only.

On the same day that the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, August 9, 1945, President Truman told the U.S. Congress: "The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world." He warned that international control of this new source of vast energy must be devised if the world was to be spared from total destruction.

The United States and Great Britain, the country which shared in the creation of the bomb, went to work immediately to prepare a plan for internationalizing the atom. In the United States the job was turned over to Dean Acheson, later to be President Truman's Secretary

of State, and David Lillienthal, later to be head of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

The first international step in fulfillment of American aims was creation within the United Nations, at its first General Assembly in London, of an Atomic Energy Commission. It was composed of all 11 members of the UN Security Council, plus Canada when she was not a Council member. It was empowered to establish a system for international control of atomic energy. That was in January, 1946.

The second step came on March 28, 1946, when the Acheson-Lillienthal report was published and set forth the U.S. ideas for the basic prerequisites of an international plan.

The third step was taken at the very first meeting of the UN Commission on June 14, 1946, when Baruch presented a detailed U.S. plan based on the Acheson-Lillienthal report.

Considering the complexity of the problem and the radical solution proposed, it seems little short of a miracle today that the United States could have moved so far, so quickly by the spring of 1946, in view of all the other immediate postwar problems that overwhelmed the government at that time. In the history of mankind there is no parallel to the American offer to give up a tremendous military advantage and to turn over to the world the secrets of a technical development with such vast economic potentialities.

Yet the hopes of the world, which rose so high in that first spring after a long war, were soon to be dashed by the nation which today would have the world believe that "greedy" capitalists and "ambitious militarists" in the United States from the very birth of the atomic age sought only blackmailing advantages.

The Soviet Union vetoed the Acheson-Lillienthal-Baruch plan in the United Nations. It had taken an almost opposite course. The Soviet plan would have had all nations merely *promise* never to use atomic weapons, *promise* not to produce or store such weapons, and *promise* to destroy all existing A-weapons within three months. There were no provisions for assuring that promises would be honored, no inspection or control system as in the U.S. plan. There was no suggestion that development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes be internationalized. This was a Soviet pattern in the arms field that was to be followed many times in subsequent years. The Soviets still continue to seek "Ban-the-Bomb," "Stop-the-Tests," "Total and Complete Disarmament" treaties to be signed on faith with control systems to be worked out later.

Understandably, the Soviets rarely mention the 1946 U.S. plan for international control of atomic energy, and when they do it is distorted beyond recognition.

Few darker pages in postwar history exist than those which tell the story of willful Soviet destruction of the chance to internationalize atomic energy, bar its use for military purposes, and put it to work for the benefit rather than the destruction of man. Of those days immediately after the war, Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently said, "we almost had it made": the start of a world of law and order. By vetoing the U.S. plan for international control of atomic energy, a plan that had become the UN plan, supported and approved by all UN members except the Communists, the Soviets guaranteed, according to Rusk, "the kind of nuclear arms race which is subjecting the world to terror today." The Soviets assured themselves of the chance, once they were able to acquire the atomic bomb, of using it for blackmail purposes.¹

Despite the setback in the mid-forties to efforts to find a sane international policy for atomic energy, the U.S. has not abandoned other approaches. It has played a major role in helping other nations acquire knowledge about this new science with a comprehensive program for research reactors. In 1953 there was the Eisenhower Atoms-For-Peace plan which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And, finally, there was the three year effort to end the testing of atomic weapons. The United States and Britain have been prepared for months to sign a treaty which is agreed upon in all but a few points.²

Fewer problems of the postwar age have been filled with so many frustrations as the effort to devise a wise and sensible international policy for living with the atom once it was split. There is no more outstanding example of the Communist technique of accusing others of their own crimes. The U.S.S.R. blocked American efforts to turn its atomic monopoly over to an international organization. The U.S.S.R. prevented effective efforts to promote on an international scale the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The U.S.S.R. uses its atomic weapons to try to blackmail the world. The U.S.S.R. blocks an effective end to further development of atomic weapons through a cessation of tests.

1. See page 34 for the story of how the U.S.S.R. not the U.S., persistently threatens all nations with its atomic bomb in pursuance of its policy of diplomatic blackmail.

2. This dismal episode is explained on pages 143 and 146.

Who Favored A Nuclear Test Ban First?

THE LIE. *The U.S.S.R. was "the first to raise its voice for stopping nuclear weapons tests" and "for many years" has been the "standard bearer" of the peoples' wish that testing cease.*

The big print in Soviet statements claims that the Soviet Union "discontinued nuclear tests unilaterally" in March, 1958, seven months before the abortive test ban conference opened in Geneva on October 31, 1958, and tries to leave the impression that the Soviets never tested again until the 1961 massive series of tests which violated the moratorium.

THE TRUTH. Russia was not the first to propose a nuclear test ban, nor was the now-violated test ban the result of Russian initiative. Furthermore, the Russians conducted tests during the opening days of the Geneva test ban conference, but never have admitted this breach of promise.

The world first became seriously concerned about radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests after a large U.S. thermonuclear explosion on March 1, 1954, at Bikini Atoll contaminated with radioactivity a Japanese fishing vessel, the *Fukuryu Maru* (Lucky Dragon) which had sailed too close to the test area despite warnings. Shortly thereafter radioactive rain containing debris from a large Soviet H-Bomb test fell on Japan.

The Japanese were the first to protest about radioactive fallout, and Indian Prime Minister Nehru, on April 2, 1954, was the first to propose that the nuclear powers seek some sort of "standstill agreement." It was almost another two years before the Soviet Union "raised its voice" on this issue.

To talk about the early days of the test ban problem today, without reference to the facts of the nuclear world in the early fifties, only distorts the problem and its history. That, of course, is a Soviet objective.

The Hydrogen Bomb Age—in contrast to the Atomic Bomb Age—was born in peacetime but only after long and severe birth pains that ultimately included the controversy over nuclear physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer.¹ After a bitter fight within his administration, President Truman gave a go-ahead in 1950 to develop an H-Bomb, supporting those who claimed the Soviets were or would be racing to get such

a weapon first. In the end the U.S. tested an H-Bomb dropped from an airplane only six months before the Russians.*

Thus, neither of the nuclear colossi (at that point Britain had not developed even its own A-Bomb) were concerned much about nuclear matters other than the contest for the development and production of superbombs. Both countries believed that their ultimate security depended on development of such a bomb. The Soviets sound today as though they were terribly concerned then only about fallout. But the records show no such concern emanating from the Kremlin. It was not until long *after* both countries had concluded sufficient experiments to assure the ability to create H-Bomb stockpiles that they gave increasing attention to the cries of anguish and fear about fallout from countries such as Japan and India.

There followed much maneuvering in the United Nations and in disarmament talks about the new question of a cessation of tests. This unhappily got entangled with the 1956 Presidential election in the United States when Adlai Stevenson proposed a cessation of hydrogen bomb tests and President Eisenhower rejected the idea as one that could lead only to "confusion at home and misunderstanding abroad."

But in 1957 and early 1958 the pressures on the nuclear powers to move in the direction of a test ban increased sharply with each new series of tests. On March 31, 1958, after the largest series of nuclear tests ever staged until then by Soviet Russia and on the eve of already announced plans for a U.S. test series, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. approved a decree announcing unilateral cessation of Soviet tests and appealing to the parliaments of other nuclear powers to do the same. Khrushchev, who only recently had assumed the premiership of the Soviet Union, proposed to Eisenhower that the U.S. "immediately" discontinue tests.

President Eisenhower rejected the proposal with the comment that he found it "peculiar that the Soviet Union, having just concluded a series of tests of unprecedented intensity, should now, *in bold headlines*, say that it will not test again, but add, *in small type*, that it may test again if the United States carries out its already long announced and now imminent series of tests."⁸

By August, however, after a meeting of scientists on technical detection matters, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, with Great Britain acquiescing, to seek a nuclear test ban treaty with international controls and inspection. The conference was to start October 31 and on the same day a moratorium on all tests "for a

period of one year" was to start, too. The U.S. promised to continue the moratorium on a year-to-year basis after the first year if "satisfactory progress" was being made toward agreement.

With two months left before the moratorium was to start, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. raced to complete nuclear tests already planned. The United States conducted 20 tests in the air, 3 in space, and 11 underground during those two months, all small ones in the low kiloton range except for one 19 kiloton underground test. The U.S.S.R. conducted 16 tests of which seven were in the high range of megatons and only one was rated "small." All were in the air. Two of these tests were violations of the moratorium at its start, being conducted on November 1 and 3 after the October 31 deadline. President Eisenhower announced these violations and noted that it relieved the U.S. of its commitment to cease testing, but that the U.S. would continue the talks and abide by the moratorium anyway.

Thus there have been no "years" when the Soviets "ended testing and the others did not." There was a series of 16 Soviet tests even after the big headline grab in March, 1958, announcing that the Soviets unilaterally were stopping tests.

The Soviet leaders can get away with this with their own people because the Soviet people have been told next to nothing about any of the tests made by the U.S.S.R.—not even those *recent ones* in violation of the 1958-61 moratorium. The public-be-damned attitude never has been made clearer than by Khrushchev when, on May 28, 1957, Columbia Broadcasting correspondent Daniel Schorr asked him: "Why did the Soviet Government not give a pre-warning or subsequently even report the last five tests in your country?"

"What would that give mankind?" Khrushchev replied. "Nothing. Of what importance is it? Once an explosion takes place the air is contaminated. A man will not be the better if I tell him beforehand that I am about to explode a bomb and contaminate the air, and that his health will, therefore, suffer."

But when American tests are involved "Of what importance is it?" gets a different answer. Khrushchev did not tell his own people about the 50 explosions in the air by the Soviet Union in September-October, 1961. But when the U.S. responded with a few relatively small tests, all underground with no radioactive fallout, they made the front page of *Pravda* every time!

Having completed his series of tests, Khrushchev then said that if the United States tested again in the air, the Soviet Union would be "compelled" (there's that word again) to resume testing!

Russia Never Will Test First Again

(In this instance, the order of *The Lie* and *The Truth* are reversed because on this issue the truth is brief and recent, while the Soviet lies that preceded the violation of the test moratorium are many and extended over several years).

THE TRUTH. On September 1, 1961, the Soviet Union broke a voluntary moratorium on all nuclear tests with the United States and Great Britain that had prevailed for two years and ten months. The violation occurred while the three nuclear powers still were sitting at a conference table in Geneva seeking a treaty to ban all nuclear tests forever under a system of international inspection and control. The Soviet Union justified its decision by charging that President Kennedy and America's allies were threatening to "unleash" World War III and a thermonuclear holocaust against the Soviet Union.

With an alleged "heavy heart" and admission of "the harmful effects on living organisms" of nuclear tests, the Soviets nevertheless proceeded between September 1, 1961 and the first week of November to stage more than 40 nuclear tests in the atmosphere. And among them were two of the largest explosions ever made by man—one of 30 megatons and another of 57 megatons yield. (A megaton is equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT.) The Russians disregarded an appeal by the United Nations not to explode its superbomb in the 50 megaton range. A bomb so large exceeds all practical military application and can only be classified as a weapon of terror.

THE LIE. When the Soviet Union resumed testing of nuclear weapons it proved that its endlessly repeated statements of the previous years to the effect that it never would be the *first* to begin tests again were nothing but falsehoods. Whatever the motivation behind the Kremlin's decision, a major lesson of this episode is more proof that Soviet statements cannot be taken at face value.

1. Details of the Oppenheimer case are contained in the transcript of the hearings on his security clearance, published by the Government Printing Office, 1954.

2. See page 149 for details of H-bomb race.

3. Khrushchev revived this same "trick" in 1961-62, after completing the biggest series of Russian tests ever and thus breaking the three-year-old test moratorium. Once the Russian series ended, Khrushchev denounced President Kennedy's preparations to resume testing as an "aggressive act." He threatened to stage more tests if the U.S. answered the 1961 Russian test series with tests.

Time and again Nikita Khrushchev accused the United States during the long Geneva negotiations on a test ban treaty of preparing and planning to resume tests. Just as frequently he piously proclaimed that the U.S.S.R. would never be guilty of frustrating the hopes of mankind in this fashion.

The details of the nuclear testing controversy are complex and technical. But on some things the record is clear and understandable to the layman. In retrospect, it seems that Khrushchev did protest too much. Here is only a partial list of his "solemn pledges" that the Soviet Union would never be the first to resume testing:

- The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. on August 29, 1959 at the end of the first year of the moratorium: "resolved not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union if the Western powers do not resume nuclear testing. Only in case of resumption by them of nuclear tests will the Soviet Union be free from this pledge."

- To the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959, Khrushchev promised: "Only if the Western powers resume tests of nuclear weapons will the Soviet Union consider itself free . . . to resume atomic and hydrogen weapons tests."

- The pledge to the UN was repeated verbatim to the Director of the Argentine newspaper *Clarín* on December 30, 1959.

- To the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on January 4, 1960, Khrushchev expressed horror at the "consequences" if any of the nuclear powers resumed tests and warned: "The government that resumes nuclear tests first will assume a grave responsibility before all the people."

- Ten days later Khrushchev expanded on the same theme: "It would be difficult to reconcile a decision by any one of the three powers to resume nuclear weapons tests with the commitments made before all the members of the United Nations to continue the moratorium . . . The instigators of such violations will cover themselves with shame and be condemned by the peoples of the world."

- At an incredible press conference in Paris, May 18, 1960, after wrecking the Summit Conference, Khrushchev accused President Eisenhower of planning to resume tests and added: "In that event all people will see who the true culprit is, who is wrecking the cessation of these tests."

- After President Kennedy was inaugurated, Soviet claims that it never would be first to test became less explicit. After all, by then preparations for the forthcoming Soviet violation of the moratorium

were underway. Khrushchev conceded in 1958 that "a year is precisely the period necessary for preparing another series of nuclear tests." In that case preparation for the September-October, 1961, Soviet tests must have started in September 1960. Yet as late as June 21, 1961, Khrushchev returned again to the theme that the Soviets would not test first but coupled with the threat that: "no sooner does the United States resume nuclear tests than the Soviet Union will start testing its nuclear weapons . . . For close to three years the Soviet Union has been making no nuclear weapons tests . . . and in the future we can do without carrying out nuclear tests."

The Khrushchev exercise in duplicity ended with the first Soviet nuclear bang on September 1, 1961 and reached a climax in outraging world opinion with the explosion of the superbomb, equivalent to 57 million tons of TNT on October 30, 1961. That bomb had an explosive force 3,000 times the atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima.

While violating his oft-repeated promise on the one hand, Khrushchev did not share the horror of the rest of the world after the explosion of the 57 megaton terror bomb. On the contrary, he who professes to be disturbed by the "war psychosis" he attributes to others joked about the superbomb. He told the 22nd Communist Party Congress that it was a "mistake" and larger than planned, but "we shall not punish the Soviet scientists for it."

By the end of 1961 world-wide agitation over the Soviet resumption of tests was subsiding, but Khrushchev showed no sign of letting it do so. He seemed determined to reap every ounce of propaganda advantage from it and to advertise his utter disdain for world opinion. On December 9, 1961 before the World Congress of Trade Unions, Khrushchev became near-hysterical with mixed boasts and threats:

"As a result of the test carried out, the forces of Socialism and the international workers movement obtained a mighty new weapon to keep the imperialist aggressors in check—thermonuclear bombs with a power of 50 million to 100 million tons and more . . . We say to the imperialist camp: 'Take it easy, Messrs. Imperialists; if you want to conduct a policy from a position of strength, then here is the strength which will be posed to counter your strength. Here it is! You still do not have 50 megaton and 100 megaton bombs and we already have more than 100 megatons'.

"We do not use these weapons to present any demands—no, and never will use this weapon for claiming anything by threats. But

we shall always use these weapons against enemies if they unleash war against the Socialist countries. Let those whom it may concern put that in their pipe and smoke it!

"This is a colossal force, comrades, and therefore now, when the imperialists decide the question of whether they should unleash war or not, the 50 and 100 megaton Soviet bombs will hang over their heads like the sword of Damocles . . . We do not want to frighten anybody—anybody at all!

"We understand their concern [about fallout] and are also trying to put an end to the exploding of thermonuclear bombs. But . . . the Socialist countries must think primarily not of the radioactive dangers from tests but of preventing nuclear bombs from destroying whole cities and millions of people . . . Imperialists are increasing nuclear weapons in their countries, they are threatening us with war, and we, you and I, would be fools [the Russian word was *slyuntyai*; some newspaper versions translated it "slobbering idiots" and the Tass Agency English version used the word "nincompoops"] if, having the opportunity of creating thermonuclear weapons, we did not create them because it is said that our 'health' would, so to speak, worsen. And thus we would find ourselves disarmed in the face of the armed imperialist camp.

"Do you then want to create conditions where the imperialist bosses would destroy the peoples of the Socialist countries and we not even carry out tests so as not to pollute the air for them! . . . What good is clean air to me, what good is clean air to our people, if they are threatened by death by the imperialist camp!"

The H-Bomb—A Russian First

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union invented the H-Bomb.*

Back in the immediate postwar years of the Stalin era, Soviet propagandists engaged in a major effort to claim "firsts" in almost every field of endeavor. Hardly anything was omitted in this ridiculous campaign. They even claimed that Russians invented baseball.

This is not a characteristic acquired since Communism took over Russia. It seems to be a long-standing trait of the Russians, now used by the Communists in the effort to make people believe that their society is first in everything.

Nikita Khrushchev uses this technique frequently when talking to

his own people whose only knowledge of the world is limited to what the regime thinks is good for the regime.¹ He makes statements to Russian audiences which would be hooted down with ridicule by audiences whose knowledge is not restricted to *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. He often combines such unsupportable claims with his earthy type of humor which brings a chuckle and thus dilutes the falsehood he is stating.

Khrushchev's boasts about Soviet science have known few bounds since Sputnik and none at all since first sending a man into space. Nikita is not satisfied to confine his boasts to fields where the Soviets have unquestioned "firsts" but insists on projecting them to other areas, as in the following statement on February 23, 1961, to agricultural workers who have no basis for judging between lie and truth: "Having created the atom bomb, the American imperialists began talking about creation of a hydrogen bomb. Our scientists, as the saying goes, put this in their pipes, wound it around their whiskers, worked a bit and created the hydrogen bomb *before* it was invented in the United States."

THE TRUTH. The United States conducted its first hydrogen bomb experiment—a thermonuclear experiment—on November 16, 1952. The Soviet Union's first thermonuclear device was tested August 20, 1953.

The United States first tested an H-Bomb dropped from an aircraft on May 21, 1955. The Soviet Union's first air drop of an H-Bomb was on November 26, 1955.

In this case the truth, for which Khrushchev has no discernible respect, is that American and Soviet scientists were neck-and-neck on this nuclear age development. As in so many other scientific accomplishments, there can be parallel development of inventions without the two developers having any contact or exchange of information.

Once the atomic bomb became reality in the test at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, the most important obstacle to the nuclear age had been hurdled. That successful explosion confirmed many more theoretical possibilities, including the step from a fission bomb (the A-Bomb) to a fusion bomb (the H-Bomb with a fission trigger).

The fact that the Soviet Union created its own atomic bomb more quickly than expected after its late start, often has been attributed primarily to the stealing of atomic secrets through its elaborate es-

pionage system. Scientists would concede that this helped, although the original Smyth Report, freely published by the Government of the United States in July, 1945, undoubtedly gave the Soviets more valuable information than they were able to steal.

The most valuable secret, as in so many scientific developments, was the knowledge that production of the atomic bomb was possible, that the atom could be split, and that Einstein's equation $E=cm^2$ was correct. This became common knowledge the minute President Truman announced the dropping of a bomb on Hiroshima.

U.S.S.R. Abides by International Law

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union is the only true believer in and abider by international law.*

The Communists use this canard whenever it fits a particular tactical situation, but easily forget it whenever challenged to put their actions to the test of international law.

A most recent example was the Soviet violation of the moratorium on nuclear testing, at a time when their propaganda pitch was all-out for a ban on nuclear tests. On February 8, 1961—about six months prior to Soviet resumption of tests in the atmosphere and at a time when preparation for the massive series of tests in the fall of 1961 must have been underway—the Soviet Publishing House of the Institute of International Relations passed for publication a booklet entitled "Nuclear Disarmament," by O. V. Bogdanov.

The forthcoming switch in the Soviet "line" on tests obviously had not gotten this far in the Moscow bureaucracy because the booklet expressed outrage at the idea of nuclear tests.

"Among the universally recognized principles of international law," the booklet proclaimed, "a principle has existed for ages obliging all states to *refrain from actions which may cause damage to other states*. Each country must exercise its sovereign rights in such a way as not to impair the rights of other countries . . . So tests of nuclear weapons in view of their harmful consequences inevitably entail the infliction of definite damage to all countries and peoples, which in turn demonstrates that *they are not in accord with the foregoing principle of international law*.

"The international legal community quite rightly drew attention to this point, noting that the U.S.S.R. had completely fulfilled its

obligation arising out of the above mentioned international-legal principle, when in 1958 it unilaterally stopped nuclear tests and announced that it would never resume the testing of nuclear weapons if the Western powers would also discontinue nuclear explosions.

"Thus at the present time the question arises of recognising that in view of the universal damage they cause, *the tests of nuclear weapons are in conflict with the elementary principles of contemporary international law*. . . All nuclear tests must be stopped everywhere and forever. This conclusion is dictated by the interests of safety and international peace, and also by the standards of humanitarianism and internal law."

THE TRUTH. This is one of those frequent cases where the Communists not only prove themselves liars and deceivers, but also violators of international law and decency.

Nuclear testing in the air, they admitted in February, would "cause damage to other states," and therefore violate "the universally recognized principles of international law."

But in September, Soviet tests were resumed on a huge scale—both in numbers of tests and size of explosion. In two months the Soviet megatonnage exploded exceeded that of all the tests by the Western powers in 16 years.

The only conclusion can be that they are guilty by their acts of September, 1961, of violating the standards proclaimed by the Soviets themselves in February, 1961.

U.S.S.R. Favors Strict Inspection

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union is ready to agree to comprehensive international control and inspection of disarmament agreements. The United States sabotages all efforts to achieve disarmament. It does not dare say publicly that it is opposed to disarmament and, therefore, has concocted the legend that the Soviet Union is opposed to inspection and control.*

This has been a most successful lie. It has led many people, especially those who still accept Russian statements at face value, to believe that the United States is to blame for the failure of disarmament negotiations.

"We have openly announced," Khrushchev says over and over again,

"that we are prepared *beforehand* to agree to *any of their proposals* for the *strictest international control* if they accept our proposal for general and complete disarmament."

If Khrushchev really meant what that statement seems to say, a comprehensive disarmament program would have been under way long ago.

THE TRUTH. When the Soviets are pinned down to agree to specific American proposals for inspection and control of disarmament, the answer is that such systems—in *advance of total disarmament*—would only be "an international system of legalized espionage." They insist that "general and complete disarmament" must be *achieved* before general control and inspection can operate.

And when it is asked how anyone is to know that genuine disarmament is taking place if there is not an international system for verification, Khrushchev responds with the kind of reply he recently gave *Pravda*:

"Control measures may be compared to a whip. And so it appears that the Western powers would like to have the whip before they obtain the horse. We propose to get the horse, that is to *solve* the question of disarmament, and *then* to start using the whip to urge on those who deviate from the obligations on disarmament that they have taken upon themselves."

The key to this semantic trick is that he always talks about "international control *over disarmament*." The Soviet government's disarmament document that was presented to the UN should make this trick clear: "The Soviet government cannot accept control *before* disarmament . . . Control *before* disarmament is nothing more than a form of arms control—in other words, control over a continuing arms race. Control not linked with disarmament measures would become an international system of legalized espionage."

Yet the previous paragraph of that same document says: "If the Western powers will accept the proposal on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union will *unconditionally* accept those powers' proposals on control."

This is the now-you-see-it, now-you-don't game.

The records of the past 15 years of disarmament negotiations prove beyond peradventure of doubt that the Soviet Union has been consistent on only one point: *unconditional rejection* of every control and inspection system ever proposed. It was on this issue that the Baruch plan for internationalization of atomic energy foundered.¹ It

was the issue on which every discussion of any arms problem—from President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" offer to the most recent Geneva nuclear test ban conference—died.

Much of the success, however, of the Soviet propaganda on this issue is not just the result of Communist propensity for saying one thing in one paragraph and the opposite in the next, on the theory that a lot of people can be fooled a lot of the time. It also is their ability to offer what looks like a very simple solution for an extremely complex problem, usually based on the demand that the U.S.S.R.'s good faith be accepted.

It is only fair to note at this point that at various times the United States has been inept, unprepared, poorly organized and even disorganized for disarmament negotiations—factors Russia always takes advantage of brilliantly. American governmental agencies seldom have been in complete agreement, either.

But the real obstacle to disarmament is Soviet-American disagreement on the control and inspection issue. A comparison of the two positions discloses the deep-seated nature of this conflict and how it goes to the root of the differences between an "open society" and a "closed society":

The U.S. position: There must be comprehensive and effective international control, inspection and verification *at every stage of disarmament*. Complete and total disarmament cannot be achieved overnight, as the Soviets imply; it is a goal far in the future that can be worked for only by progressive steps. There must be a comprehensive international control system set up at the beginning of disarmament, to verify among other things from what position the nations are disarming. It doesn't do any good to witness the destruction of 100,000 Russian artillery pieces on the theory that they are half of the total unless there is a system to verify that the total is in fact 200,000 and not, say, 300,000 or 400,000, etc.

The U.S.S.R. position: Total disarmament, except for small arms needed for internal policing, should be accomplished in four years. Until that is achieved, inspection must be limited to observation of the destruction of weapons. Each nation must take on faith the word of the other side about the status of its disarmament program. Control, inspection and verification, therefore, would be confined to each specific disarmament measure. The Soviets would let the international control system watch the destruction of 100,000 artillery pieces in the above example, but would forbid inspectors from verifying that it

was half the Soviet stockpile or from determining that others were not being built.

The United States put the Soviets to the crucial test on this problem at the United Nations in the fall of 1961. The Kennedy Administration's new disarmament program accepted as the goal of any disarmament plan the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament. The President's special disarmament advisor, John J. McCloy, negotiated with the Soviets a set of general principles to guide future negotiations. But again, as so many times in the past, the Soviets refused to include what their own general statements seem to say about controls. They insisted on removal of the following phrasing which the U.S. considers the key to any disarmament plan: "Verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage."

Without such guarantees any disarmament plan would be a sham. Without them the United States could never enter a disarmament program because the Kremlin long ago destroyed any faith others might have in its word. The deadlock is total because the Soviets insist they will never sign a treaty that contains such guarantees.

U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson spelled out the American position and its differences with Russia in November, 1961, at the UN: "Verification must be understood not as a technical point but as a *fundamental principle*—as the *essential condition* for any significant progress in disarmament—as its *sine qua non*. To pretend that there is enough confidence between the major armed powers to accept disarmament without verification (which is what the U.S.S.R. would have us do) is to deny the existence of the arms race itself. For the arms race is nothing if not living proof of the absence of mutual trust, and confidence has been rudely shaken by recent events (Soviet resumption of nuclear testing).

"I will say quite bluntly that mistrust exists on our side—and how could it be otherwise? The hostility of Soviet leaders toward my country, its institutions and its way of life is proclaimed, documented and demonstrated in a thousand ways. Yet we earnestly seek agreement with them—through diplomatic methods—and through agreements recorded in words and deeds. So we may be excused, it seems to me, if we are wary of agreements" deeply involving our national security with a nation whose recent leader wrote this: 'Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is

no more possible than dry water or iron wood'. These are the words of the late Marshal Stalin. . .

"We have seen wholesale violations of agreements pledging self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe³—not to mention so contemporary an event as creation of a wall through the middle of a city in violation of a postwar agreement.⁴ I do not mention these matters to belabor the dead, not to rub salt in wounds both old and fresh, nor to becloud the disarmament problem with irrelevant questions. They are not irrelevant—because there can be no disarmament without agreement—and because clear warnings and harsh experience have taught us to insist upon independent and international verification of agreements with the Soviet Union.

"Our deepest hope—our most fervent prayer—is for proof that this acquired lack of trust will no longer be justified. Meanwhile, we do not ask that those who are suspicious of us take us at our word. We offer to them the same guarantees that we have the right and duty to demand of them. *We offer to submit to verification procedures under international control at each step of disarmament.*"

Stevenson reminded the Soviet leaders that even in an "open society" such as ours, it would not be easy to play host to teams of foreign inspectors inside the United States, but that the United States was willing to pay that price if the result was disarmament and an end to the terrifying arms race. "There is no other way to dispel mistrust—to exorcise suspicion—to begin to build the mutual confidence upon which peaceful cooperation ultimately depends," he warned.

During February and March, 1962, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev exchanged letters which left the question of inspection, control and verification of disarmament agreements more deadlocked than ever. Khrushchev not only rejected the American proposals, but also persisted in misrepresenting what the United States seeks. The breadth of disagreement is set forth in two excerpts from the correspondence:

Khrushchev to Kennedy on February 21, 1962—"You want the Soviet Union to agree to the establishment of control over not only the armed forces and armaments to be reduced or liquidated in accordance with agreement, but also over the part which is to be retained by the states for the time being . . . Imagine, for instance, that we negotiate reduction of the armed forces of our countries by several divisions. We are willing to do this. But you demand control not only over the disbandment of these divisions but over all the armed

forces and armaments in the possession of states. This would indeed be 'buying a lamb for a ruble and getting ten rubles change,' as the popular saying goes."

Kennedy to Khrushchev on February 24, 1962—"Your discussion of the control problem is based, in my view, on a fundamental misconception of the United States position . . . It is not true, as you allege, that the United States is seeking to establish complete control over national armaments from the beginning of the disarmament process. Our position is a quite simple one, and it is that whatever disarmament obligations are undertaken must be subject to satisfactory verification . . . If, as we have both proposed, there is an agreement to reduce the level of armed forces to a specified number we must be able to insure through proper verification mechanisms that this level is not exceeded."

U.S. Blocks Disarmament

THE LIE *The Soviet Union has been negotiating patiently for years with the United States on disarmament. But the Americans are always disrupting such conferences.*

This distortion of the postwar history of disarmament negotiations¹ is frequently made in the face of such U.S. initiatives in this field as the Baruch plan for internationalizing atomic energy,² and many subsequent efforts to stop the arms race. The reader will not have forgotten that the conference on a nuclear test ban treaty was torpedoed while in session by the explosion of Soviet nuclear tests on September 1, 1961.

THE TRUTH. On March 14, 1962, a new Disarmament Committee met in Geneva to try again. This time it was an 18-nation committee³, with five Communist nations, five Western powers, and eight other nations representing Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

Just to keep the record straight, it may be of value to repeat here how the last general disarmament conference broke down, or rather,

1. See page 141 for details of the Baruch plan.

2. For worthlessness of Soviet treaty promises see page 18.

3. See page 52.

4. See page 124 and 127.

how it was broken up by the walk-out of the Communist members. That was the old 10-nation Disarmament Committee, five Communists and five Westerners.

The time was late June, 1960. The U.S. delegate Frederick Eaton had just returned to Geneva from Washington with new instructions and a new paper for submission to the conference. He informed the Soviet delegate, Valerian Zorin, now the chief U.S.S.R. delegate to the UN, of plans to present his new proposals. When the conference convened on June 27, it was the turn of the Polish delegate to be chairman. His first action was to recognize each of the five Communist delegates. Each announced his intention to walk out of the conference before Eaton had a chance to present his new proposals. The verbatim record of the rest of the meeting follows.

Naszkowski (Polish delegate and Chairman): "After the statements made by the Representatives of the Five Socialist States, the work of the Ten Nation Committee is discontinued, and it is quite clear that the role of the chairman has been exhausted."

The Representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics started to withdraw from the meeting.

M. Moch (France): "Point of order. Mr. Chairman, I ask you to recognize me. I ask to speak, Mr. Chairman. Do you know the rules of procedure? What a scandal!"

Mr. Ormsby-Gore (United Kingdom): "Point of order, Mr. Chairman."

Mr. Eaton (United States): "Point of order."

M. Moch (France): "I ask for the floor, I ask that this meeting continue and that the next representative in alphabetical order should take the chair. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, please take the chair. The meeting is going on. This is a scandal. It is hooliganism. What a shameful performance! If this is your kind of democracy I can only say that it is a fine one!"

The representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the U.S.S.R. withdrew from the meeting.

Against such a background, it is not surprising that in February, 1962, before new disarmament talks were to start in Geneva on March 14, Nikita Khrushchev did his best to prevent them from starting on a business-like, negotiating basis and tried to convert them into a major propaganda circus.

As the time drew near for the 18-nation disarmament conference to start, President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Mac-

millan, who were depressed by the collapse of nuclear test ban negotiations, took the initiative to try to revive meaningful talks that would at least slow down the arms race. On February 7 they sent a joint letter to Khrushchev proposing that the 18-nation Geneva conference be preceded by a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three nuclear powers, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, British Foreign Secretary Lord Home, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. They further proposed that the 18-nation conference open at the Foreign Ministers' level.

"We must view the forthcoming disarmament meetings as an opportunity and a challenge which time and history may not once again allow us," the Kennedy-Macmillan letter concluded.

Khrushchev responded by raising the ante, suggesting in letters to the heads of government of all the 18 participating nations that it be converted into a summit conference. He spoke disdainfully of lesser bureaucrats.

Kennedy politely rejected the proposal, but held out a possibility of the heads of government meeting later if there was progress in lower level negotiations. He pointed out that such progress depended on eliminating the differences over that old bugaboo, inspection, control and verification of disarmament measures step by step. Khrushchev dropped his polite facade in the correspondence and sent a tough, undiplomatic and accusatory reply to Kennedy on February 22—insisting on a summit conference and accusing the United States of not really wanting to negotiate seriously. He even denounced as "aggressive acts" President Kennedy's preparations to resume nuclear testing in the air, a step taken only after Russia conducted a massive series of tests in late 1961 in violation of the moratorium.⁴

Khrushchev's most angry words were a categorical rejection of the U.S. proposals for an inspection system: "We have every reason to regard the control proposed by the Western powers—which would in effect be control before disarmament—as espionage. Such control would enable an aggressive state (the U.S.) to place its intelligence agents on the territory of peace-loving states (the U.S.-S.R.) and collect information about their defense system; and then decide whether to proceed with disarmament or turn to war . . . I must tell you frankly: You will achieve nothing if you approach the question of control in this way, because we will not agree to this."

Khrushchev's description of the inspection and control system proposed by the United States is a distortion of the facts. He fails to

mention that whatever kind of inspection would take place in Russia would also take place in the United States, or that it would be done by an international control agency, not "intelligence agents" of the United States."

Kennedy adamantly opposed being euchred into a premature Summit Conference and by early March Khrushchev dropped the proposal and accepted the Kennedy-Macmillan plan to start the conference with foreign ministers, reserving the possibility of a heads of state gathering until such time as some evidence of progress was made.

In the meantime, President Kennedy announced in a television and radio address on March 2 that the United States would resume nuclear testing in the air if the Soviet Union failed to agree by then to a test ban treaty with international controls and guarantees against both preparation for tests and tests themselves. (Previously the U.S. exploded 20 small nuclear tests underground after the Russians had broken the voluntary moratorium on tests with a massive series which included superbombs).

The Kennedy announcement touched off another round of vituperation from Kremlin occupants who acted as though they had not already started a new phase of the nuclear weapons testing race after nearly three years of no tests by the big powers. Khrushchev replied with a threat to stage more Russian tests and tried to twist the facts so that blame for another round would fall on Kennedy rather than on himself.

Forgetting the more than 40 tests he staged in the fall of 1961, Khrushchev warned Kennedy: "If the United States starts test explosions of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union, in the interests of safeguarding its security and world peace, will undoubtedly have to reply to this too by holding a series of new tests. And we have the technical possibilities for this and they are at least equal to yours. Hence by your tests you will start a new stage in the race of creating the most death-bringing types of weapons."

President Kennedy answered that lie about recent events prior to announcing his intention to resume atmospheric tests.

In an earlier exchange, Kennedy placed the blame exactly where it belonged.

"It is strange," the President's letter of February 24 to Khrushchev said, "for the Soviet Union, which first broke the truce on nuclear testing, now to characterize any resumption of testing by the United States as an aggressive act. It was resumption of testing by the Soviet Union which put this issue back into the context of the

arms race and that consequently forced the United States to prepare to take such steps as may be necessary to insure its own security. Any such steps could not be characterized now as 'aggressive acts.' They would be a matter of prudent policy in the absence of the effectively controlled nuclear test agreement that we have so earnestly sought."

As the above shows, negotiations with the Soviets are extremely difficult at all stages. They do not hesitate, as in June, 1960, to break up an existing conference with "hooligan" behavior. They do not, as in February, 1962, have any compunctions against seeking propaganda advantages in advance of the conference. And, of course, actual negotiations during a conference never have been anything except tortuous.

1. The most comprehensive study of all disarmament negotiations since the war is contained in *Postwar Negotiations For Arms Control*, by Bernard G. Bechhofer. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1961.

2. See page 139 et seq for Russia's rejection of the Baruch Plan.

3. The 18 nations are divided into three groups—*The West*: United States, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy. *The Communists*: The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. *Others*: Brazil, Mexico, Burma, India, Sweden, Ethiopia, Nigeria, United Arab Republic. France boycotted the opening sessions.

The set of general principles which are supposed to be the basis for negotiation were agreed upon after months of work by John J. McCloy for the U.S. and Ambassador Valerian Zorin for the U.S.S.R. during the summer and fall of 1961.

4. The story of Soviet resumption of nuclear testing is told on page 146.

5. Details of the conflicting positions on disarmament control will be found on page 152 et seq.

Part Six
COLONIALISM

Americans Are Imperialists

THE LIE. *The United States is today's No. 1 colonial power, the center and main stronghold not only of old-fashioned imperialistic colonialism, but also of the new fangled, economic neocolonialism which dominates and controls territories with military and economic aid.*

The Communists whip up this thesis into a major issue each year at the United Nations. With the help of many new nations, they are invariably able to obtain support of a resolution calling for "immediate and total" independence for all remaining colonial territories—even for tiny oceanic atolls like St. Helena, Guam, Pitcairn Island, etc.

The United States, rather than the old-time colonial powers, has become the major target of the Communists on colonialism. It is accused of being an "apologist" for imperialism motivated by the desire for "vast profits by U.S. monopolies derived from the exploitation of the natural wealth and the cheap labor of colonial territories."

The Soviet document on this subject at the 16th UN General Assembly contained this unjustified diatribe: "The history of the United States of America has been for many decades and still is today a history of colonial wars and imperialist aggressions . . . Like the other colonial powers, the United States has not only clung tenaciously to its colonies but is even not averse to appropriating additional territories . . . The United States is itself acting as the chief gendarme and oppressor of the colonial peoples."

THE TRUTH. The Soviet campaign to smear the United States with the "colonialism" label is a calculated scheme to hide these truths:

- The Sino-Soviet bloc is the largest colonial empire which has ever existed in all history.
- Communist colonialism is the only imperial system which is trying to expand in all directions and on all continents. All other colonial systems, except Portugal's, are in the process of liquidation.
- The Soviet colonial system is one of the most cruel and oppressive ever devised. It is maintained by ruthless police controls, eradicates

all national identity of the people, suppresses basic freedoms, and isolates the subject peoples from the rest of the world.

• Once seized by the Communist colonial tentacles, people are not given a chance to choose their future or destiny.

Much of the Soviet campaign against a colonial system that is disappearing is to distract attention from the Red colonial empire which is growing. It also is an effort to lure the new nations recently freed from colonialism into the Communist orbit with scare talk about neo-colonialism. Lies or distortion and falsification of the facts are major tools for this strategy.

The Communists always enjoy ignoring the fact that more than 40 former colonial territories of Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands with more than 800 million people have attained independence since the war, and that more than half of them are in Africa. No one in the Soviet or Red Chinese Empires has acquired freedom and independence except by fleeing.

While the Communists talk as though old-fashioned colonialism is growing, Britain, once the world's largest colonial power, has guided India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Ghana, Nigeria, Cyprus, Sierra Leone and Tanganyika to independence since World War II. Uganda, Jamaica, British Guiana and the West Indies Federation are to be free in 1962, and progressive steps toward early independence are underway in Kenya, Zanzibar, Mauritius, Gambia and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The French African Empire has been converted within the last five years into 22 independent nations, and President Charles de Gaulle has devoted all of his energy in recent years to finding a solution for Algeria where a million European settlers complicate matters.

The most hard-bitten colonialist doesn't deny that difficult problems are unsolved. The Portuguese colonial empire, particularly, and the problem of apartheid in the Union of South Africa and its dependent territories remain. But the policies of the Western powers are for gradual transition so as to avoid another tragedy such as continues in the Congo where Belgium's failure to prepare the people for independence, plus the precipitate granting of freedom overnight, led to anarchy and chaos, the handmaidens of Communism.

And what is the picture when one looks at Communist colonialism? It is the opposite—increasing denial of the right of self-determination of peoples as President Kennedy explained to the United Nations in 1961: "There is no ignoring the fact that the tide of self-determination

has not yet reached the Communist empire where a population far larger than that officially termed 'dependent' lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of free institutions—under a system which knows only one party and one belief—which suppresses free debate, free elections, free newspapers, free books and free trade unions—and which builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners."¹

But such truths do not deter the Soviets from talking about independence while imposing dependence on others. One of the first decrees of the Bolsheviks in 1917 was a "Declaration of Rights" which proclaimed "the right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states." Mere mention of the word Hungary is a reminder of how this fine-sounding "right" has been honored in the breach. But even in the earliest days of Bolshevik rule this decree was ignored, with denial of self-determination to the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.² World War II offered the Soviets another chance to show what they really mean by self-determination; in Finland; the Baltic states; the Romanian provinces, etc.³ And following the war, in flagrant violation of agreements and promises of self-determination, the Soviet Union incorporated whole nations and peoples of Eastern Europe within its neocolonial empire, and divided Germany, Korea and Viet Nam, with half of each subjected to Communist slavery.⁴

More tragic than the actual gobbling up of territory, is what has happened to the people in those areas. They have been victims of practices particularly shocking for the 20th century. During the war entire ethnic groups were deported from the western areas of Russia to Siberia. Nikita Khrushchev confessed in his first anti-Stalin speech that among those deported were 405,000 Volga Germans, 259,000 Crimean Tatars, 130,000 Kalmucks of the northwestern Capi-an area, and 74,000 Ingush. Equally brutal was the deportation of 700,000 people from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.⁵

Yet those who have indulged in this inhuman campaign of deportation are the ones who rise in the UN and charge the U.S. with exploitation of Puerto Rico. They compound this with demands that by the end of 1962—"at the latest"—all remaining dependent peoples (except those in the Soviet Empire) be given "extensive democratic rights and freedoms, including universal suffrage, freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly, freedom to establish their own national political parties, trade unions and other public organizations." Yet when the rest of the world demands that the Soviet Union give

its enslaved peoples these same rights and freedoms, the Soviets angrily reply that that is counterrevolutionary interference in the internal affairs of another country and none of the world's business.

Perhaps the most telling indictment of Soviet colonialism is the unending flow of refugees from the Sino-Soviet colonial empire. More than 12,000,000 persons have escaped since World War II from the Soviet Union, Communist China and the areas they control:

- More than 3,000,000⁶ Germans fled the "Utopia" imposed by the Soviets on East Germany.

- About 1,800,000 North Koreans migrated south of the 38th parallel within two years after the U.S.S.R. installed its Communist regime in 1948. After the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, thousands of North Korean prisoners of war as well as many Chinese soldiers refused to go home.

- After the partition of Viet Nam at the 1954 Geneva conference, nearly a million Vietnamese fled the Communist-controlled north of the country for South Viet Nam, an area the Soviet propagandists now call a U.S. "colony."

- Hungary offered the most dramatic example, with 200,000 Hungarians fleeing to the "colonial" West in 1956 after their revolution was crushed by the Red Army.⁷ Prior to the revolt, another 200,000 had fled Hungary after the Soviets imposed Communist rule in 1947.

- Tibet is the most recent example. More than 20,000 refugees left their homes after the Communist Chinese subjugation of Tibet. They included the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetans, who found asylum in India.

- Hong Kong, the escape hatch for Red China, is overflowing with millions of Chinese refugees. Untold numbers escaped to Taiwan in the early days of the Red take-over of the mainland, and others continue to trickle away from the Communist "paradise."

This is part of the answer to the Soviet propaganda that only under Communism is there genuine freedom and independence—the happy life. No wonder Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko shouts loudly at the United Nations: "It is an indisputable fact that the United States now has 12 colonial possessions with 3.3 million people." Gromyko includes Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico among American "colonies" as well as the Pacific Trust territories, which is the responsibility of the U.S. under a Trusteeship of the United Nations.

Naturally, the Soviets ignore the fact that the people of Puerto Rico are fully self-governing, are American citizens, and are free to request a change of status at any time. They do not care to remember the long campaigns of the people of Alaska and Hawaii for statehood. They refuse to accept the facts that the U.S. is associated with only three territories that are not fully self-governing: the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa with a total indigenous population of less than 100,000. Even counting the Trust Territories, administered by the U.S. by international agreement within the UN, only 200,000 people are involved.

"What about the 200 million alien people whom the Soviet Union has subjugated since 1945?" U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson asks in vain. "Haven't they also the right (in the words of the UN Colonial Declaration) to 'freely determine their political status' and 'to enjoy complete independence and freedom?' Is this subjugation not also a virulent form of colonialism, or if you prefer 'imperialism'?"

"No wonder it is often asked in the United States why Western powers, who have relinquished their former rule over nearly a billion men and women since 1945, are still criticized—even in some of the new nations themselves—while the Soviet Union, which in the same period has subverted or absorbed so many independent countries in Eastern Europe, or Communist China which has for 10 years been crushing the struggle for self-determination in Tibet, have of late been much more gently handled by these same critics."

If there is today a threat of colonialism in the old-fashioned sense of that word, "the main stronghold" of it is in Moscow.

Russian Liberators

THE LIE. *All the new nations of the world are indebted to the Soviet Union for their recently acquired freedom. It is the U.S.S.R.*

-
1. See pages 124-7 for explanation of "The Wall."
 2. How the Bolsheviks "self-determined" those people is described on page 44.
 3. The Soviet process of subjugation of neighbors is outlined on pages 44-45.
 4. See pages 45-46.
 5. The tragedy of the Baltic states is chronicled on page 53 et seq.
 6. More than 2,600,000 of these refugees registered since 1949 when records were started. See page 124 for details.
 7. See page 47 et seq for Soviet words vs. deeds in Hungary.

that has been the main enemy of imperialism and colonialism and has forced the non-Communist world to make political and social changes.

This is the claim the Russian leaders make to the peoples of the new countries and to Communist Party members: all change in the world is the result of the Communist movement. The Party's new program, adopted in late 1961, asserted: "The main content, the main trend and main features of the historical development of mankind are being determined by the world Socialist [Communist] system, by the forces fighting against imperialism, for the Socialist reorganization of society . . . The gigantic revolutionary exploit accomplished by the Soviet people roused and inspired the masses in all countries and continents. A mighty purifying thunderstorm making the springtime of mankind is raging over the earth."

Yet when Communist subversion and infiltration stirs up trouble in the world, Moscow denies involvement unless there is success for Communism. Nikita Khrushchev frequently complains that the West blames Russia for all the world's troubles. But he really likes this kind of "flattery" as he indicated at the 22nd Communist Party Congress:

"When the working people of any capitalist or colonial country rise in struggle, the imperialists start shouting, 'This is the handiwork of the Communists, the handiwork of Moscow.' We, of course, are glad that all the good deeds of the people are ascribed to the Communists. The imperialists thus unwittingly help the masses better understand Communist ideas."

THE TRUTH. Khrushchev is wrong on both counts: all change in the world is not the handiwork of Moscow and no informed person ever has so suggested. When there is trouble, the Communists usually are quick to try to exploit it for their own ends. But change does not always come about as the result of trouble, any more than changes have to await Communism.

This double-faced lie of the Communists has not always been handled well by the leaders of the non-Communist world. Too often they have fallen into the Communist trap of pointing out only the cases of Communist intervention, leaving the listener with the idea that they accept the Communist contradictions.

President Kennedy was confronted with this Communist argument by the editor of *Izvestia*, Aleksei Adzhubei, during their November

meeting. Do you seriously think, Adzhubei asked, that "the social changes which are happening in the world today are the result of actions in which Moscow has its hands?"

"Of course," *Izestia's* editor added as a sort of postscript, to get both sides of the lie in, "we can't give you any assurances that there won't be social changes in the world, although you will call it the result of the 'hands' of Moscow."

The President's riposte was a nearly perfect answer. He reiterated that if the people of any country make a truly "free choice"—if they choose a Communist, Socialist or any other system—then the U.S. would accept a free decision.

"But of course," the President continued, "I do not hold and I do not say that the Soviet Union is responsible for all the changes that are coming in the world. For example, since the end of World War II, the British Empire has been turned into independent states, I think 15 of them. The French community has been turned into 22 independent states. There are many changes in the world. Western Europe has joined closer together in the Common Market. These are not the result of the Communists' efforts."

A double-barreled answer to a double-barreled lie: we deny the false claim that only Communism is determining the future of man, and we also deny that Communism deserves credit for everything that happens in the world. Good changes are in spite of the Reds.

Some of the new countries, which tend to fall for the propaganda emanating from Moscow on Western colonialism, will profit by studying this Kennedy statement carefully. If they reflect honestly, most of them will remember that they did not obtain their independence through help from Moscow. India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma were freely granted independence by Great Britain after the war, and not even required to remain within the Commonwealth unless they desired to do so. Burma chose not to remain a part of the Commonwealth. The members of the French African Community were given a chance freely to decide their future, and almost all chose independence with links with France. Moscow certainly did not contribute to the independence of the Philippines or even of Indonesia, although it has meddled in the latter country in recent years to Indonesia's disadvantage.

Ghana and Guinea, newer African countries which tend to lean well into the Communist camp on international matters, might remember how little attention they received from Moscow prior to the free granting of independence by their former mother countries.

Any of these nations that will honestly look back in history will remember that not until after Stalin died did the Communist movement concede that countries like India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, etc., had acquired independence. The Communist dogma of those days was that a colony remained a colony, even though independent in the western sense, until it embraced Communism. The wise new nations will not overlook the fact that Khrushchev's rival for leadership of the world Communist movement, China's Mao Tse-tung, still sticks to the Stalinist theory: that "bourgeois" governments (non-Communist) in the newly independent nations are untrustworthy and should be destroyed because the stronger they get the weaker becomes Communism within the country.

It was not until Khrushchev's barn-storming tour of India in 1955 that the old Stalinist line was modified with respect to that country. As late as 1954 a Soviet history of the countries of Asia continued to assail the hero of the India independence movement, Gandhi, as a faker whose "sole aim was to urge the imperialists to make concessions in favor of the exploited masses of India, to achieve the admission of the bourgeoisie and the landowning class to the helm of power." A year later Khrushchev was hailing Gandhi before the Indian masses as the main contributor to Indian independence!

U.S. Plot For Bases

THE LIE. *The United States is engaged in a foul plot to destroy the national sovereignty of new nations by "dragging newly liberated countries into military blocs."*

The Russians make it sound as though all nations which have attained independence since World War II have been forced to become military satellites of the United States. Nikita Khrushchev's version of this at the 22nd Communist Party Congress, where no one dared challenge his misstatements, was that the U.S. is striving in new nations "to establish military-dictatorial regimes . . . to place their puppets in power and to bribe certain parts of the bourgeoisie by using the poisoned weapon of *national dissension*."¹

"To this end aggressive military blocs and bilateral military alliances are actively used," he asserted.

THE TRUTH. Of the more than 40 countries which have attained

independence since 1945 only three are aligned with the United States in military pacts. In all of Africa, to which much of this kind of Communist slander of the United States is directed, not a single new nation is aligned militarily in a pact with any of the Western powers. Of the new countries in Asia, only Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea and (without a formal pact) South Viet Nam have such a relationship with the United States.

Khrushchev assumes that America's military allies were acquired like his in the Warsaw Pact—by diktat. He is unable to conceive that it can be in the interest of self-preservation for some small nations voluntarily, and with approval of their parliaments, to ally themselves with the United States. He overlooks the fact that most of America's 44 military allies are old, long-established nations, rather than new ones.

At the same time, the United States maintains very close and friendly relations, including strong economic ties, with many unaligned nations. India is an outstanding example of a nation unaligned militarily to the United States but receiving massive economic aid. Another is Communist Yugoslavia, which defied Moscow because it refused to knuckle under to the Kremlin.

Independence For All—Tomorrow!

THE LIE. *The United Nations must bring to an end all colonial wars, to which the Soviet Union is opposed, and guarantee that by the end of 1962 the 88 territories in the world that are in a dependent status be granted absolute sovereignty and independence.*

The Soviet campaign each year to put the United Nations on record in favor of this extreme and impractical proposal coincides with efforts to prevent discussion of Communist colonialism in Hungary and Tibet.

Russia egged on the new nations, in the first blush of independence, to include in the 1960 UN anti-colonial resolution such irresponsible statements as this: "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." In 1961 the resolution was more moderate.

1. See page 51 for Soviet ambidexterity on what is good nationalism and what is bad nationalism.

This is as irresponsible as parents turning their children loose to shift for themselves when they enter kindergarten. The Congo has been a tragic example of what happens to a country unprepared for independence.

THE TRUTH. It is the Soviet Union which favors "colonial wars," except that it calls them "wars of liberation." The "Peace Manifesto" of 1960, issued by 81 Communist parties, spells out in detail for the faithful not only how to provoke such wars—which are "just"—but also encourages them and promises Soviet support once they are started.

The Soviets have found fertile ground among the newly-independent nations for this thesis. Even India justified its aggression against the Portuguese colony of Goa in December, 1961, as in the cause of "liberation" apparently oblivious of the fact that this was just an old-fashioned "colonial war" in reverse. India's Prime Minister Nehru thanked the Soviet Union for sympathy and approval of the conquest of Goa by force.

As for the Soviet statement that there are 88 "colonial" territories with 71,100,000 people under "colonial rule," it is necessary to count some very small places to come to that figure—tiny spots of land whose conversion into independent nations would make a farce of the world community of nations.

A U.S.S.R. document on colonialism on file at the United Nations says: "The conscience of mankind cannot tolerate the fact that to this day the great continent of Africa . . . still has 27 dependent and Trust territories where 50,000,000 Africans live under the cruelest colonial oppression."

Actually, there are fewer than 20 dependents areas in Africa and within the next five years many of those are scheduled for independence. The Soviets have never acknowledged that within the last five years most of the continent of Africa has been granted independence. At the end of World War II there were only two completely independent African states—Liberia and Ethiopia—in addition to the Union of South Africa. At the end of 1961, 28 of the 104 members of the United Nations were on the African continent.

What the Soviets also overlook is the degree of self-government in many territories that the U.S.S.R. claims are under "colonial oppression." Even more ridiculous is the Soviet failure to make any distinction between areas large and competent enough to aspire to nationhood and those which are not. So far as Soviet policy is concerned,

their campaign for total independence for everyone—except those under Soviet rule—would make independent nations of the following:

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Area (sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population</i>
Gibraltar	2¼	25,500
Cayman Islands	100	9,050
Turks and Caicos Islands	166	5,250
Montserrat	32	14,300
Pitcairn	2	269
Bermuda	21	43,100
Falkland Islands	4,618	2,250
St. Helena	47	4,760
Ascension	34	500
Tristan da Cunha	38	282

The Soviets never spell out in detail their grandiose plans. Therefore it is not known what they have in mind for a colony listed by the British as "Central and Southern Line Islands" in the West Pacific. There are no inhabitants!



Part Seven

INSIDE THE COMMUNIST WORLD



The Free Russian People

THE LIE. *The Soviet people are masters of their own fate; they run the country. The Soviet system has rid the country of the millionaires and exploiters which dominate the capitalist world and treat the ordinary people like slaves.*

Nowhere is this distorted version of life in the Soviet Union more vividly painted than in the new Communist Party Program outlining a Utopia for "the people" when a true Communist society is achieved—now promised for about 1980.

The old saw about Bolshevism having abolished private ownership of the means of production and turned over ownership of the factories, the land, etc., to the people is brightened up in this way:

"The awareness that they (the people) work for themselves and their society and not for exploiters inspires the working people with labor enthusiasm; it encourages their effort for innovation, their creative initiative and mass Socialist (Communist) emulation. Socialism is living creativity by the masses . . .

"The entire life of Socialist society is based on the principle of broad democracy. Working people take an active part, through the soviets, trade unions and other mass organizations, in *managing* the affairs of the state."

THE TRUTH. Almost everyone today understands that the Communist Party, not the people of Russia, run and manage the affairs of state. And within the Party real power rests with a small hierarchy at the top, of which Nikita Khrushchev is the chief. The Party is supreme over the Soviet Government; it is the Party that determines policy and the government that carries it out. In the case of Khrushchev, of course, he is top dog in both the party and the government, Secretary of the Party and Premier of the Soviet Government.¹ If such a system prevailed in the United States, the Democratic National Committee would decide matters of national policy which the cabinet then would carry out!

Once the overriding position of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union is understood, the fiction of the people having anything to say about the affairs of state is obvious. In the first place, the Communist Party is a very exclusive organization. Unlike political

parties elsewhere, membership is hard to get and harder to keep. Khrushchev told the 22nd Party Congress that during the six years that he has been the top hierarch 200,000 party members had been expelled. "Purged" is the word used in Stalin's day.

The Soviet Union has 220,000,000 people. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has only 8,872,516 members plus 843,489 candidate members, making a total of 9,716,005, or less than 4.5 percent of the population. A year ago Khrushchev reported that there were Communist parties in 87 different countries with 36,000,000 members—a dramatic idea of the "elite" rather than "democratic" quality of this international movement. Thirty-six million Communist Party members in a world of about three billion people! Only about one percent of the world's population.

With absolute power in the hands of the Communist Party and with such a tiny fraction of the people in the Party, such Party Program statements as this amount to obvious nonsense: "proletarian democracy is becoming more and more a Socialist democracy of *the people as a whole*."

Few better explanations of Lenin's concept of the Party—a concept that is basically unchanged despite talk to the contrary—is available than the outline recently written by Bertram D. Wolfe in the introduction to two essays by the German Communist, Rosa Luxemburg:

"... The working class needs a party which is not made up of the working class but a party of guardians, a self-constituted vanguard for the working class; an elite party drawn from all classes, made up primarily of declassed revolutionary intellectuals, who have made revolution their profession. This party should lead and guide the working class, inject its doctrine into the workers, infiltrate the workingmen's organizations and struggles, and seek to use them for its purposes. Only 'bourgeois politicians', Lenin wrote, can believe that the task of a Socialist is to serve the workers in *their* struggles. The task of the Socialist (Communist) politician is 'not to assist the economic struggle of the proletariat, but to make the economic struggle assist the Socialist movement and the victory of the revolutionary party.'

"Such a 'party of a new type' needs an organization of a new type. It should be organized like an army, have the unquestioning discipline of an army, be centralized like an army, with all the power and authority residing in its 'general staff'."

Lenin envisaged the Party's Central Committee as the "general staff." Stalin was his own personal "general staff." Khrushchev has returned closer to the Lenin thesis but has packed the Central

Committee with supporters who overruled an adverse vote in the Presidium in the early days of Nikita's ascendancy to the top.

It is Khrushchev who portrays the United States as "a monstrous pyramid of inequality." At the 22nd Communist Party Congress he indulged in one of his favorite pastimes—accusing the democratic system of the United States of all the evil trappings of Soviet society:

"Is it not true that in the United States, where the workers, employees and working farmers number over fifty million," there is not a single worker, not a single small farmer in Congress? That is their free world; a society in which there is no true freedom and democracy, a society based on the social and national yoke of inequality, on the exploitation of man by man and the trampling of human dignity and honor. The flourishing of democracy in the Socialist countries and the ever growing curtailment of democracy in the capitalist countries, limited as it is—these are two opposing lines in the political development of the modern world . . .

"Let us turn to the social structure of capitalism: Before us stands a monstrous pyramid of social inequality. At its apex is a handful of industrial and financial oligarchs. Like the decadent decline of the nobility of the Roman Empire, it wallows in luxury and is satiated to the limit. At the same time, hundreds of millions of people who form the base of this pyramid are doomed to privation and disenfranchisement."

A person only slightly informed about the structure of the Soviet system will understand that Khrushchev is, in fact, describing it—not the United States. As for the background of the members of Congress, Khrushchev can for a few dollars obtain a copy of the Congressional Directory with biographies of all members. In that book he would discover, if he were interested in facts, that most of the members of Congress come from modest backgrounds and not a few from the simple worker and farmer background from which Khrushchev himself sprang.

1. When Khrushchev visited the United States in 1959 he also temporarily assumed the title of head of state, normally held by the President of the U.S.S.R. so that he would have equal status with the President of the United States who is both head of state and head of government.

2. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism*; Introduction by Bertram D. Wolfe, page 12; The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1961.

3. The U.S. labor forces number well over 70 million; the number of employed is nearly 70 million.

The Well Informed Russians

THE LIE. *The Soviet people are the best and most accurately informed people in the world about current events.*

This preposterous pretension is constantly made by the Soviet regime. The Soviet press, the argument goes, is factual, honest and superior to all others; the non-Communist press is dishonest, a purveyor of calumny and lies, and an instrument of espionage.

When President Kennedy expressed satisfaction that the Soviets let him explain his views to the Russian people through an interview with *Izvestia*, his comment was denounced as "obvious unscrupulousness"—that President Kennedy dared to suggest the Soviet press did not give regular and complete coverage to his statements!

Izvestia followed that unprecedented interview in November, 1961 (in contrast to the untold numbers of interviews the American press has printed over the years with Soviet leaders), with these claims:

"The Soviet press has regularly reproduced the most important statements of the United States leaders, including the President's . . .

"As regards the Soviet people's knowledge of United States policy . . . the Soviet people are very well informed about the events in the world and understand them."

THE TRUTH. The Soviet people are not only almost totally uninformed about world affairs, but also ignorant of what goes on inside their own country. This is a deliberate and calculated policy of the regime which owns, directs, operates and manipulates all information media with only one objective: to propagate the Communist line.

There is an old Muscovite saying: there is no news in *Izvestia* (the Russian word for news) and no truth in *Pravda* (the Russian word for truth). *Izvestia* is the official newspaper of the Soviet government, and *Pravda* is the organ of the Communist Party. The bite in that joke was unwittingly but unashamedly exposed in the definition of "news" stated by N. G. Palgunov, director of Tass, the official Soviet news agency:

"News must be *organized*, else it is news of mere events and happenstance . . . News must not merely throw light on this or that fact or event—it *must pursue a definite purpose* . . . *News is agitation via facts*. In selecting the news topic, the writer of the story must proceed above all from the realization that not all the facts and not just any event should be reported in the press."

This follows the dictum set forth by Lenin in 1920 on "freedom of the press" and never deviated from since: "The periodical and non-periodical press and all publishing enterprises must be *entirely subordinated* to the Central Committee of the Party. Publishing enterprises must not be permitted to abuse their autonomy by pursuing a policy that is not entirely the Party policy."

If such a policy prevailed in the United States, the Democratic and Republican National Committees, depending on the incumbent President's political affiliation, would decide what was news, what could and could not be printed, and how the "news" item should be written. If the American people were thus limited, they would be as badly informed as the Russian people. The Soviets make no attempt to hide the Party's determination of what is printed as news, even while crowing about "freedom of the press." In the recent argument with President Kennedy, *Izvestia* did not hesitate to say that the "opinion, the will and thoughts of all Soviet people are best expressed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government."

Volumes could be written about how little actual information the Russian people get in their newspapers, magazines or radio and television broadcasts. Unlike other peoples, they are not allowed to buy or see publications from other countries, except for those published by Communist Parties abroad. The only American newspaper available on newsstands anywhere in the Soviet Union is *The Worker*, the newspaper of the Communist Party of the United States. Very few Americans are aware that such a newspaper exists. On the other hand, Soviet newspapers are for sale in the United States, and there is an elaborate system for translating the Soviet press. Columbia University's *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* is for sale to anyone and available in major libraries.

Soviet press treatment—or rather lack of treatment—of three recent major events are examples of how the Soviet Union denies its people information considered essential elsewhere:

- The almost total blackout of news inside the Soviet Union about Nikita Khrushchev's violation of the nuclear test moratorium; the explosion of more than 40 test blasts in the fall of 1961, including the testing of a 57 megaton bomb; the outraged reaction the world over at the renewed pollution of the atmosphere; the "solemn appeal" by the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations to Khrushchev not to test the 57 megaton bomb. The Russian people were told only that the U.S.S.R. was "compelled" to resume testing

because the U.S. was threatening to start World War III, but no further explanation or details were given.

• Khrushchev delivered his famous anti-Stalin speech to the party hierarchy in a secret session in 1956. For nearly six years thereafter not a single word about that speech appeared in any Soviet newspaper, nor was it mentioned on any Soviet broadcast. There was much discussion about the "cult of personality," but the details of the charges against Stalin were not made public. The text of that 1956 speech was published abroad and caused chaos among Communist Party members in non-Communist countries. But the Russian people had to wait for the 22nd Communist Party Congress in 1961 to read about what an ogre Khrushchev claims Stalin was.

• Early on the morning of February 10, 1962, the Russians released Francis Gary Powers, American pilot of the ill-fated U-2 spy plane who had been captured by the Soviets on May 1, 1960, and was tried, convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison for espionage. At the same time—and at the same place, a bridge in the suburbs of Berlin—the Americans turned over to the U.S.S.R. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, a Soviet citizen who had been caught and convicted in New York in 1957 of espionage against the United States. The Powers-Abel swap was delayed for nearly an hour until word from the center of Berlin was received confirming that Frederick L. Pryor, a 28-year-old American student who had been held by the East German Communists since August, 1961, had been set free in West Berlin. The information given to the free world told the story of the reciprocal, simultaneous exchange involving all three men.

The Russians made a big thing about their "humane" action in releasing Powers but did not mention to their people that they got back one of their spies. It was two weeks after the swap before Abel's name was ever mentioned in the Soviet press. Then it was a "letter" from Abel's wife in *Izvestia*, thanking Khrushchev for getting her husband released from "illegal" imprisonment. No mention was made that the Abel release was part of the deal for release of Powers and, of course, no admission that Abel was a Russian spy. (The Soviets claim they have no spies.) As of this writing neither the Soviets nor the East German Communists ever have mentioned the release of Pryor who was held six months in an East Berlin prison, incommunicado and without charges being preferred against him.

Leo Grulio, editor of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, wrote a revealing article for the monthly bulletin of the International Press Institute late in 1961 analyzing what was in the Soviet press (more

accurately, what was not in it) during the critical months of August and September. Not only did the Soviets resume nuclear tests during that period, but "The Wall" was built through the center of Berlin, and that crisis was pushed near the shooting level. Gruliov's survey states in part:

"If you had depended solely upon the Soviet press for your information during August and September, you would *not* know:

- "That there had been any flight of East Germans to West Berlin before or during the sealing of the border.
- "That the border closing placed any hindrance in the way of crossings by persons with relatives on the other side.
- "That East German police used tear gas grenades or water hoses at any time. (Or later shot and killed East Berliners trying to swim to freedom across canals.)
- "That Soviet troops were in the vicinity and that Marshal Konev had been appointed commander of Soviet forces in East Germany.
- "That there were large protest rallies in West Berlin. (There were only 'routine assemblages' of a handful of 'revanchists and provocateurs').

• "That Indian Prime Minister Nehru had ever qualified his support of the Soviet stand on Berlin.

"You would have had to wait a month after the event to discover, in a retrospective account in *Izvestia* in mid-September, that barbed wire, bricks and cement had been used to seal the border [between East and West Germany] in August.

"You would have to scan the press closely to find a single passing mention that tanks and guns had been deployed. (The mention came in a report of a speech by East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht.)

"As for the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, you would have been left in ignorance:

- "That 15 Soviet tests were conducted in September.
- "That those attending the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries had uttered any words of criticism of the Soviet action.
- "That there had been protests by peace groups in the West.

"On both the Berlin and the nuclear testing issues, you would have found the statements of the Western leaders presented for the most part only in form of brief summaries. These summaries were printed belatedly at the bottom of replies by Premier Khrushchev or beneath the answering notes of the Soviet Government, which appeared in full.

"The only reporting of any concern anywhere over the dangers

of fallout, for instance, was five paragraphs in Khrushchev's 4,000-word statement rejecting the Kennedy-Macmillan plea for an agreement to discontinue tests in the atmosphere. The Premier described this concern as a hypocritical dodge of the Western powers.

"The Kennedy-Macmillan plea itself was summarized in 100 words in *Pravda* and 200 words in *Izvestia*, beneath Khrushchev's massive reply.

"The subject of fallout was carefully avoided earlier when the first White House statement on the Soviet resumption of testing warned against the danger of increasing fallout. Tass managed to report the White House statement without once mentioning the word fallout."

Yet, on the basis of such press reporting as outlined by Grulioff for two critical months, the Soviets insist that their people are "widely informed."

Genuine Democracy

THE LIE. "*The most brilliant democracy on earth*" exists in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries—"a new type of democracy . . . democracy for working people . . . Only in a Socialist (Communist) society is it possible to have genuine freedom."

This is the kind of extravagant nonsense the Communists tell each other, with the hope that naive non-Communists will believe it. It makes it possible for Nikita Khrushchev to tell the 22nd Communist Party Congress that in the United States, Britain, France, etc., "there is no true freedom and democracy," and leads to statements like this in the new Communist Party program:

"Socialist democracy (as in the U.S.S.R.), unlike bourgeois democracy (as in the U.S.), does not merely proclaim the rights of the people, but makes it really possible for the people to exercise them. Soviet society insures the *real liberty* of the individual. The highest manifestations of this liberty is man's emancipation from exploitation, which is what primarily constitutes genuine social justice."

The program's list of freedoms which allegedly exists in the U.S.S.R. but are absent in the U.S. includes:

- Political freedoms—"freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly, the right to elect and be elected."

- Social rights—"the right to work, to rest and leisure, to education, to material security in old age, illness or disability."
- Rights of equality—"equality of citizens of all races and nationalities; equal rights for women and men in all spheres of political, economic and cultural activity."

To complete this strange exercise in semantics, Khrushchev painted this picture of the non-Communist world:

"The ideologists of imperialism call the world of capitalism 'the free world'. But what has capitalism in contrast to genuine freedom, the economic growth, the material welfare, culture and individual prosperity in the Soviet Union? The freedom for the rich to exploit and rob the poor, millions of people out of work, growing taxation, an unbridled arms race, race discrimination, the dictatorship of the purse, a ban on democratic organizations—what kind of a free world is that? No, that (the U.S.) is not a free world but a world of slavery and exploitation.

"Imperialist ideologists describe capitalist countries as an open society and the U.S.S.R. as a closed society. Yes, we agree. Our Socialist state is really closed to exploitation and plunder by monopolist capital, to unemployment, to robbery, to the corrupting ideology of decadence."

THE TRUTH. A special dictionary on the peculiar use of words and the extraordinary meanings given some words by Communists is necessary to "translate" this kind of statement.¹ Only a little practice teaches the non-Communist quickly that even the simplest words and concepts have the strangest meanings behind the Iron Curtain.*

Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently offered a brief but handy guide to some of this Communist jargon:

"*Peace* has become a word to describe whatever condition would promote their [the Soviet's] world revolution.

"*Aggression* is whatever stands in its way.

"*People's Democracy* is a term applied to regimes no one of which has been chosen by free elections.

"*Self-determination* is loudly espoused but only in areas *not* under Communist control.

"The normally attractive word *negotiation* is used as a weapon, for the only subjects to be negotiated are further concessions to Communist appetite. . .

"An agreement is apparently a rest camp, where one pauses and refits for a further advance. New assurances are offered in the very act of withdrawing those earlier given.

"Law, as one of their spokesmen put it, 'is like the tongue of a wagon—it goes in the direction in which it is pointed.'

". . . The gains of lawlessness are cited as the *new conditions* which justify new invasions of the rights of others.

"*Neutrality* is temporary, a pasture growing green for future grazing . . . Apparently, according to one of Mr. Khrushchev's homely maxims, 'Every vegetable has its season'."

Readers who are familiar with the novels of George Orwell about Communism, *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty Four*, will have had some practice in "translating" such statements as appear in "*The Lie*" of this section.

It is difficult to believe that a man like Khrushchev, basically a very shrewd peasant type who has travelled all over the world and seen at first hand "the world of slavery and exploitation" in the United States, can really believe what he says. He probably doesn't, but that is the basis of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, which reaches back to the mid-19th century, and no modifications in that dogma are allowed to compensate for changes that have occurred.

Unhappily, the Russian people have very little other than the Communist version of the outer world upon which to judge."

Free Choice In 1917

THE LIE. *In November, 1917, the Russian people revolted and freely chose Bolshevism as their future way of life.*

One of the most recent attempts to perpetuate this myth was in the reply by the Soviet government's newspaper, *Izvestia*, to the remarks

1. Several guides to this "language" have been written. Two excellent ones are *A Guide to Communist Jargon*, by R. N. Carew Hunt, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1957; and *The Language of Communism*, by Harry Hodgkinson, Pitman Publishing Corporation, New York, 1954.

2. See page 8 for President Kennedy's comments on "the wholly different meanings" Communists give to such simple words as war and peace after his Vienna Conference with Nikita Khrushchev.

3. For an explanation of how ill-informed the Soviet people are see page 182.

about freedom of choice for people made by President Kennedy in his interview with its editor in November, 1961.¹

Referring to the U.S. refusal to recognize immediately the original Bolshevik regime in Russia, *Izvestia* said: "The United States refused stubbornly and for a long time to agree with the *free choice* made in 1917 by the peoples of Russia."²

Another typical Communist version of what happened in Russia in 1917 that the Soviet leaders declaim on each anniversary goes like this: "The Russian proletariat, together with the poorest peasantry under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin, took power into its hands and proclaimed the birth of a new social and state regime."

Always the emphasis is upon the "free choice" of the Russian people.

THE TRUTH. The Bolsheviks *seized power* in Russia. The will of the people had nothing to do with establishment of the Bolshevik regime. It was done with bayonets by a tiny band of revolutionaries after the collapse of the Provisional Government.

The "will of the people" in Russia was anti-Bolshevik, or at least non-Bolshevik. The Bolsheviks got less than a quarter of the votes in the only free election ever held in Russia. It was held one month after the seizure of power by Lenin and his tiny gang and was for representatives to a Constituent Assembly. On its first meeting day, that Assembly was broken up and dissolved by force by the Bolsheviks because they (always considerate of "the will of the people") were outvoted.

One of the most extraordinary jobs of rewriting history has been done by the Communists about what really happened in Russia during that fateful year of 1917. Their version bears almost no resemblance to the facts as recorded either by objective observers or historians.

The Great October Revolution which the Soviets celebrate each year on November 7 was not a revolution at all.³ It was a coup d'etat by a handful of professional revolutionaries led by Lenin and supported by a Bolshevik Party with barely 30,000 members.

The real Russian Revolution occurred in March, 1917, with the abdication of the Tsar.⁴ None of the leading Bolsheviks were on hand then. Lenin was in exile in Switzerland, Leon Trotsky was on a lecture tour in the United States, Stalin and other party leaders were in Siberian prisons. Lenin hurried back to Russia⁵ but found his fellow Bolshevik conspirators opposed to seizing power in the chaos that prevailed. They argued that the "situation" did not conform to

Marxist doctrine, and that the Bolsheviks should wait until Russia had passed from Tsarist feudalism to capitalism before trying to start on the road to Communism through Socialism.* But Lenin decided otherwise, converted Trotsky to his thinking, and started the conspiracy to seize power from an ineffectual Provisional Government.

The final act of the Bolshevik coup d'etat was staged on the night of November 7-8. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin were not on the scene, despite the "heroic" roles Soviet historians later portrayed for them. Some versions say they were catching a nap. No one seems to know where Stalin was, although the Stalinist history of that night would have you believe that he personally helped infuriated citizens storm the Winter Palace in what was then called Petrograd (today's Lenin-grad).

The official *History of the U.S.S.R.*, published by the Foreign Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, part three, gives this version of the critical hour:

"By this time (early evening of November 7) the insurgents controlled the whole city except the Winter Palace. Lenin (at Smolny Institute, the headquarters of the Bolsheviks on the outskirts of Petrograd) ordered the Winter Palace to be captured . . . The Provisional Government was called upon to surrender forthwith, but it refused, whereupon, at 9 p.m., the assault on the Winter Palace was launched. After the prearranged signal, the firing of a gun from the Fortress of Peter and Paul and shots from the six-inch guns of the *Aurora*, the Red Guards, sailors and soldiers, led by the Bolsheviks, stormed the Winter Palace."

In fact there was no storming of the Winter Palace. Historian George F. Kennan tells quite a different story:

"The cruiser *Aurora*, contrary to legend, had fired only blanks, and the ancient artillery pieces of the Fortress had frightened those who fired them more than those against whom they were aimed. The Bolshevik capture of the Winter Palace occurred because there was much disunity and vacillating among its defenders, and someone had inadvertently left the back door open."

The key events of that November 7 started in the morning when Alexander Kerensky, leader of the weak Provisional Government, fled Petrograd to round up troops loyal to his government. The Bolsheviks already had done everything except physically oust the Kerensky government from the Palace. Kerensky's cabinet sat in session all day, "protected" by a handful of loyal soldiers. The rest of the city was calm except around the Winter Palace which was besieged by

the Red Guard. In contrast to the mood alleged by the Soviets 30 years later, here is Kennan's description of that historic night:

"Life . . . seemed outwardly to be following what was almost its normal rhythm. Restaurants, movies and night clubs were open along the Nevski Prospekt. The ballet was in progress at the Mariinsky Theater. The streetcars moved as usual over the Troitski Bridge. The rickety droshkies that took the place of taxis still rolled quietly along the wide avenues, only the horses hooves clattering on the paving of cobblestones and paving blocks."

On an upper floor of the Winter Palace the Provisional Government sat around a long green table "while the final numbered seconds of that Russia of which they were the last custodians ticked away into history." At 2 a.m., on November 8, the Red Guard that had been recruited from the Bolsheviks by Trotsky entered the Palace, unresisted. At 2:10 a.m., the doors of the room where Kerensky's ministers were sitting burst open. A man wearing a pince-nez and a broad-brimmed artist's hat—looking, as Kennan puts it, "more like a figure out of the French Revolution than a Bolshevik"—entered and shouted: "In the name of the Military-Revolutionary Committee I declare you arrested."

Without saying a word or protesting, the ministers rose and marched out under guard to prison in the Fortress of Peter and Paul. Bolshevik Russia was born without bloodshed that night, but before Lenin was to consolidate his control of the country blood was to flow throughout Russia like rivers.

This is a far cry from the "revolution" the current Soviet leaders tell about—the "free choice" of the people. It is undoubtedly true that most of the people of Russia had never heard of Bolshevism until the Reds, after seizing power, imposed it upon them by civil war. Whatever chance the people had to express a choice was cut short by Lenin when he destroyed the Constituent Assembly.

In the summer of 1917, even the Bolsheviks professed to be in favor of electing such a group to write a new constitution to replace Tsarism. After seizing power in November, Lenin decided to go through with such a plan in spite of grave doubts about popular support of the Bolsheviks. The doubts were confirmed with the election results—the first and only free election ever held in Russia. The Bolsheviks won less than a quarter of the 707 Constituent Assembly seats. The Social Revolutionaries, comparable to today's Western European Social Democrats and opponents of Bolshevism, won a comfortable majority,

410. It was an overwhelming vote of no confidence for Lenin and his party which, nevertheless, was in power.

The Bolsheviks were undaunted. They prepared to test their theory that a minority, if unscrupulous enough, could wreck a democratic assembly. On January 18, 1918, the Assembly met and the Bolsheviks tried to ram through a Declaration of Rights which the non-Bolshevik delegates opposed. Defeated, 237 to 138, the Bolsheviks interrupted the proceedings early in the morning of the 19th. A delegate named Raskolnikov announced that the Bolsheviks were leaving the Constituent Assembly because of the "counterrevolutionary majority." Shortly after the Bolsheviks walked out, a sailor who was in command of the military guard announced to the President that he had received instructions to close the meeting "because the guard is tired." The order had come from Lenin. Shortly before 5 a.m., the Assembly "adjourned," but never met again. Later the same day, the Bolshevik regime declared the Assembly dissolved.

"Every period of history has its own dramatic symbols," historian E. H. Carr points out in *The Bolshevik Revolution*. "The dismissal of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly by an armed sailor 'because the guard is tired' is one of these."

The events of 1917 in Russia are as exciting and dramatic as any in the world since the days of the French Revolution. Few have the temerity today to try to judge the merits of those events, or to place blame or credit for what happened. The major quarrel modern non-Communists have with the Soviet leaders is their claim that it all came about as a result of the "free choice" of the people. There was no choice then, and there has been none since.

1. See page 74 for the President's comments.

2. The U.S. did not agree to diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R. until 1933.

3. Russia still used the Julian calendar in 1917 under which today's November 7 was October 25.

4. February under the Julian calendar; hence called The February Revolution.

5. Lenin was able to return through the courtesy of the German High Command which provided him passage from Switzerland in a sealed railway car.

6. See page 7 for the Marxist formula for getting from feudalism to Communism.

7. *Russia Leaves the War*, by George F. Kennan, Princeton University Press, 1956, pages 4-6.

8. The man wearing the prince-nez who was the chief actor in this last scene of the pre-Bolshevik Russia is not remembered today, not even by Soviet leaders. He was Vladamir Alexandrovich Antonov-Ovseyenko, secretary of the Military-Revolutionary Committee, a leading Bolshevik from 1903. His reward? The same as that for so many other faithful Old Bolsheviks—a bullet in the back of the head after his return from the Spanish Civil War in the 1930's.

"The Apple of Our Eye"

THE LIE. *Unity, equality and fraternal community—those are the outstanding characteristics of the bloc of Communist countries.*

"The expectations of the imperialists, renegades, and revisionists on the possibility of a split in the Socialist (Communist) camp are built on sand and are doomed to failure," the Manifesto of 81 Communist Parties proclaimed in 1960. "All the Socialist countries guard the unity of the Socialist camp as *the apple of their eye* . . . The Socialist camp, a social, economic and political comity (in Russian, *sodruzhestvo*) of free sovereign peoples, is united by close links of international solidarity, common interests, and aims along the road of Socialism and Communism . . . *True equality and independence* of every country belonging to it are safeguarded in the Socialist camp. Guided by the principles of *full equality, mutual advantage, and fraternal mutual aid*, the Socialist states are perfecting complete economic, political and cultural cooperation . . . It is one of the greatest achievements of the world Socialist system that the Marxist-Leninist proposition, that a lessening of antagonism among the classes is followed by a lessening of antagonism among nations, has been confirmed by practical experience."

THE TRUTH. Fewer Communist myths are more gargantuan than the one that each of the Communist bloc countries enjoy "true equality and independence." Just to name a few Communist countries which have tried to exercise such alleged rights—Yugoslavia and Hungary, and now Albania—is adequate refutation.

That there are many competing voices within the Communist camp is no longer in dispute. It has been sufficiently confirmed that even President Kennedy, in his 1962 State of the Union message, was constrained to mention the "extraordinary rumbles of discord (that) can be heard across the Iron Curtain . . . It is not free societies which bear within them the seeds of inevitable disunity."

The free world has suffered from a multiplicity of ideas on how to cope with the challenge of Communism. That is part of the price

9. The fascinating details of the Constituent Assembly, an early example of the Communist technique of destroying democratic organizations such as parliaments, assemblies, trade union, etc., are contained in: *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-23*, by E. H. Carr; Macmillan, New York; 1950. See Vol. I, pages 105-123.

men pay to be free. But after years of believing that one of the Communist world's "assets" was monolithic direction, it is somewhat encouraging to watch the Reds squabbling among themselves.

The most intriguing facet, of course, is the dispute between the Soviet Union and Communist China. And if the reader really wants to know what Khrushchev thinks of Mao Tse-tung, and vice versa, all he needs to do is watch carefully from day to day what each says about Albania, that tiny piece of mountainous wasteland which has become the center around which the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute rages.

No more convincing rebuttal of Khrushchev's claim that there is no split in the Communist camp is available than an exchange which occurred between Khrushchev and Albania's Communist leader Enver Hoxha (pronounced ho-ja) at the meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow in November-December, 1960. Khrushchev opened the meeting with a long speech in which he expounded at length on his new thesis that "war is not *fatally* inevitable." (Lenin used to argue that it was inevitable so long as any capitalist country existed; that total peace could exist only in a world that was totally Communist). Then this Hoxha-Khrushchev exchange occurred—

Hoxha: "Anyone who does not see that imperialism is preparing for war is blind. Anyone who sees it and refuses to recognize it is a traitor . . . World War is not fatally inevitable, but we must insist that it should be made clear that war will not be wholly rejected until imperialism has disappeared . . . We must prepare to seize power by violence. It is only in this way that the struggle for peace will be won . . ."

"Khrushchev has distorted the thesis of Leninism to suit his own purposes; no party has yet seized power without resorting to violence . . . Albania does not wish to separate itself from the Socialist camp, but if we think that errors are committed we shall say so . . . The cult of personality does not apply only to Stalin . . ."

Khrushchev: "Comrade Hoxha, you have poured a bucket of dung over me, and now you will have to wipe it off!"

This, apparently is the meaning of "comity" among Communist nations. Normally "comity" means "friendly and courteous understanding among nations."

A year later Hoxha refused to attend the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party, or to let any Albanian attend. Yugoslavia's Tito also

was absent. Mao Tse-tung sent only the third man in Red China's hierarchy, Premier Chou En-lai, who within three days was defending Albania against the Soviet Union, and publicly criticizing Khrushchev. He left for home a week before the Congress ended.

In his violent anti-Stalin campaign, directed for the first time to the Russian people, Khrushchev made an embittered attack on Albania in his opening speech, October 18, 1961, warning that Albania would have to "abandon erroneous ways" if it wanted to be a member of "the fraternal family of the Socialist community." He accused Hoxha of pursuing Stalinism, a creed of Communism Khrushchev has decreed anti-Communist.

Chou En-lai, who rightly saw in Khrushchev's attack on Albania an attack on China, whose ideology is the opposite of Khrushchev's and identical with that expressed by Hoxha, took advantage in his opening, and only, speech to say:

"Any public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party [as Khrushchev had just done to Albania] does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems. To lay bare a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries openly in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. Such an attitude will only grieve those near and dear to us and gladden our enemies."

Khrushchev did not back down. The day after Chou's criticism he sent Mikhail A Suslov, Moscow's chief theoretician, to the rostrum to announce: "The Albanian Workers (Communist) Party crassly violates the Leninist norms of party life. The personality cult [Nikita's euphemism for Stalinism] and arbitrariness flourish in it." To all of which the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers (Communist) party responded in Tirana: "Khrushchev's anti-Marxist lies and attacks serve only the enemies of Communism and of the Albanian People's Republic, the various imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists."

But Khrushchev had the last word during the Congress and in his closing speech linked Red China with Albania:

". . . We do not recall an instance when anyone passed with such dizzy speed from expressions and vows of eternal friendship to unbridled anti-Soviet slander the way the Albanian leaders have done . . . The main thing in [Chou En-lai's] speech was alarm that the present state of our relations with the Albanian Workers Party might influence the cohesion of the Socialist camp . . . If the Chinese comrades desire to apply their efforts to normalization of relations on the part of the Albanian Workers Party with the fraternal parties, then

hardly anyone can make a better contribution to the solution of this problem than the Communist party of China."

The break between the U.S.S.R. and Albania was formalized in December, 1961, with the recall by both countries of their diplomats. *Kommunist*, the ideological magazine of the Soviet Party's Central Committee, outlined the ideological dispute in a long article which emphasized that the debate going on inside the Communist camp is over what Khrushchev calls "peaceful coexistence." For example, Albania (and Red China) oppose Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa—an attitude *Kommunist* branded as "nationalist narrow-mindedness and egotism."

Kommunist expounded Khrushchev's thesis that "peaceful coexistence" (fighting the capitalist world through peaceful competition) is now possible because "the balance of forces has changed in favor of peace and Socialism (Communism), to the detriment of imperialism." But then *Kommunist* denounced Hoxha, and indirectly Red China, because they argue that "the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is . . . merely a phrase, words which do not bind one, a clever tactical maneuver." The latter, of course, is precisely what many experts in the Western world say about Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" campaign.

If this were really only a dispute between the U.S.S.R. and Albania (only 1/870th the size of the U.S.S.R.), it would not be worth more than a footnote. But since this is a dispute between two Communist giants—the U.S.S.R. and China—with tiny, insignificant Albania the foil for each, it is important and vital not only to the Communist world but to the non-Communist world.

Aside from the effect this controversy will have on the future of the world, it is an amusing exposition of how what Khrushchev calls "the apple of our eye" (the unity of the Communist bloc), is in fact a mote in his eye (disunity).

U.S. in Decay

THE LIE. *Capitalism in the United States is on its last legs, a decaying system which will be replaced by Communism. The Soviet Union will catch up and surpass it in production by 1970.*

The new Communist Party Program writes this epitaph for the United States (which is what the Communists mean when they talk

about "Imperialism"): "Imperialism has entered the period of decline and collapse. The inexorable process of decay has seized capitalism from top to bottom—its economic and political systems, its politics and ideology. Imperialism has forever lost its power over the bulk of mankind."

Nikita Khrushchev spelled out this prediction to the 22nd Party Congress:

"The Party sets the task of turning our country during the next ten years into *the first industrial power in the world*, to achieve superiority over the United States both in total industrial output and in per capita industrial output. At that approximate time (1970-71), the U.S.S.R. will have exceeded the present U.S. level in per capita output of agricultural products 1.5 times and will have exceeded the United States in national income.

"But that is the first objective; we are not going to stop at that. In the course of the second decade, up to 1980, our country will leave the United States far behind in industrial and agricultural production . . . By 1980 the world Socialist system will contain approximately two-thirds of all world industrial production."

THE TRUTH. This Khrushchev exercise in hyperbole is now familiar. With slight variations for special audiences, it exaggerates the probable great increase in Soviet production into an improbable prediction.

Khrushchev's inclusion of agriculture in his prophecy makes it more ludicrous because that is the Soviet Union's Achilles' Heel. In fact, agriculture is the major problem of all Communist societies. The American cynic would be justified in declaring that it would serve the Kremlin right if it produces 1.5 times more agricultural products than the U.S.—and thus saddles itself with a surplus problem that has plagued this country since the war.

No one today denies the phenomenal growth of Soviet industry—both under the forced labor and forced industrialization plans of Stalin before and after the war, and similar, if less brutal, prodding by Khrushchev. Continued concentration on increases in heavy industry (with consumers' goods industries still the stepchild of Soviet economy) has, indeed, made the U.S.S.R. the second largest industrial country in the world.

But to jump to the conclusion that in the next ten years the Soviet Union will be the first industrial power as well as the first agricultural power in the world is a prediction that even the gloomiest economists

in the United States, who study the future relative positions of the world's two giants, would not accept. The gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in basic industrial production will be narrowed in the coming decades—may even be closed. The Soviets could surpass U.S. production in such basic products as steel. But the question still would remain—production for what? The Soviet economy remains geared to heavy industrial production—the major necessity of a militaristic society.

Comparison of the future relationships of the American and Russian economies has engaged economists all over the world during the post-war period. The rapid rate of growth of Soviet industrial production cannot be dismissed lightly as some wishful thinkers would like to do with the foolish argument that those who can't produce abundant food and luxuries for their people can't produce steel. They can. But it does not follow that the United States is about to become a second-rate nation economically or industrially.

Shortly after Khrushchev and President Kennedy met at Vienna in June, 1961, Khrushchev released the new Party Program which is filled with rosy predictions of the coming of Communism in Russia by 1980, combined with denigration of the United States as a world industrial power. President Kennedy, who had expressed concern during his campaign about the gap between the *rate* of industrial growth of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., nevertheless put the issue in better perspective at his news conference on June 28:

"Without wishing to trade hyperbole with (Khrushchev), I do suggest it reminds me of the tiger hunter who has picked a place on the wall to hang the tiger's skin long before he has caught the tiger. This tiger has other ideas.

"Premier Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union is only 44 years old, but his country is far older than that, and it is an interesting fact that in 1913, according to the best calculations I can get from governmental and private sources, the Russian gross national product was 46 per cent of the United States gross national product. Interestingly enough, in 1959 it was 47 per cent. Because while the Soviet Union was making progress and improving the material standards of her people in the ensuing years, so was the tired-out runner [according to Khrushchev that's the U.S.], and on a per capita basis, the Soviet product in 1959 was only 39 per cent of ours.

"If both countries sustain their present rate of growth, three and a half percent in the United States and six percent in the Soviet Union, Soviet output will not reach two-thirds of ours by 1970. Our

rate will be far easier to sustain or improve than the Soviet rate, which starts from a lower figure. Indeed, if our growth rate is increased to even four and a half percent, which is well within our capability, it is my judgment that the Soviet Union will not out-produce the United States at any time in the 20th Century . . .

"Mr. Khrushchev obviously sees the future differently than we do, and he has urged his people to work hard to develop that future. We in the United States must work hard, too, to realize our potential. But I believe that we can maintain our productive development and also our system of freedom. We invite the U.S.S.R. to engage in this competition which is peaceful, and which could only result in a better living standard for both of our peoples. In short, the United States is not such an aged runner, and to paraphrase Calvin Coolidge [who bowed out of a possible third term in the Presidency in 1928 by saying, "I do not choose to run"], we do choose to run."

This is not a subject which can be exhausted in a few pages. Neither is it one that can be explained in a few wildly exaggerated sentences such as Khrushchev is prone to do. Both Soviet industry and agriculture have serious problems—especially the latter. During the last year or more, Khrushchev probably has spent more time in rural areas prodding the Russian farmer than on any other single project. He is constantly referring to wasteful and inefficient farm methods—many of which he once sponsored.

It is interesting and probably significant that Khrushchev has asked the editors of *Who's Who in America* to delete from the newest edition, available in March, 1962, previous references to him as a "leader in work for planned agricultural growth in the U.S.S.R." This suggests that even in an American reference work Khrushchev does not want to be blamed for either recent Soviet crop failures or the overall failure of collective agriculture. In an all-day speech to the Central Committee on March 5, 1962, Khrushchev spelled out the details of the Russian farm crisis and suggested that capitalist incentives might be needed to produce enough food.

"We are Prosperous—We are Poor"

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union is prosperous and booming, close to surpassing the U. S. and on the road to triumph over capitalism.*

But at the same time in a different place—

The Soviet Union is poor and struggling, still striving to recover from World War II damage, and needs a reduction in its annual assessment for the United Nations.

Which "lie" is one to believe? Both statements cannot be correct, although the U.S.S.R. manages frequently to have its cake and eat it, too.

The superiority of Communism and the decadence of capitalism ("in the last stages of decay," is the way it is put) is a tune Moscow has sung for a long time. Never has the pitch been more strident than during the 22nd Communist Party Congress when the new Party program proclaimed that "Communism—the Bright Future of All Mankind" was within grasp.

The poverty of the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, is an equally familiar tune at the United Nations each year when the problem of that organization's near bankruptcy is tackled. The bankruptcy is caused primarily by Russia's refusal to pay its share of the UN costs. The Soviet delegate invariably argues that the "rich" United States (for this purpose no longer "decadent") should pay more to the UN, and the "poor" U.S.S.R. (for this purpose no longer prosperous) should pay less.

THE TRUTH. The Soviet Union is not nearly as affluent as it pretends at pep rallies for Communist Party members. But neither is it so poor that it cannot and should not pay its present share of UN costs and probably considerably more.

The Soviet delegates at the United Nations never hesitate to speak or vote—or veto. But they pay an absolute minimum. In his 1962 State of the Union message, President Kennedy blamed the near-bankruptcy of the organization on "those members who are willing to contribute their votes and their views—but very little else."

Likewise, Soviet leaders never hesitate to brag about the superiority of their economic system, especially when trying to impress the new, underdeveloped nations. These are the same men who claim they cannot scrape together the necessary funds to keep the UN solvent. The budgets of UN activities are tiny compared with national government budgets.

Trying to refute Soviet claims or excuses in the field of economics

is difficult. The lack of statistics comparable to those of other countries and the questionable reliability of Soviet statistics makes the effort frustrating and often fruitless. Even Stalin complained to the 13th Communist Party Congress and expressed a desire for some "bourgeois statisticians, people who respect themselves and possess a certain minimum of professional honor." Khrushchev himself denounced faked and inflated figures on farm production as recently as January, 1961. "As is known," he told a meeting on agricultural problems, "one cannot make pancakes out of statistics."

The United Nations is one place where Soviet claims of incredible prosperity, growth and superiority in almost all fields of endeavor are put to test. Contributions to UN are based on a complicated formula, a major factor of which is national income and ability to pay. Conceding that there also are political factors involved:

- Either Soviet prosperity is not nearly so great as Khrushchev claims;
- Or the U.S.S.R. is contributing far less to the UN budget than it should.

Under the old assessment rates, Soviet contributions to the various UN budgets and funds for 1961 were only about 7.5 percent of the American contributions. The United States, "a nation in decay," contributed \$181,145,505, compared to contributions of only \$13,031,287 by the Soviet Union, "the wave of the future."

When is Khrushchev lying? When he boasts he is about to bury capitalism, or when he pleads poverty? When he brags about economic growth, or when he sheds tears about failure to recover from World War II? He, of course, wants it both ways. He wants the U.S. assessment for the UN boosted from 32.05 to 38.5 percent of the annual budget, and wants the combined Soviet-Ukraine-Belorussia assessment reduced from 17.47 to 15.89 percent.

The table on page 202 proves that Russia's claim of economic equality with the U.S. is out of focus with its fiscal position in the UN. The table shows the contributions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the calendar year 1961.

If such statistics are to be only a rough judge of the relative economic strength of the two countries, the Soviets have a long way to go in the UN before claims of equality are valid. The Soviet

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
UNITED NATIONS DURING 1961

	United States	U.S.S.R.
Regular budget	\$ 22,332,810	\$ 9,356,287
Congo military operations (1960)	29,962,833	nothing
Congo military operations (1961)	47,509,657	nothing
UN Middle East Emergency Force	7,915,519	nothing
Special Fund	18,811,869	1,000,000
Expanded Technical Assistance	17,812,817	2,000,000
UN Children's Fund	12,000,000	675,000
Palestine Refugees	23,500,000	nothing
UN Refugees	1,300,000	nothing
Total	\$181,145,505	\$13,031,287

Union pays only 13 percent of the regular UN budget compared with nearly one-third by the U.S.; it pays nothing to such special funds as the Congo and the Middle East while the U.S. pays between 40 and 50 percent of the total; it pays nothing for the maintenance of Palestinian refugees while the American people finance 70 percent of that program.

"Stop Spying on Us"

THE LIE. The United States has gone to wild extremes in the espionage business. It has even converted West Berlin into a hot-bed of spies and saboteurs.

This is part of the Soviet game of the pot calling the kettle black. In their thinking every non-Communist is an anti-Communist spy or potential one. And anyone who is not engaged in subverting a non-Communist regime is, ipso facto, a subverter of Communism.

"Subversive actions against the Socialist [Communist] countries have been raised by certain imperialist powers to the level of state policy," Khrushchev complained to the 22nd Communist Party Congress. "The United States of America, with cynical frankness, is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on espionage and diversionary activities against the Socialist countries; it organizes so-called partisan detachments, brings criminal elements into them—cutthroats who are prepared to commit the filthiest crimes for money."

The reason given for building "The Wall" through the center of

Berlin was that the United States had converted West Berlin into a massive center of espionage. The Warsaw Pact communique supporting "The Wall" justified it with this excuse: "In no other point of the world are so many espionage and subversive centers of foreign states to be found as in West Berlin, where they can act with impunity. These numerous subversive centers are smuggling their agents to (East Germany) for all sorts of subversion, recruiting spies and inciting hostile elements to organize sabotage and to provoke disturbances in (East Germany)."

Even more fantastic was the claim that the two and a half million people who have fled East Germany in recent years were deceived, blackmailed or bribed to leave by the West's "center of subversive activities" in West Berlin—and then forced to serve in the West German army or the West's espionage organizations!

THE TRUTH. Never in history has a government placed so much emphasis on espionage—men, money and materials—or so cavalierly accused others of espionage as does the U.S.S.R. Ever since the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917, the Soviet espionage operation has been not only incredibly extensive, but also ruthless and unscrupulous. It is not confined to spying on foreign nations; its biggest operation is espionage upon its own people, masked as State Security. Mere mention of the various names under which the secret police have operated since 1917: Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, and currently the KGB (Committee of State Security), conjures up stories that rival those of any horror fiction writer.

During the Stalin era the most feared man in the U.S.S.R., feared even by military men, was the head of this dread operation, Lavrentia Beria, who had his own private army. Nikita Khrushchev has now, told how, after Stalin's death, he and several other old Bolsheviks tricked Beria into attending a special Kremlin meeting and shot him. They feared he was about to do the same to them and seize Stalin's mantle.

Today it is no longer necessary to depend solely on books such as Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* for knowledge of the inhuman practices of the secret police during Stalin's reign. Khrushchev himself has told many of the horror stories in his de-Stalinization campaign. His descriptions have been particularly lurid about the bloody purges of Stalin in the 1930's. They shocked the non-Communist world, but the Communists then swallowed Stalin's excuse that the

victims were traitors. Khrushchev, who was a Stalin lieutenant and helped carry out the purges in the Ukraine, now tells how the secret police under Stalin really behaved:

"Many excellent commanders and political workers in the Red Army were liquidated. There are comrades among the delegates here who spent many years in prison. They were 'persuaded' by certain ways that they were German or British or some other spies. And some of them 'confessed'. Even when they were told that the charges of espionage against them were withdrawn, they themselves insisted on their earlier depositions, as they felt it would be better to abide by their false statements in order to have done with torture, to die more quickly."

The methods may be less brutal and bloody today, but the show goes on and Khrushchev's heirs may tell us how it works today. In any event, in recent months there have been increasing "spy scares" in the U.S.S.R. and the arrest of foreigners who have "confessed" to espionage for the West. Presumably Khrushchev's secret police have not lost the formula of "persuasion."

There are two major Soviet espionage organizations. The senior and larger operation is a branch of the Secret Police, the KGB; the other is Soviet Military Intelligence Service, the GRU, of the Ministry of Defense. Combined, these two vastly exceed any other espionage operations in the world in size and scope, operating abroad in collaboration with the international network of Communist parties. A recent Congressional-State Department report* provides this description of the operation:

"The KGB is the keeper of the Soviet fortress and controls an army of informants within the U.S.S.R. and an international network of spies abroad for the purpose of domestic repression, the detection and utilization of foreign intelligence operations against the U.S.S.R., the use of force and terrorism at home and abroad, and the direction of espionage, sabotage and terror in the free world. Only in foreign espionage does the Committee of State Security (KGB) have a competitor—the GRU—which gathers the military secrets of other countries. As a component of the General Staff, the GRU is administered by the Ministry of Defense and supervised ultimately, as is the KGB, by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Moscow, as the headquarters of the KGB and GRU with their octopus-like arms reaching into every corner of the world, is the world's greatest center of espionage. To use their own terms, it is a "hotbed" of spies, saboteurs, provocateurs, etc.

The second largest center of espionage activities in the world—Communist lies notwithstanding—is in East Germany and East Berlin. Communist Germany has become the center for almost every espionage organization, other than those in the U.S.S.R., operating in the Communist orbit. In addition to East Germany's own enormous espionage system, the espionage apparatus of all the Eastern European satellites is coordinated there with the Moscow headquarter's huge staffs of the Soviet KGB and GRU.

In Karlshorst, just outside of East Berlin, the Soviet KGB has about 700 recruiting agents and several hundred more communications and administrative personnel. In addition, the elite of the GRU operation in Europe is located at Karlshorst with a staff of 150 high officers and related personnel. The GRU has another headquarters at Wuensdorf with a staff of over 100 and field headquarters in Schwerin, Leipzig, Magdeburg, and Chemnitz, all in East Germany.

The court and police records of the free world are convincing evidence of this massive Communist operation. The West German government alone has announced the arrest of 18,000 Communist spies during the last eight years. The files of free nations' foreign offices are peppered with records of Communist "diplomats" declared persona non grata for espionage activities. Neutral Sweden alone has ousted 14 Communist diplomats since World War II for being spies.

The above mentioned State Department report lists only the major cases of Communist spies who have been convicted in the free world since the war. The number is over 40, but there are countless cases that gain only routine notice because Communist espionage has become routine. Mention of a few of the more notorious cases is a reminder of what a major part of life this has become in recent years: Allan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Col. Rudolf I. Abel,³ Jack Soble, etc. After exposure of elaborate espionage rings operating from Canada and Australia, the Royal Commissions of those countries wrote detailed reports which are textbooks on Soviet espionage.⁴

But nowhere is the hypocrisy of the Soviets more blatant on this subject than in East Germany and East Berlin. The East German Communist regime has an estimated 17,000 agents working full time in West Germany. There are another 15,000 functionaries who perform subversive activities in "front" organizations and by infiltrating legitimate organizations. Even the Committee of Free Jurists, one of the purest and most effective anti-Communist groups in the West, has at times been infiltrated by Communists.

Half of the 70,000 members of the illegal Communist Party in West Germany (the Party is legal only in West Berlin) concentrate on underground work in trade unions.

And then there is a large but unknown organization in West Germany called "The Silent Net," composed of Communist agents who do not do anything—now. They are kept informed and wait for the day when their action will be needed.

Western sources have estimated that the cost of this huge espionage-subversion operation in Germany is about \$50 million a year. An estimated five million copies of Communist propaganda are circulated in West Germany each month.

The very reliable and respected West German newspaper *Die Welt* did a comprehensive study of this problem in 1960 and concluded that its scope was fantastic: "It is a battle fought with camouflage and cunning, with force and persuasion. It is fought on all levels: in factories and in the federal army, in the trade unions and in political parties, in intellectual circles and youth clubs, in meetings as well as in the halls of any apartment house. At one place it is done by undermining a non-Communist organization and at another by defamation of a leading politician or military person.⁵ At one time, a harmless dreamer is misled to commit political stupidities, at another time it is plain espionage. The methods are manifold, the aim, however, is always the same: the undermining of the constitutional order in the Federal Republic (West Germany). The effort to gain this end is so enormous that it does not find its equal even in the history of the Communist International."

1. Khrushchev's professed shock about Stalin's purges now is quite different from his views when he was a partner of Stalin in those crimes. On January 30, 1937, the following statement by Khrushchev appeared in *Pravda* with respect to the second of the Great Purge Trials that had just ended with death sentences for many notable old Bolsheviks: "We are gathered here, on Red Square, to raise our proletarian voice in complete support of the sentence passed by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court against the enemies of the people, the traitors of the Motherland, the betrayers of the workers' cause, the spies, the diversionists, agents of fascism, the vile despicable Trotskyites . . . These murderers . . . have lifted their villainous hands against Comrade Stalin. By lifting their hands against Comrade Stalin they lifted them against all the best that humanity possess. For Stalin is hope; he is expectation; he is the beacon that guides all progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!"

2. *Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations*, printed for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1961.

3. See page 184 for the release of Abel the spy for U-2 pilot Powers.

4. *The Report of the Royal Commission*, June 27, 1946, Controller of Stationery,

Soviet Science Leads the World

THE LIE. *The Soviet Union is superior to the United States and all other countries in all fields of science. Nikita Khrushchev never has conceded less than equality with the United States in any aspect of science and technology.*

The Soviets took extraordinary advantage of Sputnik—a first in space technology that everyone conceded the Russians—to parlay that accomplishment in one scientific-technological field not only into claims of absolute scientific superiority but also into boasts that it “proved” the superiority of the Soviet economic and social system.

“Sputniks are the heralds of progress, heralds of the triumph of Soviet science and technology,” Khrushchev chortled at a jubilee meeting during the 40th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik seizure of power.

And a year later, talking to a sullen and silent group of workers at Cegled, Hungary, who in 1956 had experienced the “triumph” of the Soviet economic and social system when it was imposed on them by Red Army tanks, Khrushchev shouted: “Whose artificial satellites were the first to rise into the cosmos? They were the satellites created in a Socialist country, the Soviet Union. Who now intends to catch up with the Soviet Union in scientific development? The United States of America is now setting for itself the task of catching up with the Soviet Union.”

This exercise in hyperbole has been intensified since the Soviets orbited the first man into space with such Khrushchevisms as this:

“The Soviet people are filled with patriotic pride for their beloved

Ottawa. This was the first exhaustive disclosure of the methods of the Soviet spy network and remains a valuable textbook.

5. The recent campaign to daub the Nazi Swastika on General Adolf Heusinger is an example. He is the top officer of the West German Army and Chairman of NATO's Military Committee in Washington. Heusinger is probably one of the most thoroughly investigated men in the post-war world. He was cleared not only by Allied but also by West German de-Nazification courts, and again by the governments of each of the 15 NATO nations before being allowed to hold his high military offices in the German army and NATO. Heusinger was not a Nazi Party member. He was aware of the bomb plot against Hitler and was sitting beside Der Fuehrer, briefing him on military matters, when the bomb exploded. To call him a Nazi, as the Russians do, would be the same as calling General Douglas MacArthur a New Dealer because he was in the U.S. Army when Franklin D. Roosevelt was President.

motherland which is marching at the head of modern scientific and technical progress and blazing a trail into the future . . . Formerly our country was one of the most backward states. Today the Soviet Union is economically the world's second nation, and politically and culturally the first nation of the world. As to the development of science, we also hold a worthy place—I wish to be modest about it, but everyone knows what place we hold in science.”

THE TRUTH. With the exception of space technology, the United States and the free world are superior to the Soviet Union in major fields of science and technology. This challenge of extreme Soviet claims to absolute superiority is made by men who in no way belittle Soviet accomplishments in *some* fields of science and technology.

What we must concede the Soviets, however, is their extraordinary ability to propagandize one accomplishment, such as Sputnik and the man in space, into worldwide acceptance of their claims to superiority in everything. This is one facet of their use of Soviet science and technology—not primarily for the benefit of mankind but for advancing the Communist system and the power of the Soviet Union.

Some of the best answers to Khrushchev's claims of scientific superiority come from Soviet and Communist scientists themselves. These show that the Soviet hierarchy's interest is in what the scientist can do for Communism, rather than in what the scientist can do for science.

There is very recent proof that all is not as well in the world of Soviet science as Khrushchev would have the world believe. During the 18th International Conference on Theoretical and Applied Chemistry in Montreal in August, 1961, one of the eight Russian delegates, Dr. Mikhail A. Klochko, a Stalin prize winner in science, asked the Canadian government for political asylum. His public explanation of his decision to defect should cause some second thoughts for those who are tempted to accept Khrushchev's claims at face value.

Compare Khrushchev's recent boast: “The work of Soviet scientists and *their international cooperation* have already been acknowledged around the world,” with Dr. Klochko's appraisal of the life of a Soviet scientist:

“ . . . I decided to leave the U.S.S.R. five years ago. It became impossible for me to bring to realization the scientific projects on which I was working . . . *I was depressed with the lack of contact with the outside world, the falsity of information, and the difficulty of self-expression.* It became obvious to me that if I stayed in the

U.S.S.R. I would not be able to give to mankind all that I could if I were in a free, democratic country. I am now an old man (59) and I am afraid of nothing, and I do not want my life work wasted.

"Nobody tempted me here. I was not tempted by any material considerations, but was forced to take this action to seek freedom of scientific expression and to save what is left of my human self-respect . . . I had no particular personal conflict with my fellow scientists in Russia as scientists, but I could not carry out pure research where the scientist is constantly hampered by political considerations.

"It is the lack of human dignity in the U.S.S.R. that hurts the most."

A similar complaint has come from another eminent scientist behind the Iron Curtain. He is Professor Leopold Infeld, who worked in the United States with Albert Einstein but returned to his home in Poland in 1950. He is Poland's outstanding theoretical physicist and his criticism of the system under which he now lives was printed in the Polish cultural weekly, *Przegląd Kulturalny*. He warned the regime that Communist limitations on personal freedom are intolerable unless there is promise that "freedom for our children will increase rather than diminish."

"We speak of competition with the West," he wrote. "That competition cannot be purely on the economic plane. It must also be on the level of freedom and on the level of liberty."

Infeld also disclosed that when he returned to Poland, Stalinist policies prevented him from setting up a school of theoretical physics that took into account Western theories. Such intellectual restrictions are gone, he said, but he is willing to endure restrictions on personal freedom only temporarily.

A third and later incident involves Oleg Lenchevsky, 46-year-old Soviet expert on salt water conversion who defected May 4, 1961, while in Great Britain on a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization fellowship. He made available to the New York Times (January 30, 1962 edition) a copy of his personal appeal to Nikita Khrushchev to let his family visit him. Lenchevsky challenged Khrushchev to prove his anti-Stalinist policy by a demonstration of the often proclaimed Soviet aim of "service to humanity and respect for human dignity."

Lenchevsky pointed out in his letter to Khrushchev that it was in England where he learned for the first time about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the UN in 1948.

This is further refutation of the Soviet claim that the Soviet people are well-informed about world affairs.

"Surely now, 13 years later, when the liberty, fraternity, equality and happiness of all people have been proclaimed as our ideals in the new program of the Communist Party (adopted at the 22nd Party Congress)," Lenchevsky pleaded with Khrushchev, "it is high time to put into practice these elementary principles of inter-human relations that are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . I feel sure that it is utterly impossible to try to maintain a centralized system of control over men's minds, in however 'humane' form, without going against the requirements of our cosmic and atomic age . . ."

Like Klochko and Infeld, the major complaint of Lenchevsky was the lack of freedom of mind in Russia. In an earlier letter to Khrushchev, after his defection, Lenchevsky said "capitalism has more sores than a dog has fleas," but added that he found the freedom of thought and expression in the West productive of a far better climate for meeting the problems of the atomic age than the atmosphere of repression in the U.S.S.R.

Against this background it is easier to understand the well balanced appraisal of Soviet claims to scientific superiority by Dr. John Turkevich, Higgins Professor of Chemistry at Princeton University. His credentials are excellent. He knows Soviet science and Soviet scientists first hand as the result of several missions to Russia and as a U.S. delegate to the 1955 and 1958 United Nations Geneva Conferences on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. He and his wife, Ludmilla, know the Russian language and co-authored *Russian for the Scientist*, and he was editor from 1948 to 1953 of the *Guide to Russian Scientific Periodical Literature*. Turkevich gave the lie to Khrushchev's claims in this balanced manner on March 20, 1961, at a Thomas Alva Edison Foundation meeting:

"Soviet accomplishments in nuclear energy and missiles have given the Soviet state great military power and, concomitant with it, a bravado in international discussions. In boasting of their space science the Soviets claim superiority in space technology. This we must concede them. But we must not concede their claim that Soviet science overall is superior to that of the United States, or that because they can send up bigger objects into space they have a better social and economic system.

"What are the facts: The United States is superior to the Soviet Union in all major fields of science and technology but that of space.

We are superior on the basis of the number of Nobel prizes awarded, superior in the number of outstanding scientists, superior in scientific accomplishments, superior in major scientific installations. For every excellent Soviet scientist, and they do have a number of outstanding men, we in the United States have ten as good or better. We in the United States are the greatest scientific power in the world. But in the dynamic world situation, we must recognize our weaknesses and see to it that they do not jeopardize our leadership . . ."

There is one aspect of this subject in which the Soviets have unquestioned leadership and that is in the number of graduates each year in the fields of science and engineering. According to Nicholas DeWitt, this country's expert on this subject, the Communist Party in Russia deliberately has created an unbalanced educational system to train thousands of engineers and scientists to serve the state. The aim is ultimate superiority in all fields of science. The Soviets have almost no liberal arts education as we understand it, DeWitt says, and are convinced that the test with the non-Communist world will be decided in the fields of science and technology.

"This type of one-sided scientific and technical education, producing specialists who are little interested in human and ethical values, apparently is considered to provide the most suitable and pliable kind of manpower for running the affairs of the Communist state," DeWitt concludes in his recent study of this subject.¹

The relationship between the Communist Party hierarchy in Soviet Russia and its scientists, however, long has plagued some sections of Soviet science. The most outstanding example of the injection of Party dogma into science is the controversy for many years in the field of genetics: the Lysenko doctrine (called Michurinism in Russia) versus the Mendelian doctrine which is generally accepted elsewhere in the world. Greatly oversimplified, this involves Lysenko's claim that "heredity is determined by the specific type of metabolism. You need but change the type of metabolism in a living body to bring about a change in heredity." In other words, changes during life brought about by environment are transmitted to the next generation. Communists go along with Lysenko's theory, in spite of its rejection as unscientific rubbish by most of the world's scientists, because it supports their hope and belief that they can create a new "Soviet man" by controlling his environment.

The opinion of the world's scientific community is that this Lysenko nonsense has killed genetics as a science in the Soviet Union and raised havoc with the whole field of biology. In effect, the Communist

Party keeps its scientists, at least officially, out of this area of science, which is currently one of the most exciting.

Some of the long-standing Communist difficulties in agriculture stem from Communist obsession with Lysenko's genetic theories. Yet Nikita Khrushchev, despite his degradation of Stalin on many issues, continues Stalin's worship of Lysenko while his agricultural problems increase.

"If I were asked which scientist I voted for I would say, without thinking: Lysenko," he told a conference of agricultural workers. "I think there are few scientists who understand soil as well as Lysenko."

"We Write as We Please"

THE LIE. *Freedom to speak and to write exist only in Communist society. Elsewhere, writers are merely ink-stained wretches, lackeys of profit-seeking, capitalist publishers.*

Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution "guarantees" the citizen "freedom of speech," a phrase which in any other society means individual freedom to say or write what he believes, irrespective of how it conforms with existing regimes of government or prevailing political philosophies.

Nikita Khrushchev talks about his concern for "artistic mastery of literature and art" and claims that what he calls "socialist realism" gives "unlimited possibilities for the creation of such works" in this way: "In the conditions of the Socialist (Communist) society where the people are *really free*, where they are actual masters of their own destiny and creators of their new life, for the artist who faithfully serves his people, the question of whether or not he is free in his own creativity does not exist."

Nothing has changed much in the attitude toward literature or writers since Lenin in 1905 laid down the "line" of the Bolsheviks: "Gentlemen bourgeois individualists, we must say to you that your talk about absolute freedom is only hypocrisy. In a society which is based on the power of money . . . there can be no 'freedom', real and

1. *Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R.*, by Nicholas DeWitt, 1962, National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. This is the second comprehensive study of this subject by DeWitt. No comparable study of the free world exists and, as DeWitt points out, no such study exists in the Soviet language.

actual. Mr. Writer, what freedom do you have from your bourgeois publisher? From your bourgeois public which demands from you pornography in picture and frame, prostitution in the form of 'additions' to 'sacred' theatrical art? . . . Freedom of bourgeois writers, artists, actors is only a masked dependence on the money sack, on bribery and on being kept."

THE TRUTH. Bare mention of the late Boris Pasternak, poet and author of *Dr. Zhivago*, refutes the claim that Soviet writers are "free."

It is true that during the years immediately after Stalin's death, his successors experimented a little with what was called "The Thaw," allowing Soviet writers more freedom. The result was an outpouring of pent up frustration and criticism of the regime—and, of course, a fairly quick end to "The Thaw."

Few groups of people have given the Soviet regimes since 1917 more difficulty than those in the fields of art, literature and music. Back in 1930 the Soviet leaders grasped this nettle, accepted Stalin's dictum that proletarian art must be "national in form and socialist in content," and decreed that henceforth literature, art and music should be under "the careful yet firm guidance of the Communist Party." That remains the policy—Article 125 of the Constitution notwithstanding. Woe to any author in the Soviet Union who writes anything to which the Communist Party hierarchy should decide to take exception.

"There is no trend in our literature, in our art, other than the Soviet trend," Khrushchev says. "Nor can there be any . . . Literature plays an important role in our country, helping the party to educate the people *correctly*, to *instill in them* advanced, progressive ideas by which our party is united. And it is not without reason that writers in our country are engineers of the human soul."

Despite the lip service to "freedom," literature is one area in which Communist leaders do not hesitate to say that Soviet writers are tools—propagandists if you will—of the Communist Party and can be nothing else. To literature and art, the Party gives what it calls "an especially important role in the ideological work of our Party, in the Communist education of the workers . . . The Communist Party considers the workers in literature and art as faithful friends, as helpers, as reliable supporters in the ideological struggle."

Khrushchev anticipated the Pasternak case in his comprehensive essay, "For a Close Tie of Literature and Art with the Life of the

People," published in *Kommunist*, the chief theoretical journal of the Communist Party, in 1957. He scathingly denounced those who would insist on "the freedom of creativity" without respect to Party ideology.

"Unfortunately among the workers of art and literature one encounters such people, defenders of 'the freedom of creativity', who want us to pass on by, not to notice, not to give our principled evaluations and not to criticize those works which paint a distorted picture of Soviet society," he wrote. "... We openly declare that such views contradict the Leninist principle of the relationship of the Party and the State to questions of literature and art."

This complicated semantic argument between "Socialist realism"—"the truthful and profound delineation of a new people, creators of Socialist society, and of their fight for Communism"—and "freedom of creativity" became clear as crystal in the Pasternak case. There can be no "freedom of creativity" in a literature that must conform to "Socialist realism."

Pasternak's novel, *Dr. Zhivago*, was rejected for publication in the Soviet Union on these grounds—"profoundly unfair . . . historically prejudiced . . . profoundly anti-democratic and alien to any concept of the interests of the people . . . tries to prove that the October Socialist Revolution brought nothing but evil and hardship."

The world might never have heard of this had not Pasternak managed to send a copy of his manuscript out of the country (to Italy) where it was printed and became a best seller in many languages. But not in Russian—at least, not inside the Soviet Union.

The Pasternak crisis reached a climax when the author, previously famous primarily for his poetry, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. Pasternak's delight at the long-deserved recognition was short-lived. Soviet hypocrisy seldom has reached such depths. The regime piously stated it would place "no obstacles whatever" in his way if he wished to go abroad to receive the prize or leave the Soviet Union permanently to "experience personally 'all the charms of the capitalist paradise'." There would be no obstacles to that either. Already he had been expelled from the Soviet Writers Union and denounced in public in the presence of Nikita Khrushchev by Young Communist League Chief, Vladimir Y. Semechastny, as "a pig who, by dirtying the place in which he eats and lives, has done what even pigs do not do."

Pasternak had no trouble in seeing through the regime's game to force him into exile from his beloved Russia (not Soviet Russia) at

the end of his life. And so he wrote a letter of "voluntary renunciation" of the Nobel prize. This letter of 179 words tells more about "realism" in Soviet society than all the millions of words of "Socialist realism" churned out by the Party hacks.

"I am tied to Russia by birth, by life and by work," the old man pleaded with the men in the Kremlin. "I cannot imagine my fate separated from and outside of Russia . . . Leaving my motherland will equal death for me and for that reason I request that you not take that extreme measure in relation to me. Speaking sincerely, with my hand on my heart, I have done something for Soviet literature and can be useful to it in the future."

He was allowed to stay. Eighteen months later he died at his home in Peredelkino, a writers' colony about 20 miles outside of Moscow. Pasternak wrote his own epitaph in *Dr. Zhivago* which some day could be the epitaph for the Communist Party:

"I think that if the beast who sleeps in man could be held down by any threats of any kind, whether of jail or retribution after death, then the highest emblem of humanity would be the lion tamer, not the prophet who sacrificed himself. But this is just the point—what has for centuries raised man above the beast is not the cudgel, but the irresistible power of unarmed truth!"

Soviet literature is a fraud and will remain so until books such as *Dr. Zhivago*—which is far from being an anti-Communist tract—can be published and read in the Soviet Union. Today the Soviet people are restricted to literature that bears as little relation to "realism" as does the campaign literature of the Democratic and Republican Party headquarters in the United States.

None of this means, however, that all is well for the regime among the Soviet writers and artists. On the contrary, as so often in the past, there is increasing evidence of ferment among these people, a straining at the Communist Party leash that confines them to works of "Socialist realism" which, in truth, means works of unrealism. Young Soviet poets are writing verse and reading it to groups—verse that would be rejected unequivocally if submitted for publication. The reader's attention also is called to the works of an anonymous young Soviet writer which have been published in the United States—but not in Russia—under the pseudonym, Abram Tertz. *The Trial Begins* is a remarkable novel and his literary essay, *On Socialist Realism*, is an illuminating discussion of Soviet literary doctrine.

But maybe the most intriguing development in the world of Soviet literature is the recent activity of veteran Soviet writer, Ilya Ehren-

burg, who during a long lifetime has been on many sides of the controversy in the Soviet literary world. He observed his 70th birthday in 1961 by receiving the Second Order of Lenin and proclaiming how happy he was to be a Soviet Socialist Writer and how proud of being a Jew. Early in 1962, he publicly condemned the way the Soviet regime had handled the news of Pasternak's death—a brief notice in the press—and said that this reflected “a certain attitude on the part of certain people and a way of life that, fortunately, is more and more receding into the background.” A third interesting Ehrenburg event is the publication of the first two volumes of his autobiography—with great curiosity in the literary world about what he will have to say in later volumes when he copes with the controversial years in his life.

In an article in the December 1961 issue of *Encounter*, T. R. Fyvel discusses “The Stormy Life of Ilya Ehrenburg” and describes him as an enigma: “It is hard to understand how a writer like himself, who in his Russian-Parisian days had been one of the most brilliant satirists of the twenties, could ever have turned out the sad propaganda work represented by so many of his later novels.” Since Ehrenburg promises in the preface to the first volume of his autobiography “frankness,” he may yet answer Fyvel's question.

Farmers Love Communism

THE LIE. *After the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 “millions of small individual farms went into voluntary association to form collective farms.”*

“Led by the Party, aided and fully supported by the working class,” the new Party Program claims, “the peasantry took the road of Socialism . . . Collectivization forever delivered the countryside from kulak bondage, from class differentiation, ruin and poverty.”

THE TRUTH. The failure of the collectivization of agriculture is one of the open secrets of the Soviet Union. But the big lie in the above statement is that the Russian peasants turned their small farms into collectives “voluntarily.”

The best witness to disprove this is the man who liquidated millions of peasants in the 1920's because they would *not* join the collective

farms voluntarily. Stalin told the sordid story to Winston Churchill at their August, 1942, wartime meeting in Moscow. During a lull in the Stalin-Churchill talks one night, Churchill asked Stalin whether "the stresses of this war have been as bad to you personally as carrying through the policy of the collective farms." To which Stalin replied that the collective farm struggle was much worse than World War II.

"I thought you would have found it bad," Churchill said, "because you were not dealing with a few score thousands of aristocrats or big landowners, but with millions of small men."

"Ten millions," Stalin replied, holding up his hands. "It was fearful. Four years it lasted. It was absolutely necessary for Russia, if we were to avoid periodic famines, to plough the land with tractors . . . When we gave tractors to the peasants they were all spoiled in a few months. Only collective farms with workshops could handle tractors. We took the greater trouble to explain it to the peasants. It was no use arguing with them. After you have said all you can to a peasant he says he must go home and consult his wife, and he must consult his herder. After he has talked it over with them he always answers that he does not want the collective farm and he would rather do without tractors. It was all very bad and difficult—but necessary."

"What happened?" Churchill asked.

"Oh, well," Stalin replied, "many of them agreed to come in with us. Some of them were given land to cultivate in the province of Tomsk or the province of Irkutsk or farther north, but the great bulk were very unpopular and were wiped out by their laborers."

Churchill records the shock he sustained when he heard this talk of "millions of men and women being blotted out or displaced for ever." And yet Khrushchev and the Communist Party continue to peddle the canard that the collectivization of Russian farms was a "voluntary" movement!

The U.S.S.R. Is Abolishing Taxes

THE LIE. Soon there will be no taxes for the Russian people.

"The working people will receive a new and feasible addition to their wages as a result of the measures for abolition of taxes which are being carried out," Khrushchev told the 22nd Party Congress. "By the end of 1965 there will be no taxation of the population. The aboli-

tion of taxes is an outstanding social gain for the Soviet people . . . an act of tremendous political and economic importance."

Khrushchev first announced his plan for "abolition of taxes" on May 4, 1960, to the Supreme Soviet. When the cheers subsided, he said his announcement was "in keeping with the joy and uplift of springtime."

THE TRUTH. But, as Ko-Ko tells Nanki-Poo in "The Mikado," the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta:

"The flowers that bloom in the spring, Tra la,

"Have nothing to do with the case."

Khrushchev has no intention of abolishing *all* taxes as his words suggest. The only taxes to be abolished are *income* taxes for single men and women "living alone" and for workers earning less than 100 rubles per month. By Soviet exchange rates, that is a little over \$100 per month which, Khrushchev admits is what most workers get. Given the chronic housing shortage in Russia, the single man or woman "living alone" is a rarity. Families have to share living quarters.

Workers earning between 100 and 200 rubles are to be relieved of only about half of their former income tax, the other half to be deducted at the source. Those earning more than 200 rubles per month (fewer than one person in 100) will no longer have to pay any "income tax," but their wages will be cut by the amount of the former tax. What kind of a "feasible addition to their wages" is that?

The element of deceit in this—even if Khrushchev were sincere about abolishing all income taxes—is that it wouldn't mean much. Tax on even the highest salaries has only been about 11 or 12 percent. Unlike the United States, where over 50 percent of the federal government's revenue comes from individual income taxes, the Soviet government never has relied on that tax method. About 85 percent of Soviet government revenue comes from "profits" on state-owned enterprises. The next biggest source of government revenue is the turnover tax—a very high sales tax. The latest annual figures show revenue from the sales tax to have been 31.7 billion rubles compared with only 5.7 billion rubles from income taxes. On a per capita basis, the Russian citizen has been paying only about 25 rubles per year in income taxes compared with about 150 rubles in sales taxes.

The Soviet system being what it is, the regime can compensate

overnight for its "loss" in income taxes by raising the prices of state-produced goods (which include almost everything) or by increasing the turnover or sales tax, the size of which the average Russian is never told. It varies from article to article and, like our excise taxes, is merely part of the retail price.

Khrushchev's unqualified statements about "abolition of taxes", when he means abolition of only part of an already very small income tax, is comparable to President Kennedy announcing the end of taxation when all he intended was abolition of a minor excise tax.

The recent Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Mikhail A. Menshikov, revived the "no taxes" in the Soviet Union lie again to present at his farewell appearance at the National Press Club in Washington in 1962: "It is needless to repeat that within the next few years no one in our country will have to pay any income tax." When he was greeted with guffaws of laughter, he responded: "I'm sure you like that."

Khrushchev's boasts about abolishing income taxes and depending on what amounts to a very high sales tax (far more inequitable in any economic system) is puzzling because at the same time he claims to be the major interpreter of Karl Marx. He apparently overlooks the fact that the 1848 Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels called for "a heavy progressive or graduated income tax." Some of the extreme right extremists in America favor abolition of the income tax system because it is, they say, a Communist device. Khrushchev obviously thinks otherwise.

INDEX

Abel, Rudolf I., 184, 205
 Acheson, Dean, 140-41
 Acropolis, 35-6, 53
 Adenauer, Konrad, 92, 96-8, 101, 108
 Adzubei, Aleksei, 25, 74, 123, 170-71
 Afro-Asian nations, 76-7
 Aggression, 187
 Agitprop, 14
 Agricultural production, 197
 Alaska, 168-69
 Albania, 4, 46, 193-96
 Algeria, 76
 Allied Kommandatura, 121-22
 Alamagordo, 150
 American atomic monopoly, 41-2
Animal Farm, 188
 Annexations, 48-9
 "Apple for an orchard," 117
 Arab League, 77
 Armenia, 44, 167
 Arms race, 31, 41, 116
 Atlantic Charter, 22
 Atomic bombs, 34-7, 40, 132, 139
 Atoms-for-Peace, 142
 Attlee, Clement, 98
 Austria, 24-5, 60, 69, 77
 Austrian State Treaty, 24-5
 Azerbaijan, 44, 167

Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations, 206

Baltic States, 20-1, 53-6, 84, 167
 Baruch, Bernard M., 140-41
 Baruch plan, 140-42, 157
 Bechhofer, Bernard G., 161
 Belgrade Conference, 76
 Benes, Eduard, 58
 Berlin, 33-4, 41-3, 47, 53, 95, 125-27, 203
 Berlin blockade, 42, 116, 121, 122
 Berlin crisis, 115-18, 118-22
 Berlin elections, 99, 119-20
 Berlin, free access to, 122-24
 Berlin, "free" city status for, 118, 122-4
 Bessarabia, 45, 84
 "Better Red Than Dead," 36
 Bevin, Ernest, 30
 Bikini atoll, 143
 Bingham, Jonathan B., 49
 Bogdanov, O. V., 151
 Bohlen, Charles E., 7-8

Bourgeois democracy, 186
 Braune, G., 36-7
 Brazzaville group, 76
 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 19-20
 British colonies freed, 166, 171
 Budapest, 72
 Bukovina, 45
 Bulganin, Nikolai, 61-2, 108
 Bulgaria, 22, 158
 Burma, 171-72
 Byelorussia, 46
 Byrnes, James F., 31, 90-1

 Cairo Declaration, 23
 Cambodia, 69
 Capitalism, 7, 15, 34, 37, 74, 115, 139, 196-99
 Caramanlis, Constantine, 35
 Carew Hunt, R. N., 188
 Carr, E. H., 192-93
 Casablanca group, 76
 Ceylon, 69, 171
 China, 20, 22, 23, 69, 131, 133, 136
 Chinese Communist Party, 23
 Chou En-lai, 9, 195
 Churchill, Winston, 26-9, 88, 97, 217
 Class struggle, 16, 38
 Coexistence, 13-7, 40, 43, 56, 73-4
 Cold War, 26-31
 Collectivization of farms, 216-17
 Colonialism, 40, 57, 78, 163-69, 170
 Cominform, 59
Commentary, 17
 Committee of Free Jurists, 205
 Common Market, 171
 Communism, 17-8, 34, 37, 74, 124, 179
 Communist bloc unity, 193-96
 Communist China, 4, 9, 18, 26, 44, 46, 59, 71, 167, 169, 194-96
 Communist Manifesto (1848), 73, 219
 Communist Party, 179-81
 Communist Party Congress (22nd), 14, 42, 43, 57, 71, 73, 90, 115, 117, 139, 148, 170, 172, 180-81, 184, 186, 194, 197, 200, 202, 217
 Communist Party membership, 180
 Communist Party Program (1961), 7, 37-8, 48, 52, 71, 170, 179, 186, 196-98, 200, 216
 "Compelled," 41-3

- Congo, 60, 69
 Conquest, policy of, 43-6
 Constituent Assembly (1918), 74, 189-92
 Coolidge, Calvin, 97, 199
 Council of Foreign Ministers (Moscow), 107
 Counterrevolution, 41, 52, 73-4
 Crimean Tatars, 167
 Cronkite, Walter, 6
 Cuba, 53, 76
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 183
 Curzon line, 45
 Cyprus, 76
 Czechoslovakia, 22, 31, 38-9, 42, 45, 58-9, 134, 158

 Deane, General John R., 23
 Declaration of Rights, 167
 Declaration on Liberated Europe, 22
 Decree on Peace, 48-50
 Democracy, 186-88
 De-Stalinization, 4
 DeWitt, Nicholas, 211-12
Die Deutsche Zeitung, 77
Die Welt, 206
 Dillon, Douglas, 23
 Diplomacy, 52-6
 Disarmament, 78, 137, 152-57, 157-61
 Disarmament Committee, 157
 Disarmament inspections, 152-57
 Diversionists, 46-7
 Division of Germany, 105
 Dogmatism, 59
 Douglas, William O., 29
Dr. Zhivago, 213-16
 Draper, Theodore, 17
 Dulles, John Foster, 61-2, 134
Dynamics of International Relations, 84

 East German army, 93
 East German refugees, 42, 74, 124-27, 168, 185
 East Germany, 22, 26
 Eastern Europe, 28-9, 74, 169
 Eaton, Frederick, 158
 Eden, Anthony, 108
 Egypt, 40
 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 215-16
 Eichmann, Adolf, 62
 Einstein, Albert, 151
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 6, 61-2, 63, 107, 142, 144, 154
 Elections in Lithuania, 55
Encounter, 216
 Engels, Friedrich, 6

 Erhard, Ludwig, 62
 Estonia, 21, 45, 53-6, 167
 Ethiopia, 174

 Fanfani, Amintore, 36
 Faure, Edgar, 108
 Feis, Herbert, 133
 Finland, 20-1, 25, 44-5, 53, 63-5, 69, 92, 108, 167
 Finnish Peace Treaty (1947), 45
Foreign Affairs, 5-6, 9, 13, 16, 57
 Foreign Ministers' Conference (Geneva), 112
 Forrestal, James, 29
 France, 22, 69, 76, 83-4
 Freedom vs. totalitarianism, 74
 French African Community, 171
 French colonies freed, 166, 171
 Fuchs, Klaus, 205
 Fukuryu Maru, 143
 Fulton, Mo., 26-8
 Fyvel, T. R., 216

 Geneva spirit, 108
 Georgia, 44, 167
 German disarmament, 90-1, 94
 German militarism, 89-95
 German peace treaty, 105, 108-09, 111, 112-15
 German prisoners of war, 100-01
 Germany, 22, 81-101, 105-28, 135, 167
 Ghana, 76, 171
 Goa, 53, 72, 174
 Gold, Harry, 205
 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 83-4, 85-6
 Gottwald, Klement, 58
 Great Britain, 22, 36, 69, 83-4
 Great October Revolution, 189-92
 Greece, 29, 35
 Gromyko, Andrei, 63, 117, 134, 159
 Gruliov, Leo, 184-86
 Guam, 169
 Guinea, 76, 171

 Haas, Ernest, B., 84
 Hammaraskjold, Dag, 60, 67, 69-71, 72
 Hammer and sickle, 43
 Hawaii, 168-69
 Heusinger, Gen. Adolf, 62-3, 207
 Hiroshima, 131, 148
History of the U.S.S.R., 190
 Hitler, S, 22, 23, 44-5, 81-4, 85-6, 86-9, 90, 93, 96-8
 Hodgkinson, Harry, 188
 Home, Lord, 159

- Hong Kong, 168
 Honka, Dr. Olavi, 65
 Hopkins, Harry, 68
 Hoxha, Enver, 14, 194-96
 Hudson, G. F., 18
 Hungarian revolution, 49-51
 Hungary, 6, 22, 41, 49-51, 53, 70, 74, 167-68, 193, 207
 Hydrogen bombs, 34-7, 53, 97, 143-45, 146-49, 149-51

 Ikeda, Hayato, 61
 Ilyichev, Leonid F., 14-5
 Imperialism, 38-41, 52-3, 124, 170, 187
 Income taxes, 217-19
 Independence, 173-75
 India, 61, 72, 77, 143-44, 171-72, 173, 174
 Indonesia, 77, 171-72
 Industrial production, 197
 Infeld, Dr. Leopold, 209
 Ingus, 167
 International Atomic Energy Agency, 142
 International Press Institute, 184
 Intervention, 56-63, 63-5, 118, 120
 Iran, 21
 Ireland, 69
 Iron Curtain, 28
 Israel, 77
 Italian orange groves, 36
 Italy, 68
Izvestia, 25, 53-6, 74, 105, 110, 223, 170-71, 182-83, 185-86, 188-89

 Japan, 22, 46, 61, 69, 82, 87, 129-36, 143-44
 Japanese peace treaty, 46, 133-35
 Japanese prisoners of war, 135-36
 Japanese surrender, 131-33
 Jordan, 69
 Just wars, 38-41

 Kadar, Janos, 50
 Kalmucks, 167
 Karjalainen, Ahti, 63
 Kekkonen, Urho, 64-5, 92
 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 20, 25
 Kennan, George F., 5-6, 9, 29, 49, 52, 190-91
 Kennedy, John F., 8-9, 25, 33-4, 42-3, 55, 74-5, 81, 92, 94, 105, 110-11, 112, 116-17, 123-24, 131, 134, 139, 146-47, 155-57, 158-61, 166-67, 170-71, 182-83, 186, 189, 193, 198-99, 200, 219
 Kennedy-Macmillan letter, 185
 Kerensky, Alexander, 190-91
 Khrushchev, Nikita, 2, 4-5, 7, 13-4, 16-7, 18, 21, 27, 31, 32-4, 34-7, 37-41, 42-3, 45, 56-7, 60, 65, 66-7, 69-72, 75-4, 75-7, 81, 87, 89-90, 94, 96-8, 101, 105-09, 109-11, 112-15, 115-18, 118-22, 122-24, 134, 135-36, 139, 145, 146-49, 149-50, 152-57, 170, 172, 173, 179-81, 185-86, 186-88, 194-96, 197-99, 199-202, 203-04, 206, 207-12, 212-14, 217-19
 Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech, 184
 Khrushchev's speech (Jan. 6 1961), 39
 Klochko, Dr. Mikhail A., 208-09
 Koenigsberg, 45
 Koestler, Arthur, 203
 Konev, Marshal, 185
 Korea, 23, 33, 69, 72, 131, 136, 167-68, 173
 Korean War, 42, 94, 131, 134
 Krylov, S., 19
 Kurile Islands, 46, 135-36
 Kuusinen, Otto, 21
 Kuznetsov, 64
 Kuwait, 69
 Kwangtung Army, 131, 133

 Laos, 69
 Latvia, 21, 45, 53-6, 167
 League of Nations, 21
 Lenchevsky, Oleg, 209-10
 Lend-Lease, 23, 89
 Lenin, 19-20, 24, 43, 48, 54, 180, 183, 189-92
 Liberia, 174
 Libya, 69, 77
 Lie, Trygve, 66
 Lillienthal, David, 141
 Limited warfare (local wars), 38-41
 Lithuania, 21, 45, 46, 53-6, 167
 Litvinov Agreements, 20
 Litvinov, Maxim, 20
 Lumumba, Patrice, 60
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 180
 Lvov, 46
 Lysenko, Trofim, 211-12

 MacArthur, Douglas, 207
 Macmillan, Harold, 158-59, 186
 Maletier, General Pal, 50
 Mali, 76
 Manchuria, 26, 136
 Mao Tse-tung, 14, 59, 172, 194
 Marshall, George C., 30, 91
 Marshall Plan, 30-1, 117

- Marx, Karl, 6-7, 15, 37, 219
 Marxism-Leninism, 4-7, 14, 73, 188, 195
 Masaryk, Jan, 31
 Mauretania, 69
 May, Allan Nunn, 205
 McCloy, John J., 155, 161
 Menshikov, Mikhail A., 219
 Mikoyan, Anastas, 23, 60-1
 Militarists, 41, 46-7, 116
 Military budgets, 31-4
 Military manpower, 32-3
 Missiles, 34-7
 Molotov, V. M., 14, 21, 30, 54, 82, 84, 86, 90-1, 108
 Morgenthau Plan, 90
 Morocco, 76
 Mossadegh, Dr. Mohammed, 21
 Munich Pact, 83
 Murmansk, 89
- Nagasaki, 140
 Nagy, Imre, 50
 Nationalism (bad), 51
 Nationalism (good), 51-2
 NATO, 32, 35-6, 61, 62, 65, 76, 77, 92, 94-5
 Nazi attacks on Russia, 86-9
 Nazi-Soviet Relations: 1939-41, 83-4
 Negotiation, 8-9, 187
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 143, 174, 185
 Neocolonialism, 165
 Nepal, 69
 Neutralism, 75
 Neutrality, 188
 Neutrality Pact with Japan, 22, 82, 132
 Nevermann, Paul, 62
 News, Communist definition of, 182
Nineteen Eighty-four, 47, 188
 Norway, 60-1
 Nuclear test ban conference, 143-45
 Nuclear test moratorium, 41-3, 143-45, 183-84
 Nuclear tests, 41-3, 92, 137, 143-45
 Nuclear tests resumed, 145, 146-49, 159, 183-85
 Nuclear weapons, 34-7
- Occupation of Germany, 107
 October Revolution, 43, 47
 Oder-Neisse line, 86
On Socialist Realism, 215
 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 143, 146
 Orwell, George, 47, 188
 Outer Mongolia, 136
- Pachter, Henry, 77
 Pacific Trust territories, 168
 Pact of Peace, 25
 Pakistan, 171-72, 173
 Palgunov, N. G., 182
 Partition of Germany, 106
 Partition of Poland, 44-5, 85-6
 Pasternak, Boris, 213-16
 Peace, 6, 37, 43, 187
 Peace Manifesto of 1960, 16, 37-8, 174, 193
 Peaceful revolution, 38
 Pearl Harbor, 131
 People's Democracy, 187
 Philippines, 171, 173
 Poland, 20, 22, 44, 83-4, 85-6, 134, 158
 Porkkala, 26, 64
 Port Arthur, 26
 Portugal, 69
 Portuguese colonial empire, 166
 Postwar cooperation, 27
 Postwar negotiation for arms control, 161
 Potsdam Conference and agreements, 45, 91, 94-5, 98-100, 106-07, 109
 Potsdam declaration on Japan, 132, 136
 Powers-Abel swap, 184
 Powers, Francis Gary, 184
Pravda, 17, 182
 Pryor, Frederick L., 184
 Purge trials, 206
 Purges, 203-04
- Rakosi, Matyas, 50
 Rearmament, 42
 Reparations, 91
 Reunification of Germany, 107-09; western plan for, 113-15; Soviet plan for, 114
 Reuter, Ernst, 99, 121-22
 Revanchists, 41, 46-7, 116
 Revenge-seekers, 41
 Revisionism, 59
 Revolution, 72-5
 Revolutionary wars, 40
 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 82
 Romania, 22, 45, 158, 167
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 88, 91, 97, 132, 135, 207
 Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 205
 Rusk, Dean, 15, 30, 142, 159
 Russell, Lord, 96
 Russian people, 179-81, 182-86
 Saboteurs, 41
 Sakhalin, 46, 135, 136

- Schorr, Daniel, 145
 Secession, right of, 47-52
 Self-determination, 41, 47-8, 105, 113, 167, 187
 Semechastny, Vladimir Y., 214
 Sergeev, Mihail, 35-6
 Sino-Soviet Treaty, 21, 23
 Smirnov, Andrei, 62
 Smyth report, 151
 Soble, Jack, 205
 Socialism, 17-8, 34, 52-3, 74, 124, 179
 Socialist democracy, 186
 Soong, T. V., 133
 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, 76
 Soviet constitution, 48, 212-13
 Soviet foreign policy, 56
 Soviet literature, 212-16
 Soviet press, 182-86
 Soviet satellites, 44
 Soviet science, 207-12
Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, 63
 Spain, 69
 Spies, 46-7
 Sputnik, 207
 Stalin, 4, 9, 22, 23, 24, 26-8, 59, 68, 81-4, 90, 98, 107, 131-33, 135, 201, 217
 Stalin-Hitler pact, 44-5, 54, 81-4, 85-6
 Stalingrad, 4, 89
 Stevenson, Adlai, 61-2, 144, 155, 169
 Subversion, 38, 46-7
 Suez, 53
 Summit Conference (Geneva), 107-111
 Summit Conference (Paris), 147
 Suslov, Mikhail A., 195
 Sweden, 77
 "Sword of Damocles," 53, 149

 Tannu Tuva, 45
 Tass Agency, 182
 Taxes, 217-19
 Territorial acquisitions, 43-6
 "The bone in our throat," 112
 "The Spirit of Geneva," 24, 108
The Strange Alliance, 23
 "The Thaw," 213
The Trial Begins, 215
 "The Wall," 41-3, 53, 62, 95, 97, 99, 106, 118, 122, 125-28, 167, 185, 202
 Thermonuclear war, 41-2, 109
 Threats, 34-7
 Three camps, 75-8
 Tibet, 163
 Tito, 50, 59
 Treaties, 18-25

 Troika, 69-70, 72, 77
 Trotsky, Leon, 189-90
 Truman, Harry, 26, 31, 87, 98, 140, 151
 Truman Doctrine, 29
 Tunisia, 77
 Turkevich, Dr. John, 210-11
 Turkey, 29
 Two camps, 13, 28, 75

 U-2 incident, 78, 184
 U Thant, 70
 Ukraine, 44, 46, 47, 70, 81, 167
 Ulbricht, Walter, 26, 87, 106, 108, 110, 123, 127, 128, 185
 Union of South Africa, 166, 174
 United Arab Republic, 76
 United Nations, 21, 25-6, 40, 49, 60, 66-72, 77-8, 105, 121, 134, 140-42, 144, 147, 165, 167-68, 173, 200-02
 UN Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War 101, 136
 UN Atomic Energy Commission, 141
 Unjust wars, 38-41
 U. S. bases, 172-73
 U. S. imperialists, 116, 165

 Versailles Treaty, 86
 Veto, 66-9, 72, 141
 Vienna, 8, 34, 81, 94, 112, 116, 134, 139, 198
 Viet Nam, 6, 38, 40, 69, 167-68, 173
 Volga Germans, 167
 Vyshinski, Andrei, 56

 War psychosis, 109, 115
 Wars, 37-41
 Warsaw Pact, 173
 Wars of national liberation, 38-41
 Wartime alliance, 27

 West Berlin, status of, 111-12
 West German army, 92-3
 West Germany, 22, 36-7, 46
 Western European Union, 95
 "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable," 117
 Whiting, Allen S., 84
 Winter Palace, storming of, 190-92
 Wolfe, Bertram D., 180
 World War II demobilization, 31-3
 World Wars, 38-41

 Yalta Conference and agreements, 22, 46, 86, 90-1, 106, 132-33, 135
 Yugoslavia, 46, 50, 59, 76, 77, 173, 193
 Zorin, Valerian, 58, 153, 199







BOOKS ABOUT SOVIET RUSSIA

PUBLISHED BY PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS

SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE. Robert Loring Allen. A penetrating book by one of the nation's outstanding authorities on Soviet affairs. Its importance is highlighted in an introduction by Erwin D. Canham, editor of the Christian Science Monitor. \$5.00

A HISTORY OF SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. Tien-Feng Cheng. The only up-to-date book on the subject, this work by China's former Minister of Education, is both authoritative and comprehensive. "I doubt if there is any person whose understanding of Sino-Russian relations and their political complications equals that of Dr. Cheng," says John Leighton Stuart, U.S. Ambassador to China until 1952. \$6.00

THE U. S. VERSUS THE U.S.S.R. Robert A. Fearey. An analysis of the conflicting ideologies of two great powers. \$1.00

SOVIET IMAGE OF FUTURE WAR. Raymond L. Garthoff. An evaluation of Russian military thinking and planning by one of the world's top experts on the U.S.S.R. "Dr Garthoff has made a splendid contribution to our understanding of the Soviets. It is a book that should be read by every American who is interested in the future survival of the free world."—General James M. Gavin in the Introduction. \$3.25

CONFORMITY UNDER COMMUNISM. Edward Taborsky. A study of indoctrination techniques in East Europe. The author was an aide to Eduard Benes when the latter was President of Czechoslovakia. \$1.00

THE RISE OF KHRUSHCHEV. Myron Rush. The author unveils in dramatic detail the processes by which Khrushchev has seized much of the despotic power once wielded by Stalin. His study was prepared under the auspices of the Rand Corporation. \$3.25

NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND SOVIET STRATEGY. D. A. Tomasic. Primarily a study of Titoism, this exceedingly important book deals with insurgent movements in Yugoslavia, China, Hungary, and Poland. (\$4.50)

BEHIND THE BAMBOO CURTAIN. A. M. Dunlap. Few Americans have had better opportunities than Dr. Dunlap to observe conditions in China under the Communists. Since a physician has special access to the hearts and minds of a people, he is able to reveal much that has not been released through official sources. \$3.75

IMPERIAL COMMUNISM. Anthony Bouscaren. A comprehensive survey of Soviet strategy and tactics throughout the world. Region by region, country by country, the author shows how Communism is achieving global domination. \$3.75

THE ANATOMY OF TERROR. Published herewith in book form for the first time is the text, as released by the U. S. Department of State, of the extraordinary speech Khrushchev delivered in February 1956 at a closed session of Russia's Communist Party. \$1.00

TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA. Eric L. Fridonoff. A sharp critic of Tito's regime and of American policies toward that regime, the author issues a sharp warning against friendliness toward Yugoslavia. \$3.75

Important Books on Public Affairs

EUROPE VIEWS AMERICA. By Edward W. Chester. A critical evaluation of the ideas of the leading thinkers of Europe since World War I. Among the subjects touched upon are national character, politics, isolationism, religion, education, and culture. Foreword by Mark A. May. \$4.50

LIVING OVERSEAS. By Louise Winfield. A handbook of advice and information for families going abroad—particularly the families of government officials, business executives and military personnel. Introduction by Harlan Cleveland. \$4.50

NEW FRONTIERS FOR AMERICAN YOUTH. By Maurice Albertson, Andrew Rice, and Pauline Birky. Sets forth the general nature and objectives of the Peace Corps, how to become eligible for participation in its program, etc. \$4.50

FROM THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE TO PEARL HARBOR. David J. Lu. A study of Japan's entry into World War II. Based upon intelligence reports and official documents. Foreword by Herbert Feis. \$4.75

PAN AMERICA IN CRISIS. William Manger. A critique by a former Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Introduction by Alberto Lleras Camargo. \$3.25

NORTH AFRICA: NATIONALISM TO NATIONHOOD. Lorna Hahn. In calling attention to the significance of this book, President John F. Kennedy stated in an introduction written before he became the nation's Chief Executive: "It stands unique as an effort to draw together the pattern of events in all of North African nationalism seen in its proper context." \$6.00

THE CHALLENGE OF COEXISTENCE. Milton Kovner. A study of Soviet economic diplomacy affecting American policies. \$3.25

GANDHI ON WORLD AFFAIRS. Paul F. Power. An appraisal of views about international and intercultural relations relevant to present day affairs. \$3.25

RACE RELATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Robert S. Browne. A provocative monograph about contemporary tensions. \$1.00

THE STRATEGY OF TRUTH. Wilson P. Dizard. The story of the varied and far flung activities of the U.S. Information Agency. Foreword by Erwin Canham. \$4.50

AMBASSADORS ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY. E. Wilder Spaulding. An informal history. "It is a study of one of the important problems in the conduct of American foreign relations, written by a professional who has devoted many years of service in the Department of State."—Elmer Plischke. \$5.00

EGYPT'S LIBERATION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION. By Premire Gamal Abdul Nasser. Frank and somewhat startling views that have disconcerted the western world. Introduction by Dorothy Thompson. \$2.50

REBIRTH OF AFRICAN CIVILIZATION. By Chancellor Williams. A member of the faculty of Howard University relates what Africans think of themselves, their culture, their social and economic problems, etc. Particular attention is given to the role of education. "If the book is as widely read throughout Africa (and, one hopes, in America) it may become one of the most influential of the decade."—Library Journal. \$6.00